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Abstract 
 Starting in the 2010-11, administrators at the Fountain Lake School District implemented 
the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), a merit pay program designed to financially reward 
all school employees with year-end bonuses primarily for significant improvements in student 
achievement. At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school year, over $800,000 in bonuses were 
distributed to school personnel. Because of the substantial investment in this program, it was 
important to determine how the CPIP impacted the school counselors, teachers, and students of 
Fountain Lake, to see if any of the potential benefits of a merit pay program were realized.  
 The results from this evaluation provided little evidence that this program had a positive 
impact at Fountain Lake. Based on interview responses, school counselors noted that they now 
had less time with students because of the CPIP, and were mixed in their opinions about whether 
or not this program was beneficial for students. Teachers responded to surveys at two different 
time periods—before and after they received their year-end bonuses and performance ratings—
and noted that they did not support the use of merit pay in general or the CPIP specifically. The 
teachers also did not think the program impacted their approach to teaching, their interactions 
with their peers, or that the CPIP had a positive impact on students. Further, after they received 
their bonuses, the attitudes of teachers did not change. 
 While Fountain Lake students did show significant growth on a national assessment, this 
growth could not be directly attributed to the adoption of the CPIP. However, on the Arkansas 
assessments, Fountain Lake students showed growth equal to or less than a demographically and 
academically matched comparison group. Thus, a reasonable conclusion from this evaluation is 
that the CPIP did not have a positive impact on student achievement, and it did not appear to 
have a positive impact on the counselors and teachers at Fountain Lake.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 In January of 2009, administrators and school board members from the Fountain Lake 
School District in Hot Springs, Arkansas contacted the Office for Education Policy (OEP) to 
provide them with information about the potential benefits of implementing a merit pay program. 
The purpose for this meeting was to determine if the Fountain Lake School District could 
capitalize on the benefits of such a program while avoiding the potential negative consequences 
that are often associated with merit pay. Ultimately, Fountain Lake officials sought to emphasize 
an increased focus on student achievement within the district, while also rewarding teachers and 
school employees with substantial bonuses for achieving this goal. School officials also sought to 
make their compensation system more competitive with surrounding school districts as a way of 
attracting and retaining the best teachers in the area.  
 As a result of this initial meeting, Fountain Lake administrators chose to put into practice 
several new programs during the 2009-10 school year to “pilot” some of the potential changes 
that would be made if a merit pay program was implemented. For example, students began to 
take the Northwest Evaluation Association (NWEA) computer-adaptive assessments, which 
would be used in the Fountain Lake merit pay program as one of the primary means of 
measuring student growth. Further, teachers were given “report cards” during the school year 
that clearly outlined their goals for student learning for the duration of the school year, while also 
summarizing how their students performed on the NWEA and Arkansas-specific assessments 
(such as the Arkansas Benchmark and End-of-Course examinations). 
 Based on what was learned during this pilot period, administrators at Fountain Lake 
chose to implement a full-scale merit pay program during the 2010-2011 school year, in large 
part due to the strong level of teacher support for this reward system (90% of certified staff and 
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96% of classified staff voted in favor of this program). This merit pay program, the Cobra Pride 
Incentive Program (CPIP), provided bonuses to all school employees (not just teachers) 
primarily for substantial gains in student achievement.
1
 At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school 
year, over $860,000 in CPIP bonuses were distributed to school personnel, including over 
$530,000 in bonuses for teachers of core subjects (math, science, English/language arts, and 
social studies) and over $150,000 in bonuses for non-core teachers/employees (art, music, and 
physical education teachers, school counselors, etc.).   
 Because of the substantial financial investment into this program, it seems particularly 
important to determine if this program was successful at reaching its goals. Thus, the purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the extent to which the CPIP impacted student achievement, to determine 
if this type of compensation scheme is a potential option for school leaders looking to increase 
the overall level of achievement for their students. While the primary focus of this study is the 
program’s impact on student achievement, I will also assess how this program influenced its 
direct participants – the teachers, counselors, and employees of Fountain Lake. In this section, I 
first begin with an overview of what merit pay is, identify why administrators might consider this 
type of compensation scheme, and summarize the potential positive and negative consequences 
often associated with merit pay.  
Problem Statement 
 At present, the vast majority of schools in the United States pay teachers according to a 
single salary schedule, where teachers get higher salaries based on the degrees they have attained 
and the number of years they have been teaching (Podgursky, 2006).  The rationale for this type 
of compensation scheme is straightforward; it is transparent and easy to understand, and it avoids 
                                                     
1
 The exact details of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program, including a full description of the 
manner in which merit pay bonuses were calculated, will be provided in Chapter 3. 
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some of the problems of earlier compensation models where female teachers were paid less than 
males, and African American teachers were paid less than Caucasian teachers (Podgursky, 2002; 
Protsik, 1995). Further, Protsik (1995) suggested that the single salary schedule encourages 
teachers to seek out additional education, and allows all teachers, regardless of gender, race, or 
grade/subject taught, to have an equal chance at earning a pay increase. Thus, there does appear 
to be a valid justification for paying teachers according to this uniform schedule.  
 However, in recent years, there has been a growing debate centered on whether or not the 
current system is an adequate and effective way of compensating teachers. There are two basic 
challenges to the single salary system that are often cited. First, researchers have suggested that 
teachers should not receive higher salaries simply by attaining advanced degrees, additional 
licensure/certification, or by gaining years of experience, as there is little evidence to suggest that 
these characteristics are strongly related to the overall effectiveness of a teacher (Goldhaber & 
Brewer, 1997; Hanushek, 1986; Harris & Sass, 2009; Jepsen, 2005; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 
2005). This point is perhaps best summarized by Hanushek (1986), who stated, “The results are 
startlingly consistent in finding no strong evidence that student ratios, teacher education, or 
teacher experience have an expected positive effect on student achievement” (p.1162). Using a 
national dataset, Goldhaber and Brewer (1997) found that years of experience and degrees 
obtained were not statistically significantly related to teacher effectiveness, nor was teacher 
certification. Similarly, using student-level data for 1
st
 and 4
th
 grade students paired with teacher, 
school administrator, and principal questionnaires, Jepsen (2005) found that teacher education, 
years of experience, and certification were also not associated with higher levels of student 
achievement.  
4 
 
 Using a large, longitudinal dataset from North Carolina that included ten years of student 
achievement data linked to individual teachers that also included information about the teacher 
(such as degrees attained, years taught, etc.), Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007a) found that 
several key teacher characteristics did, in fact, impact student achievement. For example, the 
authors noted that there was clear evidence more years of experience contributed to higher levels 
of student achievement  (especially within the first few years of teaching), and that teacher 
licensure also positively contributed to increases in student learning. However, the authors also 
found that there did not appear to be a relationship between advanced degrees and student 
achievement. In a similar paper, the authors also report findings consistent with their prior 
conclusions: There did appear to be a relationship between student achievement and various 
certifications and licenses, but advanced degrees did not appear to be predictive of increased 
student achievement (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007b).  
  While the lack of consistent findings in support of providing salary increases for 
additional degrees or years of experience merits further consideration, perhaps the more 
important concern cited about the single salary schedule is that it does nothing to encourage 
exceptional work or promote effectiveness. This is because of the constraints of the current 
system: If two teachers have the same degrees and have taught for the same amount of time, then 
they will receive the same salary, regardless of how good of a job they do in the classroom. As 
Podgursky (2002) noted, “The current salary schedule rewards a teacher who performs poorly at 
the same rate as a hard-working, highly effective teacher. Hence weak teachers have the same 
financial incentives to remain employed in a district as do the effective teachers” (p. 4). Further, 
for those teachers that do exceptional work in the classroom, there is no flexibility in the single 
salary schedule to provide that teacher with additional compensation, as a way to both reward 
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and retain that teacher. As a result, many of the best teachers—those with alternative 
professional options—leave teaching altogether; an estimated one-third of all new teachers leave 
the profession within the first five years (Hanushek, 2007).  
 The best teachers leaving the classroom is clearly the opposite of what school 
administrators and policymakers want, especially because of how much the very best teachers 
impact student learning. For example, Hanushek (1992) estimated that the “difference in annual 
achievement growth between having a good and having a bad teacher can be more than one 
grade-level equivalent in test performance” (p. 107). Rockoff  (2004) reported similar findings, 
noting that for every one standard deviation increase in teacher quality (as measured using a 
longitudinal dataset that assessed teacher impacts on student learning over time), student 
achievement increased by 0.1 standard deviations. In other words, the better the teacher, the 
more students learn.  
 While these findings make intuitive sense—that better teachers have a greater impact on 
student learning—they perhaps further reinforce how much the single salary schedule limits the 
ability of school leaders to provide the best teachers with larger salaries to reward the work they 
do. Further, the single salary system offers no flexibility to school leaders to allow them to use 
salary as a tool to ensure that the best teachers are staying in the classroom. What options then do 
school leaders have to reward and retain the top-performing teachers? Hanushek (2007) 
suggested the following: 
“The key to an effective teacher salary program must be funding that follows 
those who improve student performance. If the objective is improving student 
achievement, there is no substitute for policies that directly relate to student 
outcomes” (p. 581).  
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Put simply, the author contends that in order for a salary system to be effective (that is, the only 
way for a compensation system to be effective), the most dollars should be given to those 
teachers that have the greatest impact on student achievement.  
 This concept, commonly referred to as merit pay, is becoming more and more common in 
education. Sparked by President Obama’s Race to the Top competition, states were (and can be) 
awarded millions of dollars for, among other things, implementing some form of merit-based 
compensation. In the end, the goal of the Obama administration is simple: encourage states to 
implement policies that recognize and reward successes in the classroom to help raise the level 
of education that children receive.  
 The term “merit pay” can be defined in a number of ways, but at their core, these 
programs provide financial incentives, usually in the form of end-of-year bonuses, to teachers 
(and in some cases, all school employees) to both reward exceptional classroom performance and 
to encourage a teacher to stay in the classroom.
2
 In their seminal systematic review of how merit 
pay programs have impacted student achievement, Podgursky and Springer (2007) established 
the following definition of merit pay: 
“Merit-based pay rewards individual teachers, groups of teachers, or schools on 
any number of factors, including student performance, classroom observations, 
and teacher portfolios. Merit-based pay is a reward system that hinges on student 
                                                     
2
 It should be noted that while the term merit pay generally refers to a system in which teachers 
and school personnel receive bonuses based on some measure of effectiveness, there is not a set 
format or structure to which these programs adhere. That is, each individual merit pay program is 
structured differently, and because of this, it is important to consider these differences when 
evaluating the impacts of such programs. The myriad ways these programs can be structured will 
be outlined in Chapter 2, when I summarize the different programs across the United States that 
have been evaluated for their impacts on student achievement.  
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outcomes attributed to a particular teacher or group of teachers rather than on 
“inputs” such as skills or knowledge” (p.912). 
 The key component of this definition is that merit pay programs compensate teachers in a 
manner quite different than the current single salary schedule. That is, these programs generally 
do not provide rewards for additional degrees or years of experience (inputs), as does the current 
system; rather, under a merit-based system, teachers earn more money based on, among other 
things, how well their students perform on measures of student learning (outputs). 
 The support for these types of compensation programs is growing as policymakers and 
school leaders begin to recognize the importance of accountability in the classroom. For 
example, while they noted that the evidence is limited in terms of a prescription for the “best” 
way to structure a merit pay program, Podgursky and Springer (2007) concluded that more of 
these programs should be attempted and existing programs should be expanded due to their 
potential impacts on student achievement. Further, based on multiple evaluations of merit pay 
programs in Israel, Lavy (2002; 2009) found evidence to support the use of merit pay, as these 
programs had positive impacts on student achievement and minimal negative impacts on 
teachers. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) also reported similar findings from their 
evaluation of a merit pay program in India, where student achievement was improved through 
the use of performance incentives. Thus, these programs, and many that will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, appear to be a promising alternative to the current compensation scheme, as there is 
reason to believe that such programs could have a positive impact on student achievement. 
 The guiding theory behind how merit pay might impact teachers, and as a result, impact 
student achievement, is fairly straightforward. Barnett and Ritter (2008) suggested that such 
programs should: 
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 Motivate teachers to put forth increased effort, or become more innovative in their 
teaching approach; 
 Collaborate more with their peers to improve student learning; 
 Bring new people into the teaching profession who are confident in their ability to impact 
student achievement (because they are entering into a system with a high level of 
accountability); 
 Impact the types of teachers that stay in the profession: While the most effective teachers 
would earn large rewards, the least effective would not, resulting in a natural selection 
whereby the best teachers continue to teach (because they are being recognized and 
rewarded) and the worst teachers exit the profession (because their work is not being 
rewarded)  
 These potential outcomes can be grouped into two general categories. First, merit pay 
programs can have a motivation effect on teachers and school employees. That is, the incentive to 
earn extra money in the form of merit pay bonuses might motivate teachers to seek out additional 
training or professional development, or collaborate more with other teachers to improve their 
work in the classroom. Or, the opportunity to earn bonuses might simply motivate a teacher to 
put forth more effort in his or her work. In either case, the incentives provided to teachers are 
perfectly aligned with the needs of the student; the more the teacher improves, or the more effort 
the teacher invests into the teaching process, the better the educational experience for the 
teacher’s students.  
 On a broader scale, merit pay programs can also result in a composition effect, whereby 
the incentives offered attract new professionals with high ability and low risk-aversion into the 
teaching profession (Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, & Choi, 2008). In other words, these new 
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teachers will have minimal reservations about being held accountable for their work (since they 
are entering into a system with a high level of accountability in place) because they are confident 
in their abilities to impact student learning. Further, because the most effective teachers are 
earning additional money, and the least effective teachers are not earning anything (in terms of 
bonuses), it may be that the best teachers stay in teaching, the least effective teachers leave the 
profession, and a new group of professionals enter into the classroom. Here again, as teachers 
benefit, so do the students, as this type of effect will ultimately result in students only being 
taught by the best and brightest teachers.      
 Despite these potential positive outcomes, there is still a great deal of debate about, and 
opposition to, the use of merit pay. Central to this debate is the question of whether or not these 
programs actually have a positive impact on student achievement, a topic that will be discussed 
at length in Chapter 2. Beyond the impact on student achievement, there is also concern that 
these programs can have a negative impact on teachers, students, and the overall culture of a 
school. For example, Kohn (1993) argued that merit pay bonuses can actually be punishments 
instead of rewards, since teachers will have to constantly worry about being “caught” for doing 
something wrong. Further, the author suggested that since some teachers could earn a bonus, 
while others might not, that there is the potential for the damaging of relationships between 
teachers, since teachers might feel the need to compete with their peers (Kohn, 1993).  
 The opposition to merit pay programs can perhaps best be summarized by a statement 
from the National Education Association (NEA), the largest teachers association in the United 
States. On the organization’s website, the NEA states the following: 
“Merit pay systems force teachers to compete, rather than cooperate. They create 
a disincentive for teachers to share information and teaching techniques. This is 
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especially true because there is always a limited pool of money for merit pay. 
Thus, the number-one way teachers learn their craft—learning from their 
colleagues—is effectively shut down. If you think we have turnover problems in 
teaching now, wait until new teachers have no one to turn to.” 
  The concern that teachers will stop collaborating with others, and in turn compete for a 
finite amount of bonus money, is a commonly cited problem of merit pay programs (Goldhaber 
et al., 2008). There is also a non-trivial concern that merit pay is ill-suited for use in schools, as it 
is difficult to truly measure the individual impacts of teachers on student achievement 
(Goldhaber et al., 2008; Murnane & Cohen, 1986). This is because there are many factors that 
could impact how a student performs on a standardized test on a given day (for example, the 
child is sick, had a bad morning at home, etc.), and if a teacher’s “effectiveness” is measured 
simply by measures of student achievement, then perhaps the true impact a teacher has on his or 
her students is not being accurately captured.   
 It may also be true that scores from standardized tests are not true reflections of what a 
student knows, or how much a student has learned over the course of the school year. Teachers 
are expected to convey a great deal of knowledge and skills to their students, and much of this 
information may not be addressed on these tests. However, if a teacher’s “merit” is based on how 
students perform on such tests, then it may be true that teachers primarily focus their attention 
simply on those skills addressed on these tests, commonly referred to as “teaching to the test” 
(Lazear, 2006).   
 In addition to using test scores to capture a teacher’s effectiveness, merit pay programs 
can also be designed to use other, more subjective measures, to evaluate a teacher (for example, 
an evaluation by a principal). However, these measures are not without their flaws either; as 
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Elam (1989) noted, teachers may be concerned that these evaluations will be unfair and will lack 
objectivity. Thus, despite the potential positive impacts of merit pay, there is also the potential 
for a number of negative outcomes as well.  
 Beyond the impact that merit pay programs have on teachers, be it positive or negative, 
this type of reform strategy might also have the potential to impact the jobs of school counselors, 
and as a result, the students they serve. This is because school counselors have a number of 
primary responsibilities, such as designing student academic programs, interpreting 
psychological testing, counseling at-risk students, meeting with parents/teachers/principals about 
student needs, etc. (American School Counselor Association, 2005). However, in schools where 
merit pay is used, school counselor time may shift to other areas of focus. For example, it may be 
that school counselors assume the role of building or district testing coordinators because of the 
increased focus on standardized assessments used in the evaluation of teachers and school 
personnel (Burnham & Jackson, 2000). In fact, it appears that this is becoming more common; 
Dollarhide and Lemberger (2006) found in a national survey of school counselors in schools with 
an accountability system in place (such as a merit pay program), that 29.2% of respondents said 
they serve as the testing coordinator for their district (though it is unclear if this number is 
significantly different than what would be expected in schools without merit pay). 
 In schools with merit pay, there might also be lower motivation on the part of teachers to 
cede class time with their students to school counseling activities, because students may lose 
valuable class time learning skills or concepts that may be covered on standardized assessments 
(Brown, Galassi, & Akos, 2004; Dollarhide & Lemberger, 2006). Because of this increased focus 
on preparation for tests, it may be that school counselors are unable to provide other important 
services to these students, such as focusing on students’ social and/or emotional needs.  
12 
 
 The shift in school counselor roles, coupled with the decreased emphasis on school 
counseling itself, both may result in students’ failing to have their social, emotional, and 
academic needs completely met. The American School Counselor Association (ASCA) (2005) 
recommends that 80% of a school counselor’s time should be spent working directly with 
students, including providing direct 1:1 counseling services. In a school with a merit pay 
program in place where there is a greater emphasis on testing and accountability, it may be that 
counselors are put in a position where they are not able to provide these services because of the 
shift in their job responsibilities to more test-related activities.  
 The goal of this paper then is to evaluate the extent to which a merit pay program, the 
Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), impacted the counselors, teachers, and students in the 
Fountain Lake School District in the first year in which the program was implemented (the 2010-
11 academic year). This study is important first and foremost because it adds timely information 
to the ever-growing debate about whether or not these programs are effective at raising student 
achievement, and whether these programs are effective at identifying and rewarding the best and 
brightest teachers. While much of the limited research on merit pay has focused on impacts on 
student achievement (as I will show in Chapter 2), this study also addresses whether or not 
school counselor roles have shifted as a result of this program, and looks in-depth at how the 
teachers at Fountain Lake responded to this program. Thus, this research can contribute to the 
existing research on this topic as a way of better understanding the overall impact these programs 
have on the schools in which they are implemented.  
Research Questions 
 This evaluation of the impact of the CPIP was guided by the following research questions 
and sub-questions: 
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1) Counselor Impacts: Did the roles and responsibilities of school counselors at Fountain 
Lake shift as a result of the CPIP, and if so, how? 
a. Did school counselors report that they were asked to perform tasks outside the 
scope of the ASCA counseling model, such as coordinating test administrations or 
watching classes while teachers were occupied with test administration? 
b. Did school counselors report that they spent less time providing direct counseling 
services to students at Fountain Lake as a result of the CPIP? 
c. Did school counselors report that teachers and administrators were less inclined to 
support counseling activities as a direct result of the CPIP? 
2) Teacher Impacts: How did teachers at Fountain Lake respond to the implementation of 
the CPIP? 
a. In general, what were teacher impressions of the program: Did teachers support 
the program? Did they think it was fair? Did they think the program would 
accurately capture their overall “effectiveness”? 
b. Did teachers report that they were motivated to work harder, seek out additional 
training, or collaborate more with their fellow teachers as a result of the CPIP? 
c. How did teacher attitudes and perceptions about the program and the impact it 
had at Fountain Lake change after they received a bonus? 
d. Did the teachers that were rated as highly effective under the CPIP have different 
attitudes and perceptions about the program then those teachers who were rated as 
the least effective? 
3) Student Impacts: What impact did the CPIP have on student achievement at Fountain 
Lake? 
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a. How did Fountain Lake students perform on a nationally administered assessment 
compared to what would have been expected based on their starting score and 
grade? 
b. How did Fountain Lake students perform on Arkansas Comprehensive Testing, 
Assessment, and Accountability Program (ACTAAP) assessments as compared to 
a matched comparison group of students from neighboring districts? 
  
 The first research question and sub-questions provide insight into how school counselors 
at Fountain Lake were affected by the implementation of the CPIP, and how school counselors in 
other districts might also be impacted as a result of the use of merit pay. The results from these 
questions can show the extent to which counselors’ roles at Fountain Lake have shifted, if at all, 
and if the school counselors have less time to work with students because of the increased 
emphasis on testing and accountability. If there is evidence that a shift has occurred, it might be 
that administrators at Fountain Lake need to consider ways of ensuring that counselors are not 
hindered in their abilities to meet the social, emotional, and educational needs of their students. I 
conducted interviews with school counselors at Fountain Lake to ascertain how they were 
impacted by the CPIP.  
 The second group of research questions and sub-questions provides valuable information 
about how teachers responded to the implementation of a merit pay program, and interestingly, 
how these attitudes changed after experiencing a full year of the program, including receiving an 
end-of-year performance bonus. Here, I administered surveys to teachers at the conclusion of the 
2010-11 school year, and again in the Fall of the 2011-12 school year (after teachers received 
their bonuses at the start of the school year). The design of my survey administration, which will 
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be outlined in more detail in Chapter 4, was set up such that I could match teacher responses on 
each of the survey administrations, allowing me to see how individual teacher attitudes and 
perceptions changed after a period of time. This design also allowed me to determine if the 
teachers that view the CPIP the most favorably were also those teachers that received the highest 
bonus, and vice versa. In other words, we can see if the program resulted in the aforementioned 
motivation effects (i.e. motivated the teachers to work harder, collaborate more with other 
teachers, seek out additional training or professional development, etc.), and if teachers 
responded differently to this program based on their overall level of measured effectiveness 
under the CPIP. This last point is important, because if the “best” teachers support the program 
(and are thus receiving the highest bonuses), and the least effective teachers do not support the 
program (and are thus receiving the lowest bonuses), then it may be true that this program could 
result in the long-term composition effects that were previously discussed, where the most 
effective teachers continue to teach and the least effective teachers leave the profession. 
 Finally, the third set of research questions and sub-questions addresses perhaps the most 
important outcome of merit pay programs, the extent to which they impact student achievement. 
Here, I assessed the impact of the CPIP on student achievement in two ways. First, I sought to 
understand how Fountain Lake students performed on the nationally administered Northwest 
Evaluation Association’s (NWEA) assessments compared to a national norming population. 
Here again, more detail will be provided in Chapter 4, but very briefly, I could determine the 
extent to which Fountain Lake student performance exceeded what would be expected based on 
a student’s grade and starting test score. For example, if a 4th grade student started the school 
year with a score of 200 in math, based on the norming population of similar students, I could 
see if that student’s year-end performance met or exceeded what is typical for similar students 
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(based on their grade and starting test score) across the nation. If Fountain Lake students did 
consistently outperform typical levels of growth, it may be that the CPIP did positively impact 
the overall focus on achievement in the district.  
 I also assessed how students at Fountain Lake performed on the ACTAAP assessments 
using a matched comparison group of students. For this set of analyses, I matched each Fountain 
Lake student to a student in a neighboring school district on such indicators as grade, gender, 
race, free and reduced lunch (FRL) status, and previous levels of student achievement. In this 
way, I could control for demographic variables that may influence achievement levels, creating a 
comparison group that was identical to the group of Fountain Lake students on all observable 
measures. Because of the similarity of students in these two groups, any differences (after the 
implementation of the program) observed between the student groups can likely be attributed to 
the impact of the CPIP.
3
  
 For all of the research questions, when applicable, I disaggregated these analyses by 
grade level and school level (elementary, middle, or high school), to determine if the CPIP had a 
differential impact on certain groups of students or teachers more so than others.   
Paper Organization 
 This dissertation is divided into six chapters. In Chapter 2, I provide a systematic 
summary of current and relevant research that addresses the impact of merit pay programs on 
teachers and students. This chapter is followed by a comprehensive overview of the Cobra Pride 
Incentive Program, including an in-depth description of the criteria used to calculate bonuses for 
                                                     
3
 While the results from my analysis of student performance on the NWEA assessments will 
show how Fountain Lake students performed on this national assessment relative to a national 
norming sample, any significant gains in improvement cannot be directly attributed to the impact 
of the CPIP; these results are merely correlational. However, because of the matching procedure 
used in the ACTAAP analyses, any differences observed between Fountain Lake and comparison 
students allow for inferences to be made about the causal impacts of the CPIP.  
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different groups of teachers and employees. In Chapter 4, I provide a summary of the 
methodology used to answer the aforementioned research questions, followed by a summary of 
the results of the accompanying analyses in Chapter 5. Finally, in Chapter 6 I summarize the 
findings of this evaluation, and conclude with a discussion of what the findings mean for future 
merit pay programs. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 With the increase in prevalence of merit pay programs across the United States, there is a 
growing interest in understanding what impact, if any, these programs have on teachers and 
school personnel, and perhaps most importantly, the impact these programs have on the students 
that attend schools utilizing this type of compensation scheme. However, one consistent theme 
that emerges from a review of existing literature on merit pay is the notable lack of quality 
research with a focus on evaluating the impacts of such programs.  
 There are a number of reasons why limited research exists on the effect that merit pay has 
on schools. Murnane and Cohen (1986) noted that merit pay programs typically do not persist for 
extended periods of time due to the considerable financial costs associated with providing 
bonuses to teachers and school employees, and because merit pay programs typically face a great 
deal of opposition from teacher groups who question the fairness of compensating personnel 
based primarily on measures of student achievement. Ballou (2001) also cited financial issues as 
one of the primary determining factors for terminating these programs, and stated that 
administrators in unionized school systems likely face considerable difficulty making these 
programs last due to the opposition from teachers, and have little incentive to even undertake 
these often unpopular reform efforts in the first place.  
 For what reasons are merit pay programs unpopular, especially for teachers and school 
employees who will be eligible to receive additional compensation in the form of year-end 
bonuses? As Elam (1989) noted, much of the opposition from teachers stems from their concern 
about the fairness and objectivity of evaluations about their performance used in the 
determination of merit pay bonuses. If teachers are concerned that the bonus system being used 
is not based on fair measures of their actual performance, then it makes intuitive sense that their 
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support for this type of compensation scheme would be minimal. Additionally, teacher support 
may be low due to the fact that up to this point, merit pay bonuses have not been sufficiently 
large enough to outweigh the perceived risk associated with having the performance of teachers 
scrutinized under a merit pay system (Eberts, 2002). In other words, teachers may not support a 
system where the benefits of receiving a bonus are outweighed by the perceived negative aspects 
of being subjected to rigorous evaluations of their performance, especially if the evaluation itself 
is thought to be unfair.   
 Thus, despite the strong push by education officials and policymakers to develop and 
implement merit pay programs, there are a limited number of programs that have actually been 
put into practice across the country, and fewer still that have persisted long enough to evaluate 
the extent to which they have affected, positively or negatively, the teachers, school personnel, 
and students directly impacted by such programs. Because of this, my evaluation of the impact of 
the CPIP on 1) school counselor roles and behaviors; 2) teacher attitudes, perceptions, and 
behaviors; and 3) student achievement is highly important and relevant, as this evaluation can 
add to the limited pool of research on this topic. With this evaluation, I aim to help fill the 
existing research gap so that school leaders, teachers, parents, and policymakers have a greater 
understanding of the costs and benefits associated with the implementation of a merit pay 
program.  
Literature Review Process 
Selection Criteria 
 To provide context for how school personnel might respond to the implementation of the 
CPIP, and to assess what types of achievement gains might (or might not) be expected as a result 
of the CPIP, I sought to identify research that addressed the impact merit pay programs have on 
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teachers, school personnel, and students. In order to ensure that my review of existing research 
was as comprehensive as possible, I began my review by developing criteria to help focus my 
search of merit pay research. The criteria used for this literature review were based on the 
frameworks employed by the Campbell Collaboration, an organization that aims to prepare, 
maintain, and disseminate systematic reviews in such fields as education, crime and justice, and 
social welfare.
4
 The purpose of the Campbell Collaboration guidelines for identifying research, 
and thus the guidelines used in this review, was to systematically identify all current and relevant 
high-quality research on the topic of merit pay. 
 For these purposes then, the guidelines used to identify merit pay research adhered to the 
following search criteria: 
 Research conducted within the previous ten years (since July of 2001); 
 Focused on merit pay programs that were implemented in the United States; 
 Focused on merit pay programs implemented in public schools (including public charter 
schools), not private schools ; 
 Focused on merit pay in K-12 education; 
 Must be focused on merit pay programs in which teachers/school personnel earn year-end 
bonuses based on some evaluation of their performance; 
 The research includes an evaluation component specifically aimed at measuring the 
impact of merit pay on teachers, school personnel (including school counselors), and/or 
students. 
 There were two reasons for limiting this review to only include research conducted 
within the previous ten years. First, previous systematic reviews on merit pay, most notably the 
                                                     
4
 More information on the Campbell Collaboration can be accessed at: 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/ 
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review conducted by Podgursky and Springer (2007), identified only two research articles (that 
focused on the same merit pay program) completed prior to 2001 in which the use of merit pay 
was evaluated (Clotfelter & Ladd, 1996; Ladd, 1999).
5
  
 Further, K-12 education in the last ten years has become much more focused on 
accountability and evaluation of teacher performance than in years prior, much of this as a direct 
result of the mandates established under the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. These 
mandates have resulted in a greater number of merit pay programs being established, and have 
also resulted in more of these programs being subjected to rigorous evaluations of their impacts 
on schools. Thus, in the past ten years, the use of merit pay in schools has become much more 
common across the United States.  
 This review was also limited to only include evaluations of programs in the United 
States. There have been a number of evaluations of merit pay outside of the United States that 
were not included in this review; for example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) assessed 
the impact of a merit pay program  in India using a rigorous experimental design, and found that 
the program positively impacted student achievement. Lavy (2002; 2009) also found similar 
findings in separate evaluations of merit pay programs in Israel. Further, Glewwe, Ilias, and 
Kremer (2003) evaluated a large-scale merit pay program in Kenya, and found that the program 
resulted in increased passage rates on district exams (though the authors cautioned that these 
gains may have been the result of teachers “gaming” the system). Thus, while this international 
research does provide strong evidence in support of merit pay, the education environments in 
these countries are likely significantly different than that of schools in the United States. Because 
                                                     
5
 While these articles are not formally included in this review, it should be noted that the authors 
found that this particular merit pay program, implemented in Dallas schools, did have a positive 
impact on student achievement. 
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of this, it seems reasonable to only use research from merit pay programs in the United States to 
provide context for how the CPIP might affect schools in the Fountain Lake School District. 
 I also chose to restrict my literature review to only include reviews of merit pay programs 
implemented in public schools (including public charter schools) instead of private schools,
6
 and 
only research focused on merit pay programs implemented in K-12 education settings. Similar to 
my restriction of only including merit pay programs in the United States due to the differences in 
education environments, I also did not include merit pay programs implemented in private 
schools due to inherent differences between the private and public school sector.
7
 Further, I did 
not include research focused on the use of merit pay at the college or university level, nor did I 
include research focused on the use of such programs in the medical or business professions. 
Again, the goal of this review was to identify research that most closely reflected the education 
environment of the Fountain Lake School District in which the CPIP was implemented.  
 One important consideration for this review was that all research should be focused on 
merit pay programs in which teachers/school personnel earned year-end bonuses based on some 
annual evaluation of their performance, including (but not limited to) measures of how individual 
teachers specifically impacted student achievement, school-wide achievement gains for 
employees such as school counselors who do not directly impact student achievement, or end-of-
year evaluations by a principal, regular classroom observations, etc. Recall, the abbreviated 
definition of merit pay used in this evaluation comes from Podgursky and Springer (2007), in 
                                                     
6
 However, I did include research in which the analysis focused on merit pay programs in both 
public and private schools at a broader level, as I will show at a later point in this chapter. 
Research was not included only if the merit pay program under review was solely based in 
private schools.   
7
 For example, private school teachers often do not receive tenure in the same manner as public 
school teachers, and in many cases, private school teachers are not compensated according to the 
traditional salary schedule. 
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which the authors stated that, “Merit-based pay rewards individual teachers, groups of teachers, 
or schools on any number of factors, including student performance, classroom observations, and 
teacher portfolios.” (p.912). Evaluations of performance could vary by program for this review, 
as could the exact structure of the individual merit pay programs.  For example, some merit pay 
programs provide rewards only to teachers of core subjects, whereas other programs financially 
reward all employees in a school. In some programs, bonuses are fixed (where a teacher either 
earns a bonus of $3,000, or nothing at all) or continuous (where a teacher could earn any amount 
up to $3,000), and bonuses can either be distributed to individual personnel based on individual 
performance, or the same bonus can be given to all teachers based on the performance of the 
school as a whole. Programs might also be structured in a zero-sum fashion, such that only a 
limited number of teachers earn a bonus (such as the top ten teachers in a school), whereas other 
programs are specifically designed to ensure that everyone in a school could benefit financially 
under the program. In all of these cases, the exact structure of the program differs, but at their 
core these programs are designed to provide financial rewards to school personnel based on some 
measure of their performance each year, and all would still be included in this review. 
 This also means that programs under which personnel can earn additional money for non-
performance based activities, such as programs in which teachers earn an annual bonus simply 
for completing additional professional development activities, would not be included in this 
literature review.  For example, this review does not include any evaluations of career ladder 
programs despite the fact that these programs are often associated with merit pay. Briefly, in 
career ladder programs such as those used currently in Arizona and previously in Missouri 
schools, teachers are/were able to receive supplementary pay for meeting certain performance 
criteria. These criteria can include extra teaching work or participating in professional 
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development activities, and often also include meeting some form of tenure requirement. Thus, 
while teachers are rewarded under these programs for meeting performance criteria, the criteria 
used in these programs are not inherently focused on capturing the impact these teachers have on 
their students on an annual basis. Put differently, teachers in career ladder programs are doing 
extra work for extra money, but their extra work is not evaluated for quality or impact on student 
achievement.  
 Finally, one of the primary goals of this review was to identify high-quality research 
specifically aimed at evaluating the impact of merit pay. Because of this, one of the key criteria 
in this review process was to only include research that included an evaluation component, 
where the exact impact of the use of merit pay on some outcome measure (such as student 
achievement, teacher attitudes, etc.) could be directly quantified or measured relative to a 
comparable alternative standard or counterfactual.  This guideline was established to ensure that 
the research used for this review included actual evaluations of merit pay, rather than opinions 
for or against the use of this compensation strategy, or simply discussions about various aspects 
of the use of merit pay.  
Application of Selection Criteria 
 After developing my search criteria, the next step in my review was to apply these criteria 
to a number of different search options to identify as much high-quality merit pay research as 
possible. For the purposes of this review, I used the following search engines and alternative 
search options: 
 University of Arkansas Library Resources: 
o Ebsco Academic Search  
o ProQuest Research Library 
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o Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) 
 Hand searches of academic journals (2001-2011): 
o Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 
o Education Finance and Policy 
o Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 
o Review of Education Research 
o Journal of Public Economics 
 Hand searches of published, non-journal research  (2001-2011): 
o National Bureau of Economic Research 
o National Center on Performance Incentives 
o Rand Corporation 
o Mathematica Policy Research 
o MDRC 
 Podgursky/Springer (2007) systematic review references 
 The primary means by which research was identified was through searches of electronic 
databases through the University of Arkansas library, specifically Ebsco Academic Search, 
ProQuest Research Library, and ERIC.  In these databases, the following search terms were used 
in combination to maximize the identification of relevant merit pay journal articles: “merit pay” 
OR “performance pay” OR “teacher salary” OR “teacher compensation” OR “salary scale” OR 
“teacher incentives” OR “teacher bonus” OR “pay-for-performance” AND “effective*” OR 
“evaluat*” AND “education” NOT “health”. The search terms with asterisks (“effective*” and 
“evaluat*”) were included to identify articles in which effectiveness was measured and/or 
evaluations were conducted, and the search was restricted to only include those articles focused 
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on education. These search parameters resulted in the initial identification of a total of 4,106 
journal articles.
8
 
 In order to ensure that relevant articles on merit pay were not overlooked in my initial 
searches of the aforementioned databases, I also conducted title reviews of every article from the 
previous ten years from five prominent education and economics journals, specifically the 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (JPAM), Education Finance and Policy (EFP), 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis (EEPA), Review of Education Research (RER), and 
Journal of Public Economics (JPE). During this hand review process, my goal was to identify 
any article pertaining to teacher merit pay whatsoever for initial inclusion in this review.  In total, 
48 articles were initially identified for inclusion in this literature review.
9
  
 I also conducted hand searches of articles from the past ten years from various education 
policy research organizations and think-tanks. Organizations included in this search process were 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the National Center on Performance 
Incentives (NCPI), the Rand Corporation, Mathematica Policy Research, and MDRC; all 
relevant organizations were identified through discussions with researchers with significant 
experience in the field of merit pay. The purpose of these searches was to identify research on 
merit pay that had not been published in an academic journal, and thus would not have been 
located in the two previous search processes. These hand reviews resulted in the initial retention 
of an additional 48 articles on merit pay.
10
 
                                                     
8
 Of the initial 4,106 journal articles, 2,281 were obtained from the Ebsco Academic Search 
database, 1,641 from the Proquest Research Library, and 184 from the ERIC database. 
9
 Many of the articles identified in this search were also identified in my search of electronic 
online databases. However, in this initial identification process, I chose to retain all articles that 
were relevant, even if they had already been identified.  
10
 An example of an article identified in this process is the evaluation of the New York City merit 
pay program conducted by Springer and Winters (2009), which was only identified by reviewing 
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 As a final step in this search process, I also initially retained all of the articles used by 
Podgursky and Springer (2007) in their seminal systematic review of merit pay. Here again, the 
goal was to ensure that I was identifying all relevant research on the topic of merit pay, so the 
retention of this research served as a final search option to secure research that may not have 
been identified in the previous search options. In total, there were 96 articles that were initially 
retained for this literature review from the Podgursky and Springer systematic review.
11
  
 For each of the four search options, my review process started with numerous studies, 
and I then went through a series of steps to filter out research that did not meet my 
aforementioned selection criteria or was a duplicate of an article that had already been identified. 
In my search of electronic academic databases, all of the studies identified based on my search 
terms were initially retained, as were all of the articles from the Podgursky and Springer (2007) 
review.  With these articles, as well as with the studies identified in the hand reviews of 
academic journals and non-journal research, I then reviewed the titles of all of the different 
articles; if an article appeared to address the topic of merit pay, it was retained for further review. 
After this title review, all retained articles then went through an abstract review, and then a final 
review of the entire article if the review of the abstract showed that the article still fit all of the 
selection criteria. In the article review, I primarily focused on the methodology employed by the 
authors of each study, to ensure that retained articles were focused on an evaluation of the impact 
of a merit pay program on teachers, students, or school employees, while also adhering to the 
inclusion criteria of this review.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
research published by the NCPI. For these types of articles, if they were subsequently published 
in an academic journal, I would use the journal version of the study in my review.  
11
 Here again, many of the articles identified from this systematic review had already been 
identified from my other searches, so there was overlap in the articles already located and those 
used from Podgursky and Springer’s (2007) systematic review.  
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 In total, there were a total of 4,267 merit-pay-related articles that were initially identified 
in this review (4,202 from electronic academic databases and the Podgursky and Springer 
review, and 65 from the hand review of academic journals and non-journal research). After the 
title and abstract review, that number was reduced to 24 articles that met all inclusion criteria and 
were not duplicates of other articles; from those 24 articles, 10 more were removed after I 
completed a full article review, primarily because these articles were not evaluations of the 
impacts of merit pay programs. An example of one such article that was removed was the 
evaluation of Tennessee’s Career Ladder Evaluation System conducted by Dee and Keys (2004); 
while the authors consider this program a merit pay program, the structure of the career ladder 
program—a teacher receives salary supplements by moving up career levels over a period of 
several years based on evaluations of the teacher’s performance in multiple competency areas—
did not fit with the definition of merit pay that guided this literature review. The reviews of 
teachers in this program occurred over a number of years, and were not directly linked with the 
impact a teacher had on student achievement; because of this, this article was not included in the 
final literature review.    
 As a result of the selection criteria and filtering process, there were a total of 14 articles 
that met all criteria, and served as the basis for this literature review. A summary of this review 
process, including the number of articles that were retained after each step of the review, is 
included in Table 1.   
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Table 1 
Identification of Merit Pay Studies for Literature Review 
Resource Initial 
Identification 
of Research 
Articles 
Articles 
Retained from 
Title Review 
Articles 
Retained 
after Abstract 
Review 
Articles Retained 
for Full Review 
(Duplicates 
Removed) 
Final 
Articles 
Retained  
Electronic 
Academic 
Databases 
4,106 92 11 9 3 
Hand Review of 
Academic 
Journals 
 17 3 0 0 
Hand Review of 
Published, Non-
Journal Research 
 48 14 13 9 
Podgursky & 
Springer 
References 
96 21 5 2 2 
Total 4,202 178 33 24 14 
 
Literature Review Findings  
General Findings 
 The 14 empirical evaluations of merit pay identified here represent a wide range of merit 
pay program formats with regard to the magnitude of bonuses offered, the employees eligible for 
bonuses, and the manner and criteria by which teachers/school personnel are able to earn these 
bonuses. While these articles lack commonality in the structure of the merit pay program, in each 
of these articles the authors provide sound evidence of the extent to which the use of bonuses 
impacted either student achievement in the schools/districts in which the merit pay programs 
were implemented, and/or how teachers reacted to the implementation of such a program. When 
taken together, the conclusions from these articles, while limited in number, provide a thorough 
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and substantial overview of the effects of merit pay programs on the students, teachers, and 
school personnel who participated in, or were subjected to, such a program.  
 Counselor impacts. 
 One of the more notable findings of this literature review, beyond that there is simply a 
limited amount of quality research on the impacts of merit pay, is the scarcity of research 
considering the impacts of such programs on anyone other than students and teachers. This is 
certainly true for school counselors as well; my literature review revealed no research articles 
that met my selection criteria that were focused on how merit pay affects school counselors. 
Further, while there are a vast number of discussion pieces and articles expressing opinions 
regarding how merit pay impacts teachers and students, there are even a limited number of these 
types of articles that address the role of school counselors in a school with a merit pay program 
in place.  
 Intuitively, the lack of research regarding school counselors and merit pay makes sense; 
in many instances, merit pay programs are only designed to reward teachers, and as a result, 
there would likely be no direct impact on school counselors in such a system. Even in programs 
where all employees receive bonuses, including school counselors, it is likely true that the direct 
impact of school counselors on raising student achievement is limited, if not immeasurable, and 
thus is not considered in research on merit pay. Though reasonable in this context, the view that 
school counselors do not have an impact on student achievement, in both theory and practice, 
seems particularly unlikely. While the impact on students may not be direct, school counselors 
do still contribute a great deal to student learning, albeit in a more indirect fashion. According to 
the American School Counseling Association (ASCA) national model (2005), some of the core 
activities for school counselors include helping students acquire the knowledge and skills 
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necessary for effective learning in the school, and assisting students with academic preparation 
needed for education beyond high school. However, because the direct impact of school 
counselors on student achievement is difficult to quantify, there may be little interest in 
understanding how school counselors respond to and are impacted by the use of merit pay. 
 That is not to say that counselors do not have an impact on student achievement, nor does 
it mean that counselors are not directly impacted by the implementation of a merit pay program. 
For example, in a school that uses merit pay, it may be that the school places a greater emphasis 
on preparing for standardized tests, as the results of these tests may figure prominently into the 
calculation of end-of-year bonuses.  In such a scenario, it may also be true that the roles of 
school counselors shift to better align with the goal of raising student achievement. As Dahir 
(2004) noted, the shift in accountability for schools has also resulted in a shift in the professional 
duties of school counselors to better address the increased accountability standards.  
 Indeed, this emphasis on accountability not only impacts the duties of the school 
counselor, but may also impact the social and emotional needs of the students with whom the 
counselors work. Dollarhide and Lemberger (2006) reported that counselors did believe that 
teachers were more reluctant to cede time in the classroom to school counseling activities, while 
also noting that the increased focus on academics came at the expense of the social and 
emotional needs of the students. The authors also found that counselors viewed the increased 
pressure of testing and accountability as a deterrent to students receiving counseling services.  
 Thus, merit pay programs may have a direct impact on school counselors, especially if 
they are asked to perform activities such as being responsible for test coordination or preparation 
in a school with merit pay (which are counter to the roles of school counselors as defined by the 
ASCA national model (2005)). As the level of accountability increases within schools with such 
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compensation programs, the roles of school counselors may change in response to the increased 
focus on student achievement. As a result, the needs of students in schools with these programs 
may also be impacted by the shift in roles and activities for school counselors.  
 One of the clear benefits then of my evaluation of the impact of the CPIP is that I 
consider how the implementation of merit pay in the Fountain Lake School District changed the 
roles of school counselors in the district, if at all. Further, I also can begin to understand how 
school counselors at Fountain Lake think the CPIP has impacted their work with their students, 
and whether or not the CPIP has led to an increased emphasis on the academic needs of students 
at the expense of their social and emotional needs. As such, this study can provide a significant 
contribution to the very limited body of research that looks directly at the link between merit pay 
and school counselor roles, especially as merit pay programs become more and more common in 
schools across the United States. 
 Teacher impacts. 
 Of the 14 total articles identified for this literature review, four included an evaluation of 
how teachers responded to the implementation of a merit pay program (in addition to an 
evaluation of the impacts of merit pay on student achievement), while one was focused 
exclusively on teacher impacts (Belfield & Heywood, 2007). An abbreviated summary of these 
articles, including a brief overview of the size and type of bonus offered under the various merit 
pay programs, as well as a description of the sample, outcome measure, and results of the 
evaluation, is presented in Table 2. Additionally, a more detailed description of each of the 
articles, including the evaluation methods used and the specific aspects of each merit pay 
program, can be found in Appendix A. 
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 In Table 2, I have characterized the results of each evaluation as either positive or 
negative depending on the impact the program had on teacher outcomes such as teacher turnover, 
the level of collegiality and collaboration among teachers, the effect of the program on the 
climate of the school, and whether or not earning a bonus encouraged teachers to work harder, 
try out new strategies, seek out additional professional development, etc. Recall that merit pay 
programs, in theory, may result in short-term motivation effects (such as teachers working harder, 
collaborating more, approaching the classroom differently, etc.) and longer-term composition 
effects, which results in a change in the teacher workforce (such as effective teachers receiving 
bonuses and remaining in the classroom, whereas the least effective teachers do not receive a 
bonus and exit the profession). Thus, my characterization of the results of each evaluation is a 
summation of the motivational and compositional effects of the individual merit pay programs. 
For these purposes, merit pay programs classified as having a ‘positive’ impact are those where 
favorable outcomes, such as teachers reporting they worked harder or were more satisfied with 
their salaries, were more prevalent than negative outcomes, such as teachers reporting more 
competition among teachers or a degraded school environment. Conversely, a merit pay program 
classified as having a ‘negative’ impact was just the opposite; the negative outcomes far 
outweighed the positive ones. A program that resulted in no changes would have been classified 
as having a ‘null’ impact; however, this was not the case in any of the articles reviewed.12 
 In total, four of the five articles that examined the impacts of merit pay on teachers 
showed that the merit pay programs being evaluated resulted in positive outcomes for teachers.  
For example, the Community Training and Assistance Center (2004) evaluated the impact of a 
                                                     
12
 While this classification is certainly subjective, I have included in Table 2 all of the results on 
which I based my characterization of each merit pay program, so my summarization of the 
impacts of merit pay on teachers is as transparent as possible.  
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merit pay program that operated in schools in Denver, Colorado, in which teachers could earn up 
to $1,500 per year for reaching two ($750 each) teacher-created objectives by the end of the 
school year (such as having 90% of students proficient in math). The authors found that teachers 
in Denver schools with merit pay programs in place, compared to teachers in schools without 
merit pay, reported better access to student testing data, an increased focus on student 
achievement, and improved collegiality among teachers. However, these teachers also reported 
that the merit pay program did not influence their approach to teaching in any way. Thus, in this 
instance, there were several positive outcomes from the implementation of this merit pay 
program, and no negative outcomes, which is why the result from this evaluation was 
characterized as positive.  
 Similarly, the evaluations of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant program (TEEG, 
Springer et al., 2009a), the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant program (GEEG, Springer et 
al., 2009b), and the District Awards for Teacher Excellence program (DATE, Springer et al., 
2010b) all showed positive impacts for teachers who participated in these programs. These three 
broad programs were all similar in scope, in that schools or districts had the flexibility to design 
merit pay programs that fit the educational needs of the school/district. These programs could 
reward all teachers or school employees, or a limited number of school personnel. The programs 
could also be designed so that some personnel could earn greater bonuses than others, or 
everyone could earn the same thing. Across all three programs, each school or district received a 
limited amount of funds that could be used for bonuses; as a result, the average bonus that 
teachers received was approximately $2,000.  
 These programs did not negatively impact the level of collaboration or collegiality among 
teachers, but did likely contribute to a more positive school environment. These programs also 
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resulted in lower levels of teacher turnover for those teachers that earned bonuses (which, in the 
case of these three programs, was a large percentage of teachers). Again, similar to the program 
that operated in the Denver schools (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004), teachers 
also reported no change to their teaching approach as a result of being eligible to earn a year-end 
bonus (Springer et al., 2009a; Springer et al., 2009b; Springer et al., 2010b).
13
 
 The lone evaluation to find a negative impact on teachers was not based on a single merit 
pay program; rather, the research conducted by Belfield and Heywood (2007) assessed teacher 
attitudes and perceptions towards merit pay from the nationally administered Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS). The authors found that teachers participating in merit pay programs 
(that likely varied across school/district) were no more likely to be satisfied with their career than 
teachers in non-merit pay schools/districts. However, the authors did find that teachers in merit 
pay schools were more likely to be dissatisfied with their salary than their non-merit pay 
teaching peers. While it is not obvious why teachers who have the opportunity to earn bonuses 
would have greater levels of salary dissatisfaction, the authors hypothesized that “merit pay may 
put income at risk, involve negative comparisons, and generate peer pressure or extra effort” 
(p.250); put differently, it may be that the additional effort and stress associated with these merit 
pay programs were not worth the amount that could be earned in year-end bonuses. Or, these 
findings might simply be a result of the types of schools that implement merit pay programs. For 
example, merit pay might be used most often in those schools with the lowest teacher salaries; 
because of this, teachers may have already been dissatisfied with their salaries, not necessarily as 
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 It is worth noting that these three evaluations were all conducted by the same research team 
who used similar research methods for each evaluation, and were all evaluations of programs in 
Texas that were very similar in format and bonus structure. These programs were also all 
implemented during roughly the same time period, and in some cases, the years of operation 
overlapped. These commonalities may be a potential explanation for the similarity in results 
across the three evaluations.   
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a direct result of the use of merit pay. Because these findings were based on a national survey, it 
is not possible to know such things as how large the bonuses were that these teachers could earn, 
or whether teachers were forced to compete with each other for a limited bonus amount; this 
information would be useful to provide context for why teachers were generally dissatisfied with 
merit pay.  
 In general then, it seems reasonable to conclude that merit pay programs, more often than 
not, have a positive impact on the teachers who participate in these programs. There does not 
appear to be strong evidence supporting the idea that merit pay results in motivational effects; 
that is, teachers did not report working harder, seeking out additional training, or altering their 
overall approach to teaching. However, there also did not appear to be evidence of any of the 
potential negative impacts of merit pay. Teachers did not report that they competed more with 
each other, that the level of collaboration decreased, or that the school environment become more 
negative and contentious as a result of merit pay. In fact, teachers reported no negative changes 
in the level of collaboration or collegiality, and in many cases, noted that teacher collegiality 
improved and the school environment become more positive as a result of being able to earn 
bonuses at the end of the year. Thus, despite some data that suggests that teachers are not more 
satisfied with their careers or salaries (and may in fact be more dissatisfied) (Belfield & 
Heywood, 2007), it appears that merit pay programs have the potential for a large number of 
positive outcomes, with limited evidence suggesting that these programs result in the 
problematic issues often associated with this type of compensation strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Merit Pay Articles Focused on Teacher Impacts 
Study Type of Bonus Size of Bonus Sample Outcome Measure Result 
Community 
Training & 
Assistance 
Center 
(2004) 
A fixed bonus for all 
teachers and specialists, 
distributed as either 
individual or group 
bonuses 
Up to $1,500 in the 
second year of the 
program 
($750/teacher-
created objective) 
Teachers in Denver 
schools with merit 
pay (13% of all 
schools) compared 
to all other Denver 
teachers 
Teacher attitudes about 
approach to teaching from 
surveys and interviews 
Positive; better access to 
data, increased focus on 
student achievement, 
improved collegiality; 
however, no changes in 
instructional practice 
Belfield & 
Heywood 
(2007) 
Not explicitly stated 
whether bonuses were 
fixed or continuous, 
given to individuals or 
groups, or whether or 
not these programs 
were zero-sum 
Bonuses ranged 
from $1,612 to 
$4,822 
Responses from the 
Schools and 
Staffing Survey; 
responses from 
over 60,000 
teachers 
Teacher salary satisfaction, 
satisfaction that work will 
be rewarded, and 
satisfaction with being a 
teacher as a result of merit 
pay 
Negative; no influence on 
career satisfaction, and a 
negative impact on 
satisfaction with salary 
Springer et 
al. (2009a) 
Bonuses could be fixed 
or continuous, and 
could be distributed to 
individual teachers or 
groups; limited funds 
per school, so not all 
teachers/employees 
received a bonus 
The average bonus 
was $1,982 in the 
first year and 
$2,094 in the 
second year 
Teachers in TEEG 
schools compared 
to teachers in non-
TEEG schools 
Survey responses from 
61,000 school personnel 
about teaching approach, 
interactions with peers, and 
impact of merit on school 
climate  
Positive; no decrease in 
collaboration or 
collegiality; teachers 
believed the TEEG 
contributed to a positive 
school environment 
Springer et 
al. (2009b) 
Bonuses could be fixed 
or continuous, and were 
distributed to individual 
employees;  limited 
funds per school, so not 
all teachers/employees 
received a bonus 
The average bonus 
in the three years of 
the program was 
$2,469, $2,261, and 
$2,249 
Teachers in GEEG 
schools compared 
to teachers in non-
GEEG schools 
Survey responses from over 
3,700 teachers about 
teaching approach, 
interactions with peers, and 
impact of merit pay on 
school climate 
Positive; no decrease in 
collaboration or 
collegiality; positive 
impact on school culture; 
lower teacher turnover; no 
change in teaching 
approach 
3
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Study Type of Bonus Size of Bonus Sample Outcome Measure Result 
Springer et 
al. (2010b) 
Fixed or continuous 
bonuses for all 
employees; limited 
pool of funds for each 
school; greater 
tendency towards 
individual bonuses 
Average bonuses of 
$1,361 to $3,344 
203 schools in the 
DATE program 
compared to 
approx. 1,000 
schools that did not 
participate 
Survey responses from over 
100,000 school personnel 
about teaching approach, 
school climate, and teacher 
completion and 
collaboration  
Positive; lower teacher 
turnover; improved school 
climate; did not contribute 
to school improvements 
3
8
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 Student impacts. 
 Of the 14 articles retained, 13 considered the impact of merit pay programs on student 
achievement. In a similar manner to my summary of the articles addressing teacher impacts, I 
have also briefly summarized each of these articles in Table 3. In this table, I have included 
information about the individual merit pay programs (when available), as well as the student 
achievement outcome measure used in each evaluation (standardized test gains, retention rates, 
GPA, etc.) and the overall findings. A more in-depth summary of each of these articles can be 
found in Appendix A.  
 My characterization of the results of each evaluation is also similar to my summary of the 
results for teachers. I have characterized programs as having a ‘positive’ impact if student 
achievement was positively impacted by the implementation of a merit pay program in the 
majority of grades/schools/subject areas; a program that had a ‘negative’ impact is one where 
student achievement was negatively affected by the use of merit pay in the majority of 
grades/schools/subject areas. Further, a program characterized as ‘mixed’ is one in which there 
were some instances of student achievement significantly improving as a result of the merit pay 
program (such as at certain grade or school levels), but in other areas, student achievement was 
significantly lower, or where there was simply an inconsistent pattern of achievement across 
grades, subjects, or school levels.  Finally, in instances where a program had no effect on student 
achievement, be it positive or negative, I have characterized these programs as having a ‘null’ 
impact; student achievement was not affected by the implementation of merit pay. 
 In total, four of the 13 evaluations had positive findings, two had mixed findings, one had 
negative findings, with the remaining six evaluations showing no impact on student achievement. 
Those with positive findings assessed the impact on students in a number of different ways. For 
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example, Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (2002) evaluated how a merit pay program affected 
retention rates in a school for students at-risk of not graduating from high school. This merit pay 
program was specifically designed to promote retention rates by rewarding teachers at multiple 
points throughout the year if students remained enrolled in their classes, with the maximum 
bonus a teacher could receive equal to 12.5% of his or her base salary (approximately $5,000). 
While the program did not have a positive impact on such things as student GPA or course 
passage rates, the program did lead to significantly higher retention rates compared to a 
demographically similar high school in the area. One notable weakness of this study was that this 
program was only implemented in one school, and only compared to the performance of one 
other school; because of this, the generalizability of these results may be limited. 
 Using data from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), Figlio and Kenny 
(2007) identified schools that used merit pay by conducting a survey of the high schools included 
in the NELS 12
th
 grade sample, and asked questions about how teachers were compensated in 
each of the schools (initial response rate was approximately 40% of schools surveyed).  
The authors also used responses from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), on which 
teachers did respond to a question about merit pay, as a way of also identifying which schools in 
the NELS used merit pay. The authors found that the use of merit pay was positively associated 
with higher levels of performance for 12
th
 grade students. There were some limitations with the 
research design used in this evaluation, making it difficult to specifically link higher student 
performance with the use of merit pay; nonetheless, the use of merit pay was associated with a 1-
2 point increase in student performance.  
 On a smaller scale, Winters, Ritter, Barnett, and Greene (2008) evaluated the impact of a 
merit pay program in three schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, in which all school personnel, from 
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custodians to principals, could earn a year-end bonus if student achievement improved in the 
school. Under this program, teachers could earn a bonus that ranged from $0 to $12,000. The 
authors measured the level of student achievement growth in math, reading, and language for 
students in the 4
th
 and 5
th
 grade in schools with merit pay compared to students in other 
demographically similar schools. The authors found that students in merit pay schools had test 
score gains, expressed in Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) points, that were 3.64 to 4.63 points 
greater than the gains observed for students in demographically similar comparison schools.  
 Finally, in their evaluation of the impact of the DATE program in Texas, Springer et al. 
(2010b) found that students in DATE schools made larger gains on the Texas state assessment 
than students in non-DATE schools. Under the DATE program, schools or districts had the 
freedom to design merit pay programs that rewarded teachers based largely on measures of 
student achievement. Approximately 50% of teachers in the 203 DATE schools earned a bonus, 
with average bonuses ranging from $1,361 for those teachers under a district-wide plan, and 
$3,344 for teachers under a school-wide plan. The authors noted that while the passing rates 
were lower for students in DATE schools (which was likely because these schools were selected 
for participation in this program because they were significantly lower achieving than other 
schools in the state), the difference in passing rates between DATE schools and non-DATE 
schools decreased during the time period when the DATE was implemented. 
 One additional study I have chosen to characterize as having null findings, though it 
could certainly be argued that the findings were in fact positive, is the evaluation of the Project 
on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) program  (Springer, 2010a), a merit pay program that 
operated for a three-year period in the Nashville School District. Middle school math teachers in 
the POINT program could earn bonuses of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000 for having substantial 
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impacts on growth levels for students in their classrooms (for example, the maximum bonus of 
$15,000 could be earned if a teacher’s students performed at the 95th percentile in math). In 
grades 6-8, the authors found no significant achievement differences for students assigned to 
teachers eligible for merit pay compared to students taught by non-merit pay teachers. However, 
they did find a significant positive effect for students in 5
th
 grade, which the authors noted was 
the only grade in this study in which teachers had a core set of students (that is, classrooms were 
self-contained). Because the positive difference only occurred in one grade with a small subset of 
teachers and students, and in all others areas there were no differences, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that this program had a null impact; however, the positive impact on student 
achievement in 5
th
 grade is certainly worth noting, as it might be an indication that this program 
could have been more effective if teachers only had to focus on a smaller group of students.  
 The lone evaluation to find negative impacts associated with merit pay on student 
outcomes was Fryer’s (2011) study of a city-wide, randomly assigned merit pay program 
implemented in New York City. In the New York system, if the students in a school achieved at 
a predetermined performance level, then the school received a lump sum, equal to $3,000 per 
school employee, that could be distributed evenly among all teachers or at the discretion of a 
committee of teachers and school personnel. The author noted that this program resulted in no 
instances of positive increases in student achievement. Further, at the middle school level, the 
use of merit pay appeared to have a negative and significant impact on student achievement. 
Springer and Winters (2009) conducted a similar evaluation of the same program two years 
before this evaluation, and found that program had no impact on student achievement, positive or 
negative. It is unclear why the findings from these two independent evaluations differed; 
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nonetheless, it is clear that the New York City program was not effective at positively impacting 
student achievement.  
 The two studies that showed mixed results were an evaluation of merit pay in Denver 
Public Schools (Community Training & Assistance Center, 2004) and an evaluation of the 
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) in two unidentified states (Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 
2008). In the Denver evaluation (that was described in more detail in the teacher impacts 
section), the results varied by grade and school; in the middle and high school, students in merit 
pay schools outperformed students in non-merit pay schools in three of the six tested areas. 
However, in the elementary school, merit pay student performance was lower in five of the six 
areas.  
 In the TAP system, teachers, principals, and other school staff earned bonuses based on 
performance in three areas: Classroom observations, value-added impact of teachers on students 
in their classrooms, and school-wide achievement gains.
14
 The TAP program was intentionally 
designed so that all school personnel could earn a bonus (to minimize competition), with 
recommended bonuses ranging from $0-$12,000. The evaluation of this program showed the 
same inconsistent pattern in student achievement observed in the Denver program; in this case, 
there were positive effects on achievement for students in TAP elementary schools, but null or 
negative effects for students in TAP middle and high schools (Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 2008). 
 Thus, whereas the overall conclusions for how these programs impact teachers was fairly 
straightforward—these programs tend to lead to positive outcomes for teachers—the research on 
the impacts of merit pay on students is decidedly less clear. In some cases, student achievement 
was enhanced by the use of merit pay, and in other cases, student achievement was hindered. 
                                                     
14
 For those teachers and school personnel without a classroom of students, a larger emphasis 
was placed on school-wide achievement gains.  
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And, in the majority of articles, there was no impact on student achievement at all. Because of 
this lack of clarity about how these programs influence student achievement, in the next section I 
look at three key characteristics of individual merit pay programs, to see if there are patterns as 
to what types of programs have a positive or negative impact on teacher and student outcomes.  
 
 
 
Table 3 
Summary of Merit Pay Articles Focused on Student Achievement Impacts 
Study Type of Bonus Size of Bonus Sample Outcome Measure Result 
Eberts, 
Hollenbeck, 
& Stone 
(2002) 
A fixed bonus 
system for all 
teachers with no 
bonus cap; 
distributed to 
individual 
teachers 
Up to 12.5% of 
base salary (approx. 
$5,000) 
Students in an 
alternative high school 
with merit pay compared 
to a similar high school 
without merit pay 
Student retention 
rates was the 
primary outcome 
measure; also, 
attendance, GPA, 
and course passing 
rates 
Positive; retention rates 
increased to 71.7% 
compared to 54.5% in the 
other high school 
Community 
Training & 
Assistance 
Center 
(2004) 
A fixed bonus for all 
teachers and specialists, 
distributed as either 
individual or group 
bonuses 
Up to $1,500 in the 
second year of the 
program 
($750/teacher-
created objective) 
Students in Denver 
schools with merit pay 
(13% of all schools) 
compared to all other 
Denver students 
Student 
achievement gains 
on the Iowa Test 
of Basic Skills and 
the Colorado 
Student 
Assessment 
Program 
Mixed; elementary 
performance for merit pay 
students was lower in 5 of 6 
areas. However, middle and 
high students performed 
significantly higher in 3 of 6 
areas each 
Figlio & 
Kenny 
(2007) 
Varied between individual 
and group bonuses; not 
stated whether bonuses 
were fixed  or continuous, 
but likely varied across 
school/district 
Not explicitly 
stated in this paper; 
likely varied across 
school/district 
Schools in the NELS 12
th
 grade student 
test scores 
Positive; incentive programs 
were positively associated 
with higher student 
performance 
Springer, 
Ballou, & 
Peng 
(2008) 
Continuous bonuses for all 
teachers; bonuses given to 
individual teachers, with 
no cap on the number of 
bonuses earned 
Recommended 
bonuses ranged 
from $0-$12,000 
TAP school students (28 
schools) to non-TAP 
students 
Test gains on the 
Northwest 
Evaluation 
Association 
(NWEA) 
assessments 
Mixed; positive effects on 
achievement for elementary 
grades, but null or negative 
impacts in middle and high 
schools  4
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Study Type of Bonus Size of Bonus Sample Outcome Measure Result 
Winters, 
Ritter, 
Barnett, & 
Greene 
(2008) 
Continuous bonuses for all 
school employees; 
bonuses given to 
individual employees, 
with no cap on the number 
of bonuses earned  
Bonuses ranged 
from $0-$11,200 
Two schools in Little 
Rock using merit pay 
compared to three 
similar schools 
Math NCE gains 
on the Stanford 
Achievement Test, 
9
th
 Edition (SAT-
9) 
Positive; students in merit 
pay schools had gains of 
3.64-4.63 NCE points 
relative to non-merit pay 
students 
Bacolod, 
DiNardo, & 
Jacobson 
(2009) 
Fixed bonuses for all 
teachers and staff; bonuses 
were the same for all 
employees 
The average bonus 
amount was $1,900 
Schools directly above 
and below a 
performance threshold 
(those above are 
received bonuses, those 
below did not) 
Academic 
Performance 
Index school 
growth scores 
Null; there was little 
measurable improvement for 
schools that received 
bonuses compared to those 
that did not 
Springer et 
al. (2009a) 
Bonuses could be fixed or 
continuous, and could be 
distributed to individual 
teachers or groups; limited 
funds per school, so not all 
teachers/employees 
received a bonus 
The average bonus 
was $1,982 in the 
first year and 
$2,094 in the 
second year 
TEEG schools compared 
to non-TEEG schools 
Student 
achievement in 
math and reading 
Null; there did not appear to 
be any significant impacts 
on student achievement 
Springer et 
al. (2009b) 
Bonuses could be fixed or 
continuous, and were 
distributed to individual 
employees;  limited funds 
per school, so not all 
teachers/employees 
received a bonus 
The average bonus 
in the three years of 
the program was 
$2,469, $2,261, and 
$2,249 
GEEG schools 
compared to non-GEEG 
schools 
Student 
performance gains 
on the Texas 
Assessment of 
Knowledge and 
Skills (TAKS) 
Null; depending on the 
model, the GEEG had a 
weakly positive, negative, or 
null effect on student 
achievement gains 
Springer & 
Winters 
(2009) 
Fixed bonuses for all 
teachers and staff; not a 
zero-sum program; bonus 
amounts decided by a 
committee 
Schools received 
funding of $3,000 
for every employee 
186 NYC schools 
randomly assigned to 
receive merit pay 
compared to 137 control 
schools that did not 
Student math 
achievement gains 
Null; the program had no 
discernible effect on student 
achievement 
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Study Type of Bonus Size of Bonus Sample Outcome Measure Result 
Glazerman 
& Seifullah 
(2010) 
Continuous bonuses for all 
employees; bonuses 
distributed to individual 
teachers; not a zero-sum 
program 
Average teacher 
bonus was $2,653, 
with a maximum of 
$6,320 
8 TAP schools 
compared to 8 non-TAP 
schools; TAP schools 
also compared to other 
similar schools 
Student 
achievement in 
math and reading 
on Illinois state 
tests 
Null; there were no 
significant differences  in 
achievement  
Springer et 
al. (2010a) 
Fixed bonuses for middle 
school math teachers 
distributed to individual 
teachers; not a zero-sum 
program 
Teachers could 
earn bonuses of 
$5,000, $10,000, or 
$15,000 for 
reaching certain 
thresholds (80
th
, 
85
th
, and 95
th
 
percentile); average 
bonus earned in the 
three years was 
$9,639, $11,370, 
and $9,623 
296 middle school math 
teachers; 143 randomly 
assigned to receive merit 
pay 
Growth in math 
achievement on 
the Tennessee 
Comprehensive 
Assessment 
Program (TCAP) 
Null; no overall impacts on 
student achievement in 
nearly all grades, though the 
authors did find positive and 
significant differences for 5
th
 
grade students 
Springer et 
al. (2010b) 
Fixed or continuous 
bonuses for all employees; 
limited pool of funds for 
each school; greater 
tendency towards 
individual bonuses 
Teachers with 
district  plans 
earned an  average 
bonus of $1,361; 
teachers with 
school plans earned 
an average bonus of 
$3,344 
203 schools that 
participated in the 
DATE program  
compared to approx. 
1,000 schools that did 
not participate 
Student 
performance on 
the TAKS 
Positive; students in DATE 
schools had greater TAKS 
gains than students in non-
DATE  schools; while 
student passing rates were 
lower in DATE schools, that 
difference decreased 
Fryer 
(2011) 
Fixed bonuses for all 
teachers and staff; not a 
zero-sum program; bonus 
amounts decided by a 
committee 
Schools received 
funding of $3,000 
for every employee 
233 NYC schools 
randomly assigned to 
receive merit pay, 
compared to 163 schools 
assigned to the control 
group (no merit pay) 
Student 
achievement gains 
in math and 
language; also 
used attendance, 
grades, and grad 
rates  
Negative; the merit pay 
program did not positively 
impact any of the outcome 
measures; the impact in 
middle schools was negative 
4
7
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Key Characteristics of Merit Pay Programs 
 Bonus size. 
 One of main reasons for using merit pay is to provide teachers with incentives to focus 
more time and effort on raising student achievement, and reward those teachers who are 
especially effective at doing so. Because of this, it seems particularly plausible that the programs 
in which teachers will be the most motivated are those that offer teachers the largest bonuses—
the greater the incentive, the more likely it is that teachers will try something different, work 
harder, seek out new teaching strategies, collaborate more, etc.  
 An examination of the evaluations included in this review may in fact support this theory. 
For example, there were four merit pay programs where the average bonus, or the range of 
bonuses, was substantial (i.e. $5,000 or more), especially when compared to the average bonuses 
distributed in the other merit pay programs (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Springer et al., 
2010a; Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 2008; Winters, Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2008). Of those four 
programs, two resulted in positive impacts on student achievement: The merit pay program 
focused on raising retention rates for students at-risk of dropping out (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & 
Stone, 2002) offered bonuses of up to 12.5% of a teacher’s salary (approximately $5,000), and 
the merit pay program that was implemented in three schools in Little Rock, Arkansas (Winters, 
Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2008) distributed bonuses that ranged up to $11,200. The bonuses 
distributed in the TAP program evaluated by Springer, Ballou, and Peng (2008) ranged from $0 
to $12,000; recall, the results of this evaluation were mixed, with positive impacts in the 
elementary school, but null or negative impacts in the middle and high school. The other merit 
pay program featuring substantial bonuses was the POINT program (Springer et al., 2010a), in 
which teachers could earn bonuses of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000 for reaching certain 
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performance thresholds. The average bonus under this program was above $9,000 for all three 
years of the program, and greater than $11,000 in the program’s second year. Again, the results 
of this evaluation showed no impacts on student achievement, save for the positive and 
significant impact that occurred on achievement levels for students in the 5
th
 grade. 
 Thus, in each of the programs where the bonuses represented a substantial percentage of 
a teacher’s base salary, there were at least some positive impacts on student achievements, 
whether the impacts were evident for all students or a small subset of students. However, it is 
worth noting that the average bonus offered in the other merit pay program with positive results 
for which bonus amounts were given,
15
 the evaluation of the DATE program by Springer et al. 
(2010b), were relatively small by comparison but still resulted in positive outcomes for students 
(and for teachers). Under the DATE program, teachers in schools with plans created and 
implemented at the district-level earned an average bonus of $1,361, compared to teachers in 
schools with school-specific merit pay plans who earned an average bonus of $3,344.  
 Teachers vs. all employees. 
 One of the concerns associated with merit pay programs is that they might result in 
counterproductive competition, or might lead to school environment that is negative and 
contentious. If this were the case, it would make sense that student achievement would likely not 
be positively affected, nor would it be the case that the outcomes for teachers would likely be 
positive either. One potential way of avoiding this issue is by structuring a program such that all 
employees, not just teachers of core subjects, are eligible for a bonus. All employees contribute 
to student learning in one way or another, and as such, it is likely true that all employees should 
                                                     
15
 The evaluation by Figlio and Kenny (2007) was an evaluation of merit pay programs across 
the nation. In their study, the authors did not include any information on bonuses amounts that 
were offered or earned. 
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be rewarded for the contributions that they make. For example, school counselors do not work 
directly with students teaching them skills test on standardized assessments; however, the work 
these counselors do likely improves the ability for teachers to better work with these students. As 
Dahir and Stone (2003) noted: 
“School counselors can influence the school climate to ensure that high standards 
are the norm in a safe and respectful environment…Viewing the world of schools 
through an accountability lens helps school counselors to act on their belief 
system and assume a leadership role to identify and rectify issues that impact 
every student’s ability to achieve at expected levels” (p. 216).  
 Thus, in a system where only teachers get rewarded, the work of the school counselors 
goes unrecognized and rewarded, even though they, just like all school employees, impact 
student learning in some way. In this case, it makes sense that providing rewards to all 
employees might encourage everyone to work together to meet the common goal of educating 
students in the best manner possible. 
 It is possible then that the programs that reward all employees, not just teachers, would 
be associated with positive outcomes for students and teachers. A review of the research on 
programs that do reward all employees is largely mixed. In total, the three programs that 
rewarded all employees and had an evaluation of teacher outcomes (Springer et al., 2009a; 
Springer et al., 2009b; Springer et al., 2010b) showed positive outcomes for teachers. For each of 
these evaluations of programs in Texas, teachers reported, among other things, that collaboration 
and/or collegiality improved, and that the school environment became more positive as well. It 
may be true that these outcomes were a result of the fact that all employees were rewarded for 
their work. 
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 However, there does not appear to be a notable impact of rewarding all employees with 
regard to raising student achievement. Of the seven programs with this type of reward structure, 
the majority of programs (four in total) showed no impact on student achievement. The two 
programs that did show positive outcomes for students were the evaluation of merit pay in Little 
Rock, Arkansas (Winters, Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2008) and the evaluation of the Texas 
DATE program (Springer et al., 2010b), with the latter evaluation showing positive impacts for 
both teachers and students. 
 “Zero-sum” programs. 
 One final programmatic consideration that may influence how teachers respond to merit 
pay, and as a result, how students are impacted, is whether or not the program is set up as a 
“zero-sum” system. In such a system, there is generally a limited amount of money available for 
bonuses, and as a result, the program is structured to only provide bonuses to a certain number of 
the highest-performing teachers. With these types of merit pay programs, it is likely true that 
teachers would feel the need to compete with each other, since one teacher improving his or her 
teaching would necessarily make it more difficult for another teacher to qualify for a bonus. As a 
result, programs structured in this manner might result in increased competition, decreased 
collaboration, and a more hostile school environment, all of which have the potential to 
negatively impact school employees and students.  
  In total, the only programs that appear to have been structured as zero-sum programs 
were the three programs that operated in Texas (Springer et al., 2009a; Springer et al., 2009b; 
Springer et al., 2010b); because of the large number of schools that participated in these 
programs, budgetary considerations necessitated the need for this type of structure. And, as has 
already been reiterated in this review, all three of the evaluations of these programs showed 
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positive outcomes for teachers, and one of the three, the evaluation of the DATE program 
(Springer et al., 2010b) showed positive impacts for students as well. Thus, there does not appear 
to be a relationship between a zero-sum program and negative outcomes for teachers or 
students.
16
  
 There are any number of other possible characteristics of merit pay programs that may 
have a more pronounced impact on the responses of teachers, school employees, and students. 
Or, it may be true that certain characteristics are only problematic or beneficial in association 
with other structural decisions. For example, zero-sum programs may only be problematic when 
the maximum bonus represents a substantial percentage of a teacher’s base salary, providing 
more motivation for teachers to compete. Similarly, the opportunity for a small bonus may still 
result in positive outcomes if everyone in a school is eligible for that same small bonus, since 
everyone is being treated equally. In any event, perhaps the most salient conclusion that can be 
reached from this discussion of program-specific characteristics is that the limited amount of 
                                                     
16
 It seems counterintuitive that programs in which not all teachers earned rewards would still 
result in positive outcomes for teachers (or students), such as teachers reporting that the climate 
of their school improved because of the use of merit pay. While the reasons why this was the 
case were not clear, it may be that because the size of the rewards were relatively small (around 
$2,000), there was no reason for teachers to compete with each other for the opportunities for 
these rewards (indeed, teachers reported there was not an increase in competition as a result of 
these programs). This may also explain why collaboration did not change (for the better or 
worse), and why teachers reported no change in their approach to teaching (since the rewards 
may not have been large enough to motivate teachers to approach teaching differently). Despite 
this, the impact of receiving these bonuses, regardless of the size, may still have resulted in the 
teachers who received a bonus having a more positive outlook about the culture and climate of 
their school. For example, under the DATE program, approximately 50% of teachers received a 
bonus (Springer et al., 2010b); if teachers did not feel the need to compete with each other, then 
it may be true that those teachers who received a bonus still viewed the program as favorable 
because they received some recognition of their work. Further, if not every teacher received a 
bonus, then having competition might have focused the teaching efforts for some teachers to 
raise student achievement, which resulted in an overall positive impact on student achievement 
as well.  
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quality evaluations of merit pay programs makes it difficult to identify what aspects of these 
programs, if any, will likely result in meaningful benefits for school personnel and students. 
Summary of Literature Review 
 In sum, a review of existing literature on the impacts of merit pay reveals that, overall, 
these programs often result in positive outcomes for teachers. There is limited evidence to 
support the presence of many of the potential negative outcomes associated with merit pay, such 
as these programs will cause teachers to compete more and collaborate less, and that the school 
environment will become more contentious and degraded from implementing such a program.  
The majority of the limited number of articles that address this topic showed quite the opposite; 
teachers reported positive improvements to collaboration and collegiality (with no evaluations 
showing a negative impact on teacher interactions), and similarly reported that merit pay did not 
harm, and in many cases helped improve the school environment.  
 The impacts of merit pay on student achievement are decidedly less clear. There were 13 
evaluations that assessed how merit pay affected various measures of student attainment or 
improvement, and in four of those evaluations, the outcome was positive for students in 
classrooms where teachers were eligible for merit pay. However, in the majority of studies 
reviewed, there was no impact on student achievement whatsoever, or the impact differed 
significantly by grade, school, or subject area, with no clear pattern of where the programs were 
more or less effective at impacting student achievement. At the very least, it does appear that 
student achievement is not harmed by the use of merit pay, as only one of the 14 evaluations 
showed negative impacts of merit pay on student achievement.  
 Beyond the impact on teachers and students, this review also showed that there is a 
significant lack of research evaluating how these programs affect other school employees, such 
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as school counselors. This is not surprising given the overall lack of research; that said, as these 
programs become more prevalent, it is important to understand how other school personnel, such 
as school counselors, are impacted by these programs, beyond just how merit pay impacts the 
teaching force in a given school or district. The contributions of other employees, including that 
of school counselors, certainly have an effect on the overall academic performance of students; 
thus, it would be pertinent and informative to discern how school counselors, for example, 
respond to being rewarded for their work, and how these programs impact their perceptions of 
their professional roles and responsibilities.  
 This literature review also showed that there is not a specific characteristic of a merit pay 
program that will necessarily impact, positively or negative, student or teacher outcomes. It may 
be that larger bonuses, those that represent a sizable percentage of a teacher’s base salary, prove 
to be more motivating for teachers and thus result in greater student achievement gains. Of the 
four programs that featured bonuses of $5,000 or greater, two showed positive outcomes for 
students, and the other two evaluations had certain subsets of students with significantly positive 
achievement gains. However, it did not appear that such things as rewarding all employees, 
setting up zero-sum programs, rewarding individual teachers versus groups of teachers, etc. had 
any clear pattern of impact on teachers or students.  
 Perhaps the only clear takeaway points from this review is that there is great variety in 
the characteristics and design of merit pay programs across the country, and that more research is 
needed to measure how these programs impact not only teachers and students, but other school 
personnel as well. As such, this evaluation of the CPIP, which aims to measure improvements in 
student achievement, changes in attitudes and behaviors for teachers, and changes in the roles 
and responsibilities of school counselors, should provide a valuable contribution to the overall 
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research base on the topic of merit pay. Because of the unique nature of the CPIP, which will be 
described in detail in the next section, it is important to clearly ascertain the extent to which the 
implementation of this program resulted in positive outcomes for the Fountain Lake School 
District, as the district invested significant time and energy to the development and 
implementation of the CPIP (including effort generating teacher/staff buy-in), as well as 
considerable financial resources. Regardless of the outcomes, this evaluation will build on the 
extant merit pay literature by providing data that may help guide policymakers and education 
leaders looking to implement this type of compensation strategy. 
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Chapter 3 – Overview of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program 
 In January of 2009, school board members from the Fountain Lake School District 
contacted researchers at the Office for Education Policy (OEP), seeking assistance in the 
development and implementation of a merit pay program. The school board was interested in 
capitalizing on the potential benefits of merit pay by both rewarding teachers and school 
employees that did exceptional work, as well as making the compensation that they were able to 
offer to teachers competitive with surrounding school districts. Ultimately, the board decided to 
postpone putting a merit pay program in place during the 2009-10 school year, to allow adequate 
time to develop a program that had strong teacher support, accurately captured the impacts of 
teachers and school employees on student learning, and was financially viable over an extended 
period of time. 
 In the 2009-10 school year, the board approved the use of two new programs, both of 
which would be a central component of a merit pay program if the district decided to move 
forward with such a program in the following school year. First, in order to ensure that student 
growth was being accurately measured, the district approved the use of the Northwest Evaluation 
Association (NWEA) math, reading, and language assessments. These computer-adaptive 
assessments are designed for the specific purpose of measuring student growth, as compared to 
the Arkansas state assessments (such as the Arkansas Benchmark), which are simply designed to 
measure whether a student is proficient (according to the Arkansas state standards) or not. These 
NWEA assessments also provide teachers and principals with valuable information about how a 
student is performing at multiple points throughout the school year, so that teachers can adjust 
their teaching approach (if needed) to better reach students of all academic abilities.  
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 The Fountain Lake administration also approved the use of teacher “report cards”, on 
which teachers were given detailed information about their goals and expectations for the school 
year. For example, all core teachers in the elementary and middle schools were given NWEA 
goals for students in their class; that is, benchmarks that their students should reach by the 
conclusion of the school year. Teachers also had goals and expectations for student performance 
on the Arkansas assessments, and had the components of a principal evaluation outlined on these 
report cards as well. At the conclusion of the school year, teachers were given a summary of 
their accomplishments in relation to their end-of-year goals, so that they could clearly see how 
they performed in all of the different areas in which they were evaluated. With both the NWEA 
assessments and the report cards, the goal was to not only begin to adopt a greater emphasis in 
the district on goal-setting for teachers and focusing significantly on raising student achievement, 
but also to help teachers become more familiar with some of the changes that might occur if a 
merit pay program were put into place in the following school year.  
 At the conclusion of the 2009-10 school year, all school personnel received a small bonus 
(maximum of $1,000) as a reward for their participation in this pilot program throughout the 
school year, and for their response to some of the changes that were put into place. The 
administration then asked teachers to vote on whether or not they would approve of establishing 
a full-scale merit pay program in the following school year. This vote resulted in 90% of 
certified staff and 96% of classified staff approving the use of merit pay in Fountain Lake in the 
2010-11 school year. 
 As a result of this vote, administrators and principals from the Fountain Lake School 
District (FLSD) again worked in collaboration with researchers at the OEP to devise and 
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implement a district-wide merit pay program.
17
 Central to this process was the development of 
key tenets or considerations that would be of high importance in the creation of any such 
program. These tenets were based on the work of Ritter and Jensen (2010) from their previous 
collaboration in the development of merit pay programs with other Arkansas schools. The tenets 
for the FLSD program were: 
1) The program should be voluntary. 
2) The program should be focused on student growth (when possible). 
3) The program should foster collaboration among teachers and avoid counter-productive 
competition. 
4) The program should reward all employees in the district, not just teachers. 
5) The program should be transparent and understandable. 
6) The program should feature substantial performance rewards. 
7) The program should not force teachers to risk any portion of their base salaries.  
 Administrators at the FLSD did not want teachers or school personnel to feel like they 
were being forced to participate in any type of merit pay program, so all employees were able to 
not participate in this program if they were so inclined. While employees could opt out of 
receiving a bonus, they could not opt out of participating in the same activities as everyone else, 
such as participating in NWEA testing, having goals set for them at the start of the year, being 
evaluated by a supervisor at the end of the year, etc. In other words, while this program was 
optional, there was really no reason for anyone to not participate, since all employees would still 
                                                     
17 It should be noted that the author of this dissertation was one of the OEP researchers involved 
in the development of this merit pay program. 
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be held accountable, with the only difference being that those who opted out would not be 
eligible for a bonus at the end of the school year.
18
 
 Administrators also wanted the program to be highly focused on student growth (where 
possible), as opposed to only focusing on meeting proficiency. This was the primary reason for 
adopting the NWEA assessments, as they provide clear, individualized growth goals for students 
of all academic abilities. If the program had been focused on proficiency instead of growth, it is 
possible that teachers may have been incentivized to only work with high-achieving students, 
since these students would have shown the ability to meet the proficiency standard.  However, by 
evaluating teachers based on how much growth their students show on standardized assessments, 
there would be no reason for teachers to shy away from working with low-achieving students, 
since these students could still show growth without actually meeting proficiency (and as such, 
teachers can still be recognized and rewarded for substantial growth that still did not result in a 
student reaching the proficiency standard).   
 There were a number of steps taken to ensure that the FLSD merit pay program would 
encourage collaboration among teachers, and perhaps more importantly, avoid causing teachers 
to compete (in a counterproductive way) against each other. First, under the proposed program, 
teachers would not have to compete for a fixed amount of money; rather, teachers would be able 
to earn the maximum bonus for which they were eligible, with no negative impact to a teacher if 
another teacher earned his or her maximum bonus.
19
 Second, all employees in the district, not 
                                                     
18 At the end of the year, only one school employee elected to not participate in the merit pay 
program.  
19 For example, in a system where $10,000 was going to be distributed to the top ten teachers in a 
school, it is highly likely that this structure would result in substantial competition between 
teachers, since there are a limited number of bonuses available. However, in a system where 
every teacher is eligible for a $10,000 bonus, there is no reason for teachers to compete; this was 
the structure Fountain Lake intended to employ.  
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just teachers, would be eligible to earn a bonus; since all employees contribute to student 
learning in some fashion, it seems reasonable that all employees should also have the opportunity 
to have their work recognized and rewarded. The magnitude of the bonus for which school 
employees were eligible varied by position, but everyone at the end of the year would at least be 
eligible to earn some bonus money. Finally, a portion of every employee’s bonus would be based 
on how the school as a whole performed on standardized assessments. Because of this, teachers 
might be incentivized to collaborate more, since the better all students do, the greater every 
employee’s bonus would be. 
 In order for the merit pay program to be motivating for school personnel, it was important 
for the program to be easily understandable by school personnel, while also featuring substantial 
bonuses to that were both motivating and rewarding. To make the program understandable, 
administrators again elected to use the report cards that were a component of the pilot program in 
2009-10. These report cards would be given to all school personnel, including teachers, school 
counselors, and principals, at multiple points throughout the year, with goals clearly stated at the 
start of the year, and a summary of how a teacher or school employee performed relative to these 
goals provided at the conclusion of the school year. 
 To ensure that bonuses were substantial, and as a result, motivating for school personnel, 
FLSD administrators sought out external philanthropic funding for a three-year period, while 
also allocating a significant portion of the district’s local funds to this program. The combination 
of external and local funds provided administration with the flexibility to offer significant 
bonuses to all employees, including a maximum bonus for teachers of core subjects of $10,000. 
Recall, all core teachers would be eligible for this maximum bonus amount, so this program 
represented a significant financial investment for the district.  
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 Finally, because the goal of any merit pay program is to be both motivating and 
rewarding, the administration decided that this program would be structured to provide bonuses 
in addition to the existing salary schedule, as opposed to replacing step-raises altogether or 
forcing teachers to risk a portion of their base salary. It is likely that a merit pay program would 
be less motivating if a teacher was concerned about not receiving his or her full salary, so school 
personnel were assured very early in the development process that this program would only be a 
bonus program, not a replacement to the current step-raise system used at the FLSD.  
 When taken together, these tenets guided the development of the Cobra Pride Incentive 
Program (CPIP), the pilot merit pay program implemented at the FLSD in the 2010-11 school 
year. In the next section, I provide a general description of how the program was structured to 
provide bonuses to all school employees.  
General Reward Structure 
 Under the CPIP, the maximum bonus a teacher or school employee could receive was 
based primarily on what subject(s) the employee taught (if any), whether or not the employee 
worked directly with students, and whether or not the employee was in an administration or 
supervisory position. Generally, the more direct impact an employee had on influencing student 
learning in measurable ways, the larger the bonus for which he or she would be eligible. For 
example, teachers of core subjects (math, science, reading/language arts, or social studies) were 
all eligible for a maximum bonus of $10,000, which was the highest possible bonus for non-
administration personnel. Teachers of art, physical education, music, or other non-tested 
subjects, by comparison, were only eligible for a maximum bonus of $6,000. The reason for this 
difference was not that there was a greater value placed on core teachers compared to those 
teachers classified as non-core; rather, because core teachers had the greatest responsibility for 
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raising student achievement, they were also eligible for a larger maximum bonus. Put differently, 
if math achievement was below average in the district, the math teacher would likely be the one 
held most accountable, not the art or music teacher. In total, there were four different employee 
groups and thus four maximum bonus levels used in the CPIP: $15,000 for principals and 
administrators, $10,000 for teachers of core subjects, $6,000 for non-core teachers and personnel 
(including school counselors, physical education teachers, foreign language teachers, etc.), and 
$1,000 for classified staff (such as bus drivers, cafeteria workers, etc.). 
 Bonuses for all employees were based on the total number of points an employee earned 
on a 100-point scale. Of those 100 points, all employees could earn up to 10 points based on how 
they performed on a principal or supervisor evaluation, with an additional 10-20 points based on 
individually assigned professional growth goals (such as the extent to which teachers used 
NWEA testing data in making instructional decisions, or how well they incorporated writing 
across the school curriculum). For all non-core teachers and non-instructional personnel, the 
remaining 70-80 points was based on how well students across the district performed on 
standardized assessments, including the NWEA tests, the Arkansas Benchmark, end-of-course 
examinations, and the ACT. The reason these remaining points were based on school or district-
wide achievement measures is because these school personnel did not work directly with 
students teaching them skills tested on standardized assessments. However, these employees do 
still contribute to student learning in many ways, including supporting the work of the core 
teachers, and the FLSD did want to emphasize collaboration and a focus on student learning for 
all employees; thus, the largest portion of the bonuses for all school personnel, other than core 
teachers, was based on how well the district improved as a whole.  
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 Like all other school employees, teachers of core subjects had the same number of points 
based on a principal evaluation and professional growth goals. However, because these teachers 
worked directly with students, we could measure the extent to which these teachers directly 
impacted student achievement (and provide rewards of increasing magnitude for increases in 
student performance).  For core teachers then, up to 50 points could be earned based on student 
achievement gains for those students with whom core teachers worked directly. Consistent with 
all other school employees, the remaining points that could be earned by core teacher were based 
on student achievement gains throughout the school or district.  
 The calculation of bonuses then for all employees was fairly straightforward. The total 
bonus amount was based on the percentage of points earned out of 100, multiplied by the 
maximum bonus amount for which the employee was eligible. For example, if a core teacher 
earned 74 out of 100 points, then his or her bonus would be $7,400 (74% of points earned 
multiplied by a maximum bonus of $10,000); if a bus driver earned 85 points, then his or her 
bonus would be $850 (85% of points earned multiplied by a maximum bonus of $1,000), and so 
on.  
Specific Employee Reward Structure 
 While the general structure of the bonus program was the same for all employees, there 
were fairly significant differences in the individual components of the bonus plan for various 
categories of employees.
20
 These differences were largely a result of differences in the grades of 
students served in each school, and the types of standardized tests administered to those students. 
For instance, the Arkansas Benchmark is only administered to students in grades 3-8 (students in 
                                                     
20 FLSD employees were assigned to one of 13 categories for bonus calculation purposes, all of 
which have different bonus criteria. For example, there were four different categories (or four 
different sets of bonus criteria) for teachers of core subjects: Core teachers in grades K-2, 3-8, 9-
10 Literacy, and all other high school non-literacy teachers.  
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the elementary and middle school), whereas the end-of-course examinations are only 
administered to students in grades 8-11. Because of these differences in assessments available at 
various grade levels (on which much of an employee’s bonus is based), as well as differences in 
the ways in which students are assigned to teachers at different school and grade levels, the 
specific manner for calculating bonuses differed fairly significantly across categories of 
employees and schools. Presented in Table 4 is a summary of the distribution of points for each 
of the different categories of employees under the CPIP plan. Additionally, a detailed summary 
of the report cards used for each of the employee categories, including a more thorough 
description of the exact manner of how each of the different bonus criteria are calculated, are 
presented in Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Distribution of Points by CPIP Employee Categories for All Fountain Lake Employees 
                                                     
21 Class refers to the total number of students with whom a teacher works. In some cases, such as in the elementary school, this could 
be a small number of students (such as 20 per teacher) actually in a teacher’s classroom. However, in the middle and high school, 
teachers can work with a much larger number of students across multiple class periods. In both cases, we would refer to both groups 
of students as a teacher’s “class”. 
22 School proficiency refers to the percentage of students at the school level scoring in the proficient or advanced range on the 
Arkansas Benchmark assessment (elementary and middle school) or end-of-course assessments (high school) 
23 Individual class proficiency refers to the percentage of students in a teacher’s classroom scoring in the proficient or advanced range 
on the Arkansas Benchmark assessment (elementary and middle school) or end-of-course assessments (high school) 
24 District proficiency refers to the total percentage of students in the Fountain Lake School District scoring proficient or advanced on 
the Arkansas Benchmark and end-of-course examinations. 
 Supervisor 
Evaluation 
Prof. 
Growth 
Plan 
Ind. 
Class
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NWEA 
Growth 
Lowest 
Quartile 
NWEA 
Growth 
School 
NWEA 
Growth 
School 
Proficiency 
Rate
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Ind. Class 
Proficiency 
Rate
23
 
ACT 
Growth 
District 
NWEA 
Growth 
District 
Proficiency 
Rate
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K-2 Core  10 10 30 20 10 20     
3-8 Core  10 10 20  10 20 30    
High School Core 
(Lit) 
10 20 25   40  5   
High School Core 
(Non-Lit) 
10 20    40 25 5   
Elem. & Middle Non-
Core 
10 10   30 50     
High School Non-
Core 
10 20    40 25 5   
6
5
 
 
 
 Supervisor 
Evaluation 
Prof. 
Growth 
Plan 
Ind. 
Class 
NWEA 
Growth 
Lowest 
Quartile 
NWEA 
Growth 
School 
NWEA 
Growth 
School 
Proficiency 
Rate 
Ind. Class 
Proficiency 
Rate 
ACT 
Growth 
District 
NWEA 
Growth 
District 
Proficiency 
Rate 
Elem. & Middle 
Classified 
10 10   30 50     
High School 
Classified 
10 20   25 40  5   
District Classified 10 10      5 30 45 
Elem. & Middle 
Principals 
10 10   30 50     
High School 
Principals 
10 10   25 50  5   
Instructional 
Facilitators 
10 10      5 30 45 
District Staff 10 10      5 30 45 
6
6
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Summary 
 At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school year, administrators distributed $874,836 in 
merit pay bonuses to the teachers and school personnel at Fountain Lake, which represented a 
total cost of $721 per Fountain Lake student. Table 5 shows the average bonus earned for 
employees in each category, including the average percentage of points earned. Also included in 
this table are the total bonus amounts distributed by category. 
Table 5 
Summary of CPIP Bonus Payouts 
 Maximum 
Bonus Amount 
Average Bonus Average Points 
Earned 
Total Bonuses 
Paid 
K-2 Core  $10,000 $9,313 93% $149,004 
3-8 Core  $10,000 $8,204 82% $270,722 
High School Core (Lit) $10,000 $6,652 67% $26,609 
High School Core (Non-Lit) $10,000 $6,452 65% $85,203 
Elem. & Middle Non-Core $6,000 $5,256 88% $89,963 
High School Non-Core $6,000 $4,068 68% $60,844 
Elem. & Middle Classified $1,000 $900 90% $13,507 
High School Classified $1,000 $714 71% $6,430 
District Classified $1,000 $792 79% $34,038 
Elem. & Middle Principals $15,000 $12,981 87% $51,922 
High School Principals $15,000 $11,292 75% $22,583 
Instructional Facilitators $10,000 $8,020 80% $16,040 
District Staff $15,000 $11,993 80% $47,971 
TOTAL    $874,836 
 If these bonuses were accurately aligned with measures of teacher and student 
performance, then, based on a review of the amount of money distributed to school personnel 
and the average points earned for each category of employees, it is likely that the program was 
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successful at reaching its goal of raising student achievement. These numbers might also suggest 
that the response to this program by the teachers, counselors, and other employees would be 
favorable, since the bonuses that were distributed were quite substantial (such as an average 
bonus of $9,313 for K-2 core teachers). Because of the substantial cost of this program, it was 
critical that the district leaders sought to determine the extent to which the CPIP positively 
impacted teacher attitudes and behaviors, and as a result, positively impacted student 
achievement. Indeed, in this study, I present my analysis of the CPIP’s impact on student 
achievement, as well as the response to this program by the employees of Fountain Lake. In the 
next section, I describe the methods used in this evaluation of the Cobra Pride Incentive 
Program. 
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Chapter 4 – Methods  
 In this chapter, I present the methods used in my evaluation of the impact of the CPIP on 
Fountain Lake school counselors, teachers, and students. For each of the three main research 
questions, I describe the research sample, the instrument, and the analytic strategy I used to 
determine how students and school personnel were affected by the implementation of the CPIP.  
Research Question #1: Counselor Impacts 
 Sample. 
 To begin to understand how the CPIP impacted the roles and responsibilities of school 
counselors at Fountain Lake, I conducted interviews in February of 2012 with all of the school 
counselors in the district. These interviews were primarily conducted via email due to time 
constraints and scheduling issues with the counselors (the counselors stated that it would be 
easier on them to conduct the interviews in this way), though if I had any additional questions, or 
if I needed clarification on any of the responses, I was able to follow up with the counselors by 
phone.  
 In total, there were four school counselors at Fountain Lake (one in the elementary 
school, one in the middle school, and two in the high school), all of whom agreed to participate 
in these interviews. All four school counselors were employed at Fountain Lake during the 2010-
11 school year when the CPIP was first implemented, as well as in the 2009-10 school year, the 
year before the CPIP was fully implemented. Because of this, each of these counselors could 
provide insight into how their roles and responsibilities were directly impacted by this new 
compensation system, if at all, and how the support of counseling services by teachers and 
administrators changed. The counselors could also provide their perceptions about how the CPIP 
affected the students of Fountain Lake, such as whether or not they believed students 
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experienced more anxiety and stress because of the increased focus on standardized test results in 
the district.  
 Instrument. 
 I created a series of questions for the purposes of these interviews, all of which were 
aimed at understanding the extent to which the CPIP impacted school counselors at Fountain 
Lake, and what the counselors’ perceptions were of how the program impacted Fountain Lake 
students. The questions were grouped into the following four general constructs: 
1) Current vs. Previous Job Responsibilities: How has the implementation of the CPIP 
impacted counselor job responsibilities, and do counselors now have more 
responsibilities related to standardized test preparation and administration? 
2) Time with Students: How has the implementation of the CPIP impacted the amount 
of time spent with students providing direct counseling services? 
3) Support from Teachers/Administrators: As a result of the CPIP, has the support for 
counseling services by teachers and administrators changed? 
4) Impact on Students: What impact, if any, has the CPIP had on student learning and 
emotional well-being? 
 Within each construct, I asked school counselors a series of 2-3 questions, each of which 
was aimed at addressing the theme of the construct. For example, in the first construct, Current 
vs. Previous Job Responsibilities, I asked school counselors if their job responsibilities had 
changed in any way as a result of the CPIP, and if they now spent more time assisting with 
testing-related activities such as coordinating test administrations, helping students prepare to 
take the tests, watching classes or students while teachers prepare other students for these tests, 
or if they now helped to proctor test administrations. These questions and those in the other 
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constructs should provide information about how the CPIP, which is primarily structured to 
reward teachers for their impact on student achievement, has affected the work of the school 
counselors as well. These questions will also allow me to show whether or not the work of 
school counselors in a school system with merit pay program in place still adheres to the 
counseling framework outlined in the American School Counseling Association (ASCA) 
National Model (2005). For example, ASCA recommends that school counselors should not act 
as a testing coordinator for a school; with these interviews, I can see if that recommendation is 
being followed.  
 A complete list of the questions used in these interviews is included in Appendix C 
 Analytic strategy. 
 After all of the interview responses were collected, I coded the responses of school 
counselors as positive, negative, or neutral depending upon the counselors’ perceptions of the 
impact of the CPIP. For example, if a counselor reported that the CPIP resulted in extra anxiety 
and stress for students, I would code that response as being negative; that is, the program had a 
negative impact on the emotional well-being of students. Conversely, if the counselor believed 
that the CPIP led to a greater focus on student achievement, which resulted in higher 
achievement for students without any additional stress, then that response would be coded as 
positive, as the counselor believed the program had a positive impact on Fountain Lake students. 
If a counselor believed that students were no better and no worse because of the CPIP, then that 
would be example of a neutral response; the CPIP did not result in any differences for the 
students. 
 I employed this coding procedure for all of the questions in each construct, which 
allowed me to organize and report the overall views of the school counselors at Fountain Lake. 
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In the Results section, I present this overall summary of counselor responses, and characterize 
the general impressions of counselors about whether the program had a positive, negative, or 
neutral impact at Fountain Lake. When possible, I have also included examples of quotes from 
the school counselors that are representative of their overall views of the impact of the CPIP.
25
 
For validation purposes, I allowed the school counselors who participated in these interviews to 
review my summary of their responses to ensure that my characterization of their answers to my 
interview questions were as accurate as possible. 
Research Question #2: Teacher Impacts 
 Sample. 
 To evaluate how teachers at Fountain Lake responded to the implementation of the CPIP, 
I administered surveys to teachers, both core and non-core, at two different time periods. Surveys 
were first administered to teachers in March of 2011, so that I could assess teacher attitudes and 
perceptions about the CPIP during the first year of its implementation, but prior to teachers 
receiving their end-of-year performance ratings or bonuses. In this way, I could gauge teachers’ 
thoughts about the CPIP before they knew whether or not they would benefit financially from the 
program. Put differently, responses from this first survey administration likely represented their 
attitudes about merit pay in general, and the CPIP in particular, without a full understanding of 
how they would be directly impacted by the implementation of this program.
26
 Responses on this 
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 In order to protect the confidentiality of the school counselors, direct quotes are only included 
if they cannot be directly linked to a specific school counselor. 
26
 If I had only administered surveys to teachers after they received their bonuses, it is likely true 
that those teachers who got the largest bonuses would have favorable things to say about merit 
pay and the CPIP, and conversely, those teachers who received the smallest bonuses would have 
had unfavorable views of this type of compensation system. In general, this would not have 
provided any insight into the impact of the CPIP, which is the primary reason I chose to 
administer surveys before and after bonuses were distributed, so I could see how attitudes and 
perceptions changed. 
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survey could provide information about whether or not teachers initially supported the 
implementation of the CPIP, if they thought the program was fair, and if they believed that the 
program would accurately capture and reward their overall “effectiveness” (in whatever way 
teachers defined that term). In total, 94 core and non-core teachers participated in this first round 
of surveys out of a total teacher population of 100, representing a response rate of 94%.  
 I also administered surveys to teachers in October of 2011 after they had participated in a 
full academic year of the program, including receiving their performance ratings and end-of-year 
bonuses. With this second administration, I could assess how the perceptions and attitudes of 
teachers changed after experiencing a full year of the CPIP, including whether or not their 
perceptions of the overall fairness of the program was significantly different. This is especially 
interesting as I could ascertain whether or not the bonus or performance rating a teacher received 
was related to how fair that teacher perceived the program to be. The responses from this second 
administration also provided information about whether or not the CPIP encouraged teachers to 
work harder, seek out additional training, collaborate more with their peers, etc. There were 109 
teachers, both core and non-core, at Fountain Lake at the start of the 2011-12 year, with 66 
participating in the second round of survey administration (61% of all teachers). Of the original 
94 teachers who completed the survey in March, 58 also completed the survey in October (62% 
of the original set of teachers). 
 Because of the notable decrease in teacher participation in October compared to March, it 
was important to take into consideration factors that might have impacted whether or not a 
teacher responded to the second survey administration. It is possible that teachers did not 
complete the second survey because they were frustrated with the program, or did not believe 
that the final bonus amount they received was a fair reflection of their effort or work with their 
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students. Thus, to adjust for any bias that may have been introduced into these analyses as a 
result of which teachers chose to respond (and not respond) to the second survey, I generated and 
applied non-response weights to all teacher survey responses. 
  For these purposes, I predicted the likelihood that a teacher would respond to the second 
survey using a logistic regression model that included the following four variables: End-of-year 
bonus amount, end-of-year performance rating, Spring survey responses about teacher support 
for the use of merit pay, and Spring survey responses about teacher perceptions about the 
fairness of the CPIP. Then, based on the probabilities that this regression model generated for 
whether a teacher responded to the second survey, I created “weights” for each teacher, with 
greater weight given to the responses of teachers who were less likely to respond to the survey 
(based on the regression probabilities), and less weight given to the responses of teachers who 
were more likely to respond to the survey based on the aforementioned variables. This weighting 
procedure does potentially reduce some of the precision of my results, but it also likely reduces 
any bias that may be introduced into my results simply as a function of which teachers chose to 
respond to the second survey.
27
  
 All core and non-core teachers were eligible to take these surveys and offer their opinions 
and views about the CPIP, though teacher participation was completely voluntary. The surveys 
were administered during the school day, with teachers able to come individually and take the 
survey during their planning periods. Teachers were informed that participation was not 
mandatory, but as a reward for completing the survey, four randomly selected teachers received a 
$25 gift card at each administration period. 
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 This weighting procedure was based on a similar procedure employed by Wolf et al. (2010) in 
their evaluation of the impact of a school choice voucher program implemented in Washington 
D.C. on various student outcome measures. 
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 Instrument. 
 The teacher surveys used in this analysis were designed by the Office for Education 
Policy specifically for the purpose of this evaluation, and were created to assess teacher attitudes 
about a wide range of topics related to merit pay in general, as well as about specifics aspects of 
the CPIP, including what impact it had on how teachers approached their work with their 
students and their fellow teachers. There were a total of 39 items included on the survey for core 
teachers and 32 on the non-core teacher survey, with teachers able to respond to each survey 
item with one of four responses: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, or Strongly Agree. A copy 
of the core and non-core teacher survey used in the Spring can be found in Appendix D.
28,29
 
 Prior to administering the surveys, I randomly assigned a unique number to each teacher. 
Teachers’ numbers were included on their surveys in the upper right-hand corner, and were used 
to link teacher survey responses from the Spring to the Fall. In this way, I could assess how 
specific teacher attitudes and perceptions changed from the first to second survey administration 
instead of just comparing the average responses of teachers from Spring to Fall. I was the only 
person to have access to the teacher-number list, so teachers could not be identified by anyone, 
including administrators at Fountain Lake, based solely on this number  
 The items on the surveys assessed teacher attitudes and opinions on a wide variety of 
topics related to merit pay, including whether or not the teacher considered him or herself 
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 The 32 items that appeared on the non-core teacher survey were also included on the core 
teacher survey. However, the survey for core teachers also included an additional seven items 
that were only relevant for core teachers, such as how these teachers used data from the NWEA 
assessments (non-core teachers did directly not use these assessments), and whether or not the 
content covered on standardized assessments used for bonuses calculations was representative of 
what students learned in the classroom.  
29
 The survey administered in the Fall was essentially the same survey that was administered in 
the Spring. There were some items for which the tense of wording changed and teachers were 
given more room to provide additional comments about the CPIP, but otherwise, the surveys 
from both administrations were identical.  
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“effective”, if the CPIP resulted in extra anxiety and stress for teachers, if the design of the CPIP 
encouraged working with the lowest performing students, and so forth. Teachers also responded 
to a number of survey items that were similar in scope, aimed at addressing broader concepts of 
how teachers responded to the use of merit pay. These groups of survey items, or constructs, 
were developed to assess teacher perceptions about the following: 
1) Support of merit pay as a compensation strategy (Supportive Construct); 
2) Fairness of the CPIP (Fairness Construct); 
3) How the CPIP impacted approach to teaching (Teaching Construct); 
4) How the CPIP impacted interactions with other teachers (Interactions Construct); 
5) Whether students at Fountain Lake benefitted from the implementation of the CPIP 
(Student Benefits Construct). 
Each construct was comprised of three to six items, all of which showed high levels of 
internal reliability or consistency.
30
 For example, the Cronbach’s alpha level for each of the 
constructs, which indicates the level of internal consistency or reliability for the construct on a 
scale of 0 to 1 (higher scores indicate greater internal consistency), was no lower than .65 for any 
of the constructs. The Cronbach’s alpha levels for each construct from the Spring and Fall survey 
administration, as well as the associated items used for each construct, were as follows: 
1) Supportive Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring = .735; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall 
=.571) 
o 1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be paid more than teachers who 
are less “effective.” 
                                                     
30
 This means that, in general, teachers responded to items within a construct in a similar fashion. 
For example, in the Fairness Construct, if a teacher responded to one question in a manner that 
suggested the CPIP was fair, then for the most part, that teacher would respond similarly for all 
of the other items in the Fairness Construct.  
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o 9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in improvements in the test scores 
of his/her students. 
o 12. Teachers with the same level of educational training who have worked for 
the same amount of time should be paid the same. (reverse coded)
31
 
o 13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for improving student 
achievement.  
2) Fairness Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring = .728; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall =.795) 
o 6. The bonus I receive will be based more on my effectiveness as a teacher 
than on the abilities of my students. 
o 14. The current bonus amount for which I am eligible is an appropriate reward 
for my work. 
o 36. The CPIP is fair. 
o 39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-year report card will 
accurately reflect my effectiveness as a teacher. 
3) Teaching Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring = .877; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall =.875) 
o 18. Because of the CPIP, I have sought out additional training (education, 
professional development, etc.) to improve my teaching. 
o 23. Teachers at my school have become more focused on raising student 
achievement as a result of the CPIP. 
o 27. Teachers at my school have investigated new teaching practices in order to 
improve their CPIP bonuses. 
o 30. I have witnessed other teachers working harder as a result of the CPIP. 
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 Some items were intentionally formatted in a different manner than other items in a particular 
construct. For example, in the Supportive Construct, items 1, 9, and 13 are all structured in the 
same way; agreement on one item likely corresponds to agreement on the others. However, item 
12 is worded such that if a teacher agreed with the other three items, then he or she should likely 
disagree with this item. Thus, by reverse coding, I have simply reformatted the responses of 
teachers on that particular item so that all responses are consistent with what the construct is 
measuring. In other words, for item 12, I have essentially reformatted the item so that it would 
read “Teachers with the same level of educational training who have worked for the same 
amount of time should NOT be paid the same”, and because of this, if a teacher disagreed with 
the item as it was previously worded, he or she would now agree with the way this item was 
worded. The goal of reverse coding is simply to maintain consistency in how teachers respond to 
items in a given construct. 
   78 
 
o 31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson planning at my school as a 
result of the CPIP. 
o 33. The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my school to adopt new teaching 
strategies.  
4) Interactions Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha -Spring =.661; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall 
=.719) 
o 21. Teachers now compete with each other instead of working together as a 
result of the CPIP (reverse coded). 
o 22. I have noticed more teachers at my school working together because of the 
CPIP. 
o 29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss various pedagogical practices 
with other teachers at my school.  
o 32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to share ideas with each other as 
a result of the CPIP (reverse coded). 
o 34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP encourages me to help other teachers 
in my school. 
5) Student Benefits Construct: (Cronbach’s alpha-Spring =.657; Cronbach’s alpha-Fall 
=.701) 
o 16. I believe the CPIP has improved the educational outcomes for students in 
my school. 
o 17. Students at my school had higher levels of anxiety and stress because of 
the CPIP’s focus on testing (reverse coded). 
o 25. Students at my school have learned more as a result of the CPIP. 
 
A numeric value was assigned to the four different response options for the series of 
items. For these purposes, selecting Strongly Disagree corresponded to a score of one, Disagree 
corresponded to a score of two, and so forth, up to a score of four for responding Strongly Agree 
to an item. As a result, scores for each item, and the average composite score for each construct, 
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ranged from 1-4, with higher scores indicating stronger levels of agreement with the item or the 
construct being measured. If a teacher had a composite score of four in the Supportive Construct, 
then that would indicate that that particular teacher was strongly in favor of the use of merit pay 
(since he or she Strongly Agreed with every item in that construct, which corresponds to a score 
of four for each item, resulting in an average score of four); conversely, a composite score of one 
for that same construct indicated strong disagreement to the implementation and use of merit 
pay. 
 Analytic strategy. 
 There were several different strategies used in my analyses of the impact of the CPIP on 
Fountain Lake teachers. Simple descriptive statistics of how teachers responded to each survey 
item, as well as to the series of items for each construct, are presented in the Results section and 
the Appendix section, including the percent of teachers that agreed with each item or construct, 
and the average score for individual items and constructs. These percentages and average scores 
provide straightforward information about how supportive teachers were of merit pay in general, 
whether or not they thought the CPIP was fair, and what impact the CPIP had on their approach 
to teaching, their interactions with other teachers, and the impact of the CPIP on Fountain Lake 
students. These simple statistics are provided for both survey administrations, so I can also show 
how teacher attitudes and opinions changed from the first survey administration in March (before 
bonuses were distributed) to the second survey administration in October (after bonuses were 
distributed) for those teachers that participated in both rounds of survey administration.  
 In addition to simply showing percentages and averages, I also used paired samples t-
tests to determine whether teachers’ responses were significantly different after they received a 
bonus. This analysis was restricted to only include those teachers that completed surveys at both 
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administration periods; in this way, I can quantify how teachers’ opinions about the overall 
impact of the CPIP changed after experiencing a full year of the program. This analysis is 
interesting, as I am able to, for example, show whether or not teachers thought the CPIP was fair 
before they knew how they would be rated and rewarded, and then see how teacher perceptions 
of the fairness of the CPIP were affected by receiving a bonus.  
 Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, I can also compare the survey responses for those 
teachers that received the highest CPIP performance ratings and bonuses to those of the teachers 
with the lowest CPIP ratings and bonuses (again, using only those teachers with responses from 
both administration periods). Similar to the previous approach, I will use independent samples t-
tests to show whether or not there were significant differences in these teachers’ responses. It 
may be true that the teachers that are the most supportive of merit pay in general and the CPIP 
specifically are those teachers that benefit the most from such a program (which intuitively 
makes sense), and that the teachers most opposed to this type of reform are those teachers that 
receive the lowest ratings or bonuses; with this analysis, I will be able to determine if that is in 
fact the case.  
Research Question #3: Student Impacts 
 Sample. 
 For the third research question, “What impact did the CPIP have on student achievement 
at Fountain Lake”, I evaluated how students at Fountain Lake performed on both nationally 
administered and Arkansas-specific assessments, as a way of capturing the overall effect of the 
introduction of merit pay in the district on improvements in student learning. First, I assessed 
how students at Fountain Lake performed on the nationally administered Northwest Evaluation 
Association (NWEA) Measures of Academic Progress (MAP) assessments. These assessments 
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were administered to students in grades K-10, and assessed student performance in the areas of 
math, reading, and language. The reading MAP assessment was administered in all grades in K-
10, while the math MAP assessment was given to students in grades K-8 and the language 
assessment was given to students in grades 2-10.  
 The MAP assessments were administered at Fountain Lake at three different time periods 
during the 2010-2011 school year: October 2010, January 2011, and April 2011. This enabled 
teachers and administrators to assess students’ baseline level of performance in the Fall and 
measure student growth from Fall to Spring, while also being able to address any deficits in 
student learning observed during the Winter MAP administration.  
 For this evaluation, I compared the amount of growth observed for Fountain Lake 
students over the course of the 2010-11 school year to the level of growth that might be “typical” 
for similar students during an academic year. This typical level of growth is derived from 
NWEA’s nationally representative norming population, and is based on two key student factors: 
a student’s grade, and his or her starting score from the Fall MAP administration. For example, if 
a 4
th
 grade student had a starting score of 200 on the math assessment, then the typical amount of 
growth for that particular student is based on the actual amount of growth observed for students 
in the same grade with the same starting score from across the United States. Because I could 
quantify the level of growth that might be typical for Fountain Lake students, I could determine 
if Fountain Lake student performance on the MAP assessments was notably different than what 
might be expected by comparing observed Fountain Lake student growth to the level of typical 
growth (across grade, school, and subject) for an academic year. 
 For the purposes of this evaluation, I only examined student performance on the MAP 
assessments for those students that had test scores from both the Fall and Spring administration 
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(i.e. those students for whom growth could be measured). As a result, the total sample for this 
analysis included the test scores for 726 students in math, 852 students in reading, and 721 
students in language. A summary of the number of students included in this analysis, 
disaggregated by grade, is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Number of Students by Subject with Fall and Spring NWEA MAP Scores, 2010-11 
Grade  N of Students: 
Math 
N of Students: 
Reading 
N of Students: 
Language 
K 70 70  
1
st
  74 74  
2
nd
 78 78 77 
3
rd
 85 85 82 
4
th
 87 87 85 
5
th
 82 82 82 
6
th
 78 79 78 
7
th
 79 82 82 
8
th
 93 93 93 
9
th
  70 73 
10
th
  52 69 
Overall 726 852 721 
 
 The analysis of NWEA performance is interesting, as it provides general information 
about the academic performance of students at Fountain Lake. Because a large percentage of 
individual teacher/employee bonuses was based on the amount of growth observed on the MAP 
assessments, it might be hypothesized that the motivation of earning bonuses under the CPIP 
resulted in significant gains on these assessments. Thus, this evaluation of how Fountain Lake 
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students performed on the MAP gives valuable information about their overall performance 
during the first year of the implementation of the CPIP. 
 However, a student showing significantly greater gains on the MAP assessments than 
typical growth, while useful, does not really tell us anything about how that student’s 
performance changed as a result of the CPIP. In other words, the MAP assessments give us a 
general understanding of student performance in the district, but without an appropriate 
counterfactual standard, we cannot say with any certainty how performance on the MAP 
assessments was different as a direct result of the CPIP. It is also true that while it is important to 
track student performance on the MAP assessments, ultimately, the district is held accountable 
for performance on the Arkansas Comprehensive Testing, Assessment, and Accountability 
(ACTAAP) assessments, not the MAP assessments.  
 Because of this, I also assessed how Fountain Lake students performed on the criterion-
referenced Arkansas Benchmark examination and the norm-referenced Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
(ITBS) as compared to a group of demographically and academically similar students in other 
local school districts. This Fountain Lake comparison group (FLCG) was comprised of one 
student in one of the seven school districts within a 25-mile radius matched to one student at 
Fountain Lake. Presented in Table 7 is a list of these seven school districts, including a summary 
of the demographic characteristics of each district. 
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 Table 7 
Demographic Characteristics of the Seven Districts Used in the Creation of the FLCG, 2010-11 
District 
 
Number of 
Students 
% 
White 
% African 
American 
% 
Hispanic 
% FRL 
Bismarck SD 961 90.2% 1.1% 7.2% 60.2% 
Cutter-Morning Star SD 640 83.6% 3.8% 6.6% 61.7% 
Glenn Rose SD 943 97.6% 0.5% 1.1% 51.9% 
Hot Springs SD 3,658 44.8% 39.1% 11.6% 77.6% 
Jessieville SD 890 90.6% 2.1% 4.9% 59.7% 
Lake Hamilton SD 4,128 84.8% 1.9% 7.5% 55.5% 
Lakeside SD 3,037 81.0% 8.4% 6.9% 39.3% 
Fountain Lake SD 1,213 85.8% 1.7% 6.3% 50.0% 
 
 Fountain Lake students were matched to comparison students on a number of observable 
measures, though the matching process was based primarily on identifying students with 
identical test scores from the Spring of 2009 and Spring of 2010, the two years of test scores 
prior to the implementation of the CPIP.
32
 By using this as my base criteria for matching 
purposes, I ensured that the academic performance of both Fountain Lake and FLCG students 
was as similar as possible. Because of this, if there were no differences in test performance 
between students in both groups in 2009 and 2010 (which there were not), it is reasonable to 
conclude that any differences in performance in 2011 is a direct result of the impact of the CPIP. 
                                                     
32
 The state started to use the ITBS in the spring of 2011. Prior to this, the state used the Stanford 
Achievement Test, 10
th
 Edition (SAT-10) as its norm-referenced assessment. As a result, the 
creation of the FLCG was based on matching students on their SAT-10 scores from two years 
prior to the implementation of the CPIP, while the norm-referenced outcome measure used in 
this analysis was performance on the ITBS.  
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 Beyond simply matching on test scores, I also sought to create a comparison group that 
was as similar as possible on observable demographic characteristics such as student grade, 
eligibility for free and reduced lunch (FRL), minority status, and gender. This was important 
because differences in these characteristics can have an impact on student performance on 
standardized assessments, and I wanted to ensure that my counterfactual condition was as similar 
to the group of Fountain Lake students as possible. Every Fountain Lake student was matched to 
a student in his or her grade; however, because I chose to prioritize accuracy on academic 
variables in my matching, the resulting FLCG was not identical to the group of Fountain Lake 
students on some of these other demographic characteristics.  
 For example, I generated two FLCGs, one matched on math performance and one 
matched on literacy performance. In both cases, there were no observed statistical differences in 
2010 test scores, the difference in test performance from 2009 to 2010, or the percentage of 
males or females in each group (see Tables 8 and 9). However, for both the math and literacy 
FLCG, there were statistical differences in the percentage of students eligible for free and 
reduced lunch, and the percentage of students that were classified as minority (African-
American, Hispanic, or Native American). The percentage of FRL eligible and minority students 
in the math FLCG was 59% and 16% respectively, compared to 53% and 9% for Fountain Lake 
students; these percentages are nearly identical for the literacy FLCG and group of Fountain 
Lake students. Because differences did exist between students in both groups, I controlled for 
differences in these matching characteristics in all of my estimations of the impact of the CPIP 
on student achievement.
33
 
                                                     
33
 Despite the differences observed in the demographic characteristics of the two student groups, 
the decision to place a greater emphasis on ensuring similarity on academic variables appears 
justified based on a simple review of the impact each of these variables have on predicting 
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Table 8 
Baseline Descriptive Statistics (Math) for Fountain Lake and Comparison Students, 2008-09 and 
2009-10
34
 
 N of 
Students
35
 
Avg. 
Math 
NCE, 
‘10 
Avg. 
Math 
NCE, 
‘09 
Avg. Math 
CRT Scale 
Score, ‘10 
Avg. Math 
CRT Scale 
Score, ‘09 
% 
FRL 
% 
Minority 
% 
Female 
Fountain Lake 
Students 
499 60.5 60.7 697.4 677.8 53% 9% 48% 
Comparison 
Students 
499 60.5 60.8 695.6 676.8 59% 16% 45% 
 
Table 9 
Baseline Descriptive Statistics (Lit.) for Fountain Lake and Comparison Students, 2008-09 and 
2009-10
36
 
 N of 
Students
37
 
Avg. 
Lit 
NCE, 
‘10 
Avg. 
Lit 
NCE, 
‘09 
Avg. Lit 
CRT Scale 
Score, ‘10 
Avg. Lit 
CRT Scale 
Score, ‘09 
% 
FRL 
% 
Minority 
% 
Female 
Fountain Lake 
Students 
499 51.6 49.8 716.7 680.0 53% 9% 48% 
Comparison 
Students 
499 51.6 49.6 714.7 673.2 59% 18% 47% 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
achievement in 2011. For example, using a state-wide student-level dataset for Arkansas students 
in grades 4-9, a regression model controlling for student grade and 2010 math score accounted 
for 57% of the variance in 2011 math scores, and including 2009 math scores in this model 
increased that percentage to 63%. Beyond these variables, the addition of FRL status, minority 
status, and gender to the regression model only accounted for 64% of the variance in 2011 math 
scores, or an additional 1% of the variance beyond grade and test scores.   
34
 The differences in percentage of FRL and minority students are significant at the p < .05 level 
35
 N of students refers to the number of students with test scores on the SAT-10 examination. 
36
 The differences in percentage of FRL and minority students are significant at the p < .05 level 
37
 N of students refers to the number of students with test scores on the SAT-10 examination. 
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 For these analyses, there were 499 Fountain Lake students and 499 FLCG students, for a 
total sample size of 998 students. Students in both groups were included in this analysis if they 
had valid test scores from both the 2011 year (the outcome measure in my analyses) and the 
2010 year (baseline measure prior to the implementation of the CPIP); it was not necessary for a 
student to have a test score from the 2009 year, though if they did, I also included this score in 
my FLCG matching procedure.
38
  
 The norm-referenced measures used in these analyses are administered to students in 
grades 1-9. By restricting my sample to only include those students with test scores in 2010 and 
2011 (and ideally 2009 as well), I could only include students in grades 4-9 during the 2010-11 
school year for this evaluation. So, for example, a student in the 4
th
 grade in 2010-11 would be in 
the 3
rd
 grade in 2009-10 (baseline year) and the 2
nd 
grade in 2008-09, or a 9
th
 grade student in 
2010-11 would have been in the 7
th
 grade in 2008-09. In other words, 4
th
-9
th
 graders were the 
only students for whom test scores from the two prior years were available.
39
 In total, there were 
593 students at Fountain Lake in grades 4-9 during the 2010-11 school year, while the sample for 
these analyses includes 499 Fountain Lake students with at least two years of testing data; thus, 
the analytic sample represents 84% of the actual number of students in grades 4-9 at Fountain 
Lake.  
  
 
                                                     
38
 Ideally, students would have valid test scores from all three test periods; however, to avoid 
restricting the sample of students further, I chose to include students in both groups even if they 
did not have a test score from 2009. If a Fountain Lake student did not have a test score in 2009, 
then when possible, I attempted to match that student to a comparison student that also did not 
have a test score in 2009. Of the 499 Fountain Lake students included in these analyses, 18 
students did not have a 2009 math or literacy score.  
39
 Testing data were also not available for students in grades 1 or 2 in 2010, which is why I could 
not include students in the 3
rd
 grade in 2011 (since they would not have baseline testing data). 
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 Instrument. 
 The NWEA MAP assessments are computer-adaptive tests that provide students with 
questions of increasing or decreasing difficulty based on whether or not a student responds 
correctly to a question. All test results are reported in RIT scores, which are units of measure that 
use individual item difficulty to estimate student achievement and create an equal-interval scale. 
This scale allows for comparisons of student performance across all grade and age levels, and is 
useful in measuring student growth over time.  
 NWEA has an extensive testing database and responses to test items collected over more 
than 13 years, which allows for a high level of stability and interpretation of the testing data. All 
NWEA tests are aligned with individual state standards to ensure that achievement gains on the 
NWEA reflect state-specific learning goals. The NWEA assessments have consistently yielded 
statistically valid correlations in test and re-test studies, and the items on the test have a high 
level of internal reliability.
40
 
 MAP data were obtained directly from NWEA, as Fountain Lake permitted the OEP to 
access all data, including student demographic information and test scores. MAP data were 
gathered for students in grades K-10 in the subject areas of math, reading, and language. These 
data were collected after each test administration (Fall, Winter, and Spring), and included test 
scores for all students, even those students who did not test at every administration period.  
 I also obtained student-level testing data for the ITBS, SAT-10 and Arkansas Benchmark 
assessments. These data were obtained from the Arkansas Department of Education, and 
included student demographic information such as student grade, school/district attended, FRL 
status, race, etc. These data were de-identified when obtained, so there were no variables 
                                                     
40 For more information on RIT scores and the NWEA examinations, see 
www.nwea.org/support/article/532 
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included that could be directly linked to a specific student (such as student name or social 
security number).  
The norm-referenced ITBS was administered in the Spring to students in grades 1-9 
starting in 2011; prior to that, the SAT-10 was the norm-referenced assessment used by the State, 
and was also given during the Spring to 1
st
-9
th
 grade students. Recall, for this evaluation, ITBS 
scores will serve as the outcome measure, and SAT-10 scores were used for matching purposes 
in 2009 and 2010 and to establish baseline equivalency between students at Fountain Lake and in 
the FLCG. Both the ITBS and SAT-10 assess student performance in math, reading, and 
language/literacy. Results from the ITBS and SAT-10 are reported in Normal Curve Equivalent 
(NCE) points, which range from 1-99 with a mean of 50.
41
  NCEs are on an equal-interval scale, 
which allowed me to compare student performance on the ITBS and SAT-10 across grades and 
school levels. Items on these assessments are presented in multiple-choice and extended response 
format.  
I also evaluated Fountain Lake student performance on the criterion-referenced Arkansas 
Benchmark examination. This examination is administered in the Spring to students in grades 3-
8, and includes open-response and multiple-choice items to assess student performance in math 
and literacy. All results reported for the Arkansas Benchmark are presented in scaled scores, 
which range from 0-999. In addition to scaled scores, student performance on the Arkansas 
Benchmark is reported in four categorical levels of performance: Below Basic, Basic, Proficient, 
and Advanced.  
  
                                                     
41 It should be noted that in a normal distribution of test scores (such as in Arkansas), an NCE 
score of 50 in one year followed by a NCE score of 50 the next year would be the equivalent of 
one year’s worth of learning. Thus, scores higher than 50 in the subsequent year indicate greater 
than a year’s worth of learning, and vice versa. 
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 Analytic strategy. 
 In my analysis of Fountain Lake MAP performance, I compared observed levels of 
growth for Fountain Lake students to the level of growth that would be typical for these students 
based on their grade and Fall test score. These growth norms provide reasonable estimates for the 
amount of growth that we might expect to observe in Fountain Lake students based on their 
grade and achievement level in the Fall. The difference between observed growth and the growth 
norms is referred to as a growth norm index, which simply indicates how actual student 
performance differed from typical growth levels. A positive growth norm index score indicates 
that Fountain Lake student performance exceeded that of the growth norm, whereas a negative 
index score indicates performance below the growth norms. A growth norm index score of zero 
means that Fountain Lake student performance was equivalent to typical growth levels. For this 
comparison, observed and typical levels of growth are presented in the Results section, as well as 
the corresponding growth norm index score, disaggregated by grade and subject. 
 For my analysis of the Fountain Lake student performance on the ACTAAP 
examinations, I used multiple regression analyses to assess the extent to which the 
implementation of the CPIP impacted student achievement (relative to the performance of 
students in the FLCG). In my regression analyses, I controlled for student grade, student 
achievement from the Spring of 2010 and 2009, and demographic variables such as student FRL 
status, race, and gender. Also included in these regression models was a binary variable that 
indicated whether a student was a Fountain Lake or FLCG student; the coefficient for this 
variable is the key coefficient of interest in these regression models, as it provides an estimate of 
how much of an impact the CPIP had on student achievement (and whether that impact was 
positive or negative), and whether or not that impact was statistically significant.  
   91 
 
 For these purposes then, the unstandardized equation for the regression model used in 
these analyses can be expressed in the following way: 
Υi = β0 + β1Xtreat + β2Xgrade + β3Xtest09 + β4Xtest10 + β5Xfrl + β6Xfemale + β7Xminority + ei 
where: 
 Υi is the 2010-11 test score (either NCE for the ITBS or scale score for the Arkansas 
Benchmark) for student i 
 β0 is the intercept 
 β1 is the slope for predictor Xtreat, a binary variable indicating whether a student was a 
Fountain Lake or FLCG student (1 = Fountain Lake, 0 = FLCG) 
 β2 is the slope for predictor Xgrade, a series of binary dummy variables indicating a 
student’s particular grade level 
 β3 is the slope for predictor Xtest09, a continuous variable representing the test score for 
student i from the 2008-09 school year 
 β4 is the slope for predictor Xtest10, a continuous variable representing the test score for 
student i from the 2009-10 school year 
 β5 is the slope for predictor Xfrl, a binary variable indicating whether a student was 
eligible for free or reduced lunch (1 = FRL eligible, 0 = non-FRL eligible) 
 β6 is the slope for predictor Xfemale, a binary variable indicating a student’s gender (1 = 
female, 0 = male) 
 β7 is the slope for predictor Xminority, a binary variable indicating a student’s ethnicity (1 
= minority (African-American, Native American, or Hispanic), 0 = non-minority 
(Caucasian or Asian)) 
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 ei is the residual for student i. 
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Chapter 5 – Results 
Research Question #1: Counselor Impacts 
 One finding from my review of merit pay literature was the lack of research focused on 
how such programs impact school employees other than teachers, including no relevant articles 
that addressed how merit pay programs affect school counselors. Thus, for this evaluation, I 
chose to evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the CPIP impacted the roles and 
responsibilities of school counselors, and from their perspective, determine whether or not the 
CPIP was beneficial for the students of Fountain Lake.  
 I assessed school counselor attitudes and perceptions through a brief interview that I 
administered in February 2012 to the school counselors at Fountain Lake. These interviews were 
conducted via email so as to not interfere with the counselors’ schedules, and were brief enough 
that the interviews took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. The school counselors made 
themselves available for follow-up interviews if needed, but for these purposes, the initial 
responses were sufficient enough to gain a general understanding of the counselors’ views of the 
CPIP. In total, I received interview responses to all of my questions from all four of the Fountain 
Lake school counselors (one in the elementary school, one in the middle school, and two in the 
high school).  
 One of the benefits of these interviews is that because all four of the counselors worked at 
Fountain Lake in the year prior to the implementation of the CPIP, they could all provide 
valuable insight into how their roles and responsibilities changed as a result of the increased 
focus on raising student achievement inherent in merit pay programs such as the CPIP.
42
 In this 
                                                     
42
 It should be noted that one of the school counselors was employed at Fountain Lake as a 
teacher in the year prior to the implementation of the CPIP, not as a school counselor. However, 
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way, I could begin to understand what counselors roles were with no individual-level 
accountability or evaluation processes in place, and then contrast those roles with the counselors’ 
views of the nature of their jobs in a school environment with an established merit pay program.  
 The interviews were structured to gauge counselor thoughts and perceptions in four key 
areas. First, I asked the counselors questions about what their current job responsibilities were 
compared to their previous responsibilities. Here, I wanted to determine if the counselors were 
asked to do anything different in response to the increased focus on raising student achievement, 
including assisting with more testing-related activities than in years prior (such as serving as 
testing coordinator, assisting with test preparation, proctoring test administrations, etc.). These 
questions allowed me to determine if counselors were being asked to take on responsibilities 
outside of what is recommended in the American School Counselor Association National Model 
(2005). 
 I also asked the school counselors to respond to questions pertaining to the amount of 
time they spent with Fountain Lake students engaged in school counseling activities, with a 
specific focus on determining if this amount of time had decreased since the CPIP was 
introduced.  It may be that in a school with a merit pay program like the CPIP in place, teachers 
are less willing to cede instructional time to school counseling activities, since a portion of a 
teacher’s bonus is based on how well his or her students perform on standardized assessments.  
And if students are not in the classroom learning the skills they need to do well on these 
assessments, and are instead spending time with the school counselors, then the teacher might be 
concerned that his or her bonus would be negatively affected. Thus, these questions provide 
information about whether or not counselors’ time with students has decreased since the CPIP 
                                                                                                                                                                           
that particular counselor was still able to provide information about how the use of merit pay 
affected the work of school counselors in the district.  
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was implemented, and if that is a result of teachers becoming more protective of their time with 
their students.  
 Along those lines, it may also be true that because the entire school/district is more 
heavily focused on raising student achievement, that the value of school counseling is minimized 
in the eyes of teachers and administrators. Because of this, I sought to understand if counselors 
believed teachers, principals, and administrators were less supportive of the services that school 
counselors provide, or were generally just less supportive of the counselors themselves. The 
work that school counselors do likely fills a necessary and important need for the Fountain Lake 
students, so I asked the school counselors a series of questions regarding whether or not their 
work was valued and supported by their colleagues and supervisors. 
 Finally, since the school counselors likely work much more closely with the students than 
perhaps teachers do (especially due to the nature of the counselor-student relationship), I wanted 
to ascertain from the counselors what their perceptions were of the impact the CPIP had on the 
students of Fountain Lake. I wanted to know if the counselors believed that the CPIP caused the 
students to experience higher levels of anxiety or stress, as counselors might be in a better 
position than teachers to say whether or not that was the case. I also asked the counselors if they 
believed the CPIP had led to positive outcomes for the students, such as increased learning, and 
if there were any other changes that the counselors had observed in the students with whom they 
worked.  
 After I received all of the counselors’ answers to my interview questions, I coded their 
responses as positive, negative, or neutral as a way of characterizing counselor viewpoints 
regarding the impact of the CPIP. For example, if a counselor reported that she felt less support 
from her principal since the CPIP was implemented, I would code that response as negative, 
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since the CPIP negative impacted her perceived level of support. Conversely, if the counselor 
stated that her principal was now more supportive of school-counseling activities, then that 
response would be characterized as positive. In general, this process allowed me to summarize 
all of the views of the counselors to see what impact, if any, the CPIP had on their roles and 
responsibilities in the Fountain Lake School District.    
 Current vs. previous job responsibilities. 
 The first set of questions I asked the school counselors at Fountain Lake dealt with if 
their job responsibilities had changed as a result of the CPIP, and if so, in what ways. The 
primary focus of these questions was to see if the counselors were being asked to take a more 
prominent role in standardized testing process, or were spending more time engaged in non-
counselor activities. Based on their responses to these questions, the overall impact of the CPIP 
in this area was neutral; that is, the implementation of the CPIP did not result in any changes to 
the roles and responsibilities of the school counselors, especially with regard to taking a more 
prominent role in the testing process.
43
 
 For example, the majority of the responses indicated that the counselors did not have any 
additional job responsibilities in 2010-11 beyond what they had in 2009-10, with all of the 
counselors noting that there were no new testing-related responsibilities that came with the 
introduction of the CPIP. One counselor stated that “there have been no additional 
responsibilities involving testing placed on me…,” while another counselor, when asked whether 
                                                     
43
 In this case, these responses could be characterized as positive, since the CPIP did not result in 
the counselors being asked to assume new roles or responsibilities under this new accountability 
system. However, I have chosen to characterize these responses as null since there was no 
impact, but for these purposes a null should also be interpreted as a positive finding of this 
evaluation.  
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he/she
44
 was asked to participate in more testing-related activities, stated “I do not spend more 
time assisting with testing-related activities than previously due to the CPIP.”   
 That is not to say that the counselors did not report some changes in their day-to-day 
work activities, or did not play a prominent role in the testing process. One counselor reported 
that he/she now spends more time completing paperwork and documenting the students with 
whom he/she works, and attributed this increase in paperwork to the adoption of the CPIP. And 
based on the responses of one of the counselors, it does appear that the responsibility for 
coordinating test administration is held by at least one of the counselors. However, this 
responsibility was not one that came to fruition as a direct result of the CPIP; this counselor was 
already serving as the testing coordinator before the program was implemented. Thus, the only 
negative change in responsibilities was an increase in paperwork, though that was only reported 
by one school counselor. 
 There were also some positive changes in responsibilities and counseling approach that 
were noted by the school counselors. When asked if his/her job responsibilities had changed in 
any way, one counselor had the following comment: “No, although I am more aware of the 
responsibility of enrolling kids in appropriate classes and encouraging them to do their best in 
academics.” Another counselor noted that he/she now works much more closely with specialty 
teachers (such as art, music, or physical education), because “the school as a whole is more 
focused on the curriculum they are implementing.” These comments do suggest a more focused 
approach towards raising student achievement that spans the entire district. Overall then, the 
majority of the counselor’s responses indicated no real substantial changes in their roles and 
                                                     
44
 To protect the confidentiality of the school counselors, I have chosen to use “he/she” when 
referring to the interview responses of a specific counselor, to avoid revealing the gender of the 
counselor making the statement (since there was only one male school counselor at Fountain 
Lake). 
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responsibilities, though the implementation of the CPIP may have resulted in more time and 
effort spent to meet the academic needs of Fountain Lake students.  
 Time with students. 
 For the next set of questions, I asked the school counselors whether or not their time with 
students was affected by the CPIP. It is possible that in a system with a greater emphasis on 
standardized test performance, that there may be a greater reluctance on the part of teachers to 
relinquish time in the classroom where students are learning the skills necessary to perform well 
on these assessments. Put differently, it may be that the increased focus on student achievement 
comes at the expense of other academic, career, or personal/social developmental needs that 
would be addressed by the school counselors. A review of counselor responses does in fact 
support this theory; it appears that the implementation of the CPIP did have a negative impact on 
counselors’ opportunities to work with Fountain Lake students. 
 One prominent theme that emerged from the counselors’ responses is that teachers 
became more protective of their instructional time because of the emphasis on testing under the 
CPIP. In nearly all of their answers to these questions, the counselors noted that it became harder 
to take students out of the classroom during lessons because the teachers did not want students to 
miss out on the content that was being taught. For example, one counselor stated that “the core 
teachers are keeping a tighter rein on their students than before CPIP.” Another counselor 
confirmed this statement, saying, “I do not spend less time than before (with students), but it is 
harder to find time to pull kids from classes because teachers are much more protective of 
instructional time.” One counselor was quite direct in his/her comments on this topic, stating that 
teachers “are also very covetous of their time with the students and would prefer I not take them 
during class time.”  
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 Beyond simply having difficulty finding time to meet with students, or teachers 
preferring to have students avoid missing class, the focus of the CPIP may have impacted the 
response teachers have to allowing their students to participate in counseling activities. One of 
the counselors said that he/she has received complaints from teachers because the counselor took 
students out during instruction time. Specifically, when asked if teachers were less willing to 
allow students to be removed from class time, the counselor stated: “Numerous times this year I 
have received complaints when counseling activities or student informational assemblies have 
interrupted instructional time.” 
 Even if teachers are supportive, it is also possible that counselors are simply too busy 
with other CPIP activities to fully devote the necessary time to working with their students. For 
the counselor who previously stated that he/she now spends more time in collaboration with 
other teachers because of the focus of the CPIP, that same counselor also noted that he/she 
spends “less time with students because I am involved in the cross-curriculum project which 
takes time: meeting, planning, carrying out (the) project.” 
 Thus, it does appear that the amount of time spent with students has been affected by the 
CPIP, as teachers are less willing to relinquish class time to the school counselors. Further, based 
on the comment of one counselor about receiving complaints, it may be that the importance of 
counseling, in the eyes of both teachers and principals, has been impacted since the CPIP was 
adopted.
 45
   
                                                     
45
 This finding is particularly interesting, because while school counselors expressed they had 
less time with students, it was because teachers were more protective of their class time. Thus, 
this system encouraged teachers to be more protective of their time with their students, which 
could be interpreted as a positive finding of this evaluation. Obviously, being protective at the 
expense of other activities, such as school counseling, is not ideal; nonetheless, the fact that 
teachers were more aware of students needing to be in the classroom learning may be a positive 
outcome associated with the use of merit pay.  
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 Support from teachers/administrators. 
 My next line of questions focused on whether or not counselors believed that teachers 
and principals were less supportive of their work since the CPIP was adopted. Some of the 
counselors’ responses from the previous section suggest that teachers may view the work that 
school counselors do as less important than the work that is done is the classroom. In general, the 
responses of counselors suggest that the level of support from teachers and principals has not 
changed as a result of the CPIP (characterized as a neutral impact). However, while the level of 
support has not changed, the need for counselors to be more cognizant of not taking students out 
of class has changed, as the counselors’ comments suggest that their work is still supported so 
long as the counselors recognize the importance of class time.  
 This point may be best summarized by the following counselor response of whether or 
not teachers are less supportive now because of the CPIP: “I would say somewhat. We have had 
some serious issues with students that teachers have recognized student need for counseling, but 
generally teachers have been very protective with instructional time.” That counselor went on to 
note that he/she believes “the level of support has remained about the same, but I have been 
asked to respect instructional time as much as possible.” 
 Another counselor made this point when asked if teachers were less supportive of 
counseling as a result of the CPIP: “My opinion is that overall they (the teachers) are not 
supportive of anything that takes away from their normal teaching day. I don’t see them singling 
out counseling activities to support less due to the CPIP.” Another counselor had a similar 
perspective, noting that his/her “administrators are very supportive of school counseling 
activities as long as it does not interfere with teach (sic) time.” This theme is consistent 
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throughout the interview responses; the level of support has not changed, but the counselors are 
put in a position where they need to find alternate times to work with students.  
 Because of this, the reasons for the issues noted in the previous section, that counselors 
now have less time to work with their students since the CPIP was implemented, becomes more 
apparent: Teachers simply do not want to give up class time with their students. So while 
teachers are more focused on ensuring that students are learning testable skills, it may come at 
the detriment of the school counselors’ work with the students. This point might be best 
summarized by the following interview response: “CPIP, teaching strategies, pacing guides, etc. 
demand more time and counseling time has diminished. I have no set time for counseling like I 
had before CPIP. I have to hunt for time to do guidance lessons.” 
 Impact on students. 
 The final set of interviews questions dealt with what impact, if any, the CPIP had on 
Fountain Lake students. I divided these interview questions into two categories; questions that 
addressed whether or not students were learning more as a result of the CPIP, and if the CPIP 
had resulted in extra anxiety, stress, or any other negative changes for students at Fountain Lake. 
Because of how closely school counselors work with students, it may be that they are better able 
to observe how students have responded to the implementation of the CPIP. 
 The responses for both sets of questions are not easily characterized, as counselor 
responses varied. Half of the counselors believed that the CPIP did not impact student learning, 
and the other half did. Further, while most of the counselors stated that the program had not 
resulted in extra anxiety and stress for the students, one counselor did believe that the CPIP had 
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caused the students to be more anxious and stressed.
46
  Because of these mixed responses, the 
interpretation of how the CPIP impacted students is not particularly straightforward. 
 Regarding student learning, there were some counselors who felt strongly about the 
positive impact of the CPIP on the students. For example, one counselor stated that he/she had 
observed “students more focused on long term goals such as career preparation. I think this may 
be in relation from teachers modeling this focus on goal oriented activities.” Another counselor 
stated that he/she believed that students benefitted because the “CPIP has made teachers focus 
more on where the students are and what needs to be done to bring them up.” This statement was 
supported by another counselor who noted that he/she thinks “the impact has been positive 
because teachers have become more focused on student learning and results.”  
 However, as was just noted, not all of the counselors agreed that the CPIP had a positive 
impact on student learning.  One counselor stated that he/she was not certain if students were 
benefitting as a result of the CPIP, but he/she did confirm that he/she had observed teachers 
putting extra effort into teaching, as a way of “trying to do what is required in order to gain some 
additional income.” Another counselor was decidedly more clear on his/her perceptions of the 
impact of the CPIP, noting that he/she did not “think that the CPIP effected (sic) student learning 
at Fountain Lake at all.” That counselor went on to state that the program was not impacting 
student learning because it was not impacting the teachers, since the teachers “are here for the 
kids and they teach because they want the kids to learn not because they can get more money.”  
 For the most part, the school counselors reported that they did not think the CPIP resulted 
in additional anxiety or stress for the students (though there was agreement that teachers were 
now more anxious and stressed). Several counselors stated they had not observed any such issues 
                                                     
46
 Several counselors did report that the CPIP caused more anxiety and stress for Fountain Lake 
teachers as well.  
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in the students with whom they worked, and certainly had not seen increases since the start of the 
2010-11 school year. One counselor stated that he/she had seen more anxiety for teachers and 
students, but was not sure if it was a direct result of the CPIP, or whether it was a combination of 
other factors. There was one counselor who offered a different perspective about the impact of 
the program, noting that the CPIP “sets high expectations for our students and some are unable to 
rise to the occasion. I feel that some students are affected by the feeling of failure, too much 
work, teacher pressure, and sometimes they just want to quit. Learning seems not to be as much 
fun as it once was.”  
 Based on the inconsistent responses of counselors for this set of questions, it is unclear 
how students are affected by the CPIP. Some counselors saw positive impacts for student 
learning, and others did not. And while the majority of counselors did not think Fountain Lake 
students were more anxious or stress, one counselor did suggest that the program had resulted in 
increased pressure and stress placed on the students. 
 Summary of counselor results. 
 The interviews with school counselors at Fountain Lake revealed some aspects of the 
adoption of a merit pay program that could be viewed as positive findings (those findings that I 
have characterized as neutral). For example, it does not appear that the adoption of the CPIP 
resulted in school counselors assuming additional responsibilities, including no reports of 
counselors being asked to assume a role in the standardized testing process (beyond what the 
counselors were already doing). Further, the amount of support from teachers and administrators 
has gone relatively unchanged, save for the fact that teachers are now more protective of 
classroom time.  
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 However, with teachers placing greater value on the time they have with their students, it 
appears that this is having a negative impact on the time that counselors get with the students. 
Counselors were nearly unanimous in noting that they now have less time to provide counseling-
related services to Fountain Lake students, and struggle to find opportunities during the day with 
meet with the students. And while the majority of counselors stated that the CPIP did have a 
positive impact on student learning, there was not agreement among the counselors about 
whether or not the program led to more anxiety and stress for the students.  
 The overall patterns for the counselor responses are presented in Table 10. Based on 
these responses, it is unclear whether, from the counselors’ perspective, the implementation of 
the CPIP was beneficial for the students at Fountain Lake. It also certainly merits further 
consideration about whether or not this program, with its increased focus on accountability, is 
having a detrimental impact on the responsibilities that school counselors have with their 
students.  
Table 10 
Summary of Counselor Interview Responses 
Construct Finding Summary 
Counselor roles and 
responsibilities 
Neutral No changes in counselor roles and responsibilities 
Time spent with students Negative Decrease in time with students; difficulty making time 
during the school day to meet with students 
Support from teachers and 
administrators 
Neutral No changes in teacher and administrator support 
Impact on the students of 
Fountain Lake 
Mixed Mixed reports on the impacts on student learning; 
inconsistency about whether the program led to more 
anxiety and stress 
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Research Question #2: Teacher Impacts 
 One of the central questions I sought to address in this evaluation of the CPIP was how 
teachers responded to the implementation of this type of compensation strategy. Because the 
teachers are the ones most directly impacted by a merit pay program—their work comes under 
greater scrutiny, and they have the potential to have their work recognized and financial 
rewarded—it seems important to understand whether or not teachers are supportive of this type 
of program, whether they believe the structure of this particular program is fair, and if the 
adoption of this type of program incentivized the teachers to alter their teaching approach.  
 Ultimately, if teachers support this type of system, and if the opportunity to earn a bonus 
motivates teachers to work harder, seek out new training, collaborate more, etc., then the use of 
merit pay may be a sound reform strategy. This is because if teachers are more focused on 
raising student achievement and feel their hard work is being recognized and rewarded, then 
everyone benefits; student achievement will likely increase, teachers will be more satisfied, and 
in the end, the best teachers will likely stay in the classroom because of this reward system. 
Conversely, if teachers are not supportive of the use of merit pay, think the approach is unfair, or 
do not alter their approach to teaching in any way, then the opposite might occur (or simply 
nothing will occur at all); student achievement will not be impacted, and teachers may become 
frustrated with teaching. Further, if this type of program does not provide incentives for the best 
teachers to continue teaching, then one of the ultimate goals of this type of strategy, rewarding 
and retaining the best teachers, may not be realized. And if that is the case, then student 
achievement will likely suffer as a result, since the students are no longer being taught by the 
very best teachers. 
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 Because of the significant costs associated with the implementation of the CPIP, both in 
terms of time spent developing and implementing the program, and the actual financial costs 
associated with providing bonuses to all employees, understanding how teachers responded to 
this particular merit pay program is of the utmost importance. For these purposes then, I chose to 
gauge teacher attitudes and perceptions about the CPIP by administering surveys to all teachers 
in March of the 2010-11 school year, and then again in October of the 2011-12 school year. The 
goal of these survey administrations was twofold; first, I wanted to understand teachers’ views of 
the CPIP, including their level of support for this type of program, their thoughts on the fairness 
of the CPIP, and whether or not the program had encouraged them to approach teaching 
differently, before the teachers received their year-end performance ratings or their bonuses (in 
March). At this point, teachers did not know how much of a bonus they would receive, so this 
survey administration provides baseline information about teacher attitudes and perceptions of 
the program.  
The second goal of the survey administration was to understand how teachers’ 
perceptions changed after they had received their ratings and bonuses (in October). This may be 
particularly interesting, as it could be that teachers are less receptive to a merit pay program 
simply because they do not understand the process, or because they are unsure whether or not 
they will be rewarded. Thus, after the second round of survey administration, I can see if 
teachers were now more or less supportive of merit pay in general and the CPIP in particular, and 
whether or not they believed the program had resulted in positive changes for teachers (among 
other things).  
One of the additional benefits of these surveys is that I could link individual teacher 
responses to their overall performance rating and bonus amount. Included on every teacher’s 
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survey was a unique identification number, to which only I had access, which allowed me to 
match survey responses to CPIP performance rating. This allowed me to see if a particular group 
of teachers, specifically those teachers who earned the highest ratings and thus benefitted the 
most from the program, were more receptive and responsive to the program than their colleagues 
who performed less well under the program. If such differences in attitudes did exist, then it may 
be that the intended goal of the program is occurring; those teachers who are rated the highest 
and receive the largest bonuses are more satisfied (and more likely to stay in the classroom), and 
those teachers who receive the lowest ratings are less satisfied and ultimately might choose to 
seek out alternative employment opportunities.
47
 
 On the surveys, I assessed the attitudes and perceptions of teachers in five key areas, or 
constructs. For example, I asked teachers whether or not they were supportive of using merit pay 
as a way of rewarding teacher effectiveness, and if teachers who are more “effective” should be 
compensated differently than those teachers who are less “effective” (Supportive Construct). I 
also asked teachers questions regarding their views of the fairness of the structure of the CPIP 
(Fairness Construct), so I could determine how support for merit pay in general and the CPIP 
specifically differed (if at all).  
 Since one of the goals of a merit pay program is to motivate teachers to alter their 
teaching approach in some way (referred to as motivational effects), it seemed important to 
determine if teachers perceived that this occurred. To accomplish this, I asked teachers if they 
had sought out additional training as a result of the CPIP, focused more on raising student 
achievement, adopted new teaching strategies, and so on (Teaching Construct). I also asked 
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 Of course, this would only be beneficial if the program was accurate in the identification of the 
highest performing teachers. The stability of these performance ratings would need to be 
observed over multiple years to ensure that there was consistency in which teachers received the 
highest ratings, and which teachers received the lowest.  
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teachers if they collaborated more with other teachers, including sharing ideas about classroom 
strategies, and if teachers were now more willing to help each other as a result of the CPIP 
(Interactions Construct). For both of these constructs, my goal was to assess whether the CPIP 
was resulting in motivational effects for teachers, and if so, to what extent.  
 Finally, I also gauged teachers’ attitudes about the impact the CPIP had on the students at 
Fountain Lake, included whether or not students were learning more because of the emphasis on 
student achievement in the CPIP (Student Benefits Construct). Ideally, teachers would be 
motivated to approach teaching differently (and be rewarded for their hard work), and as a result, 
student achievement would improve across the district. I will evaluate later in this chapter 
whether or not student achievement was in fact affected by the adoption of the CPIP, but here I 
wanted to see if teachers believed that students benefitted from this program, or if they believed 
the use of merit pay had a negative effect on students, such as causing them to experience higher 
levels of anxiety and/or stress.  
 The teacher surveys used in this evaluation can be found in Appendix E. In the following 
sections, I present my findings from the initial survey administration, show how teacher 
perceptions changed after receiving a bonus, and then compare the responses of those teachers 
who received the highest ratings/bonuses to those teachers with the lowest ratings/bonuses.  
 Spring survey responses. 
 Presented in Table 11 are the mean construct scores for teachers who responded to the 
survey in March of 2011 (before receiving a bonus). These average construct scores are weighted 
to account for factors that might have impacted whether or not a teacher responded to the survey 
in October as well (giving greater weight to teacher responses with characteristics more typical 
of teachers who did not respond to the second survey). 
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 Recall, construct scores ranged from 1-4, with higher scores indicating a greater level of 
agreement with the items included in each construct. For example, a construct score of four 
would indicate that a teacher strongly agreed with all of the items in that particular construct, and 
a construct score of one would indicate strong disagreement with each of the items. The midpoint 
for these constructs is a score of 2.5, with scores above indicating general agreement with the 
focus of that particular construct, and scores below indicating general disagreement. 
 The results from the Spring survey show a fairly consistent pattern; all of the mean 
construct scores were at or below 2.5. Scores around 2.5, in general, represent areas where most 
teachers responded near the mean, with some teachers agreeing with the focus of the construct (a 
score of 3) and others expressing disagreement (a score of 2). For example, the mean score for 
the Interactions Construct was 2.5; since items in this construct deal with whether or not teachers 
believed the CPIP led to increased collaboration and decreased competition among teachers, it is 
likely that some teachers believed this did occur as a result of the CPIP, and other teachers 
believed it did not. For this specific construct, the standard deviation was 0.5, indicating that the 
majority (68%) of teacher scores were between 2.0 and 3.0 (i.e. most responses by teachers were 
either disagree or agree). 
 The mean construct scores for the remaining four constructs show that, in general, 
teachers neither overwhelmingly agreed nor overwhelmingly disagreed with the construct being 
measured. Teachers were slightly less supportive of the use of merit pay as a compensation 
strategy (Supportive Construct=2.4), and expressed that they did not believe the CPIP was fair 
(Fairness Construct=2.2). Teachers were also slightly more likely to respond that the CPIP had 
not impacted their teaching approach (Teaching Construct=2.4), and that the CPIP was not 
beneficial for the students at Fountain Lake (Student Benefits Construct=2.3). 
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Table 11 
Summary of Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, Spring 2011 
Construct N Mean Construct Score: 
Spring (SD) 
Supportive Construct 94 2.4 (0.7) 
Fairness Construct 94 2.2 (0.6) 
Teaching Construct 94 2.4 (0.6) 
Interactions Construct 94 2.5 (0.5) 
Student Benefits Construct 94 2.3 (0.6) 
 
 To provide some context for what these mean construct scores represent, I have included 
in Table 12 the percentage of teachers that agreed or strongly agreed with each of the items 
included in the surveys analyses, as well as the overall percent agreement (agree plus strongly 
agree), with all of the items organized by construct. These individual item percentages provide 
additional information about the overall perceptions and attitudes of Fountain Lake teachers. For 
example, based on the mean construct score of 2.2, it appears that teachers did not believe the 
CPIP was fair, and the percent agreement for items in this construct reflects that general attitude. 
Of the 94 teachers who responded to the survey, only 19% believed that the bonus they received 
would be based on their own effectiveness (instead of on the abilities of their students), and only 
15% thought the rating they received at the end of the year would accurately reflect their 
effectiveness as a teacher. There were also only 37% of teachers that responded in agreement to 
the straightforward survey item about whether teachers believed the CPIP was fair. Interestingly, 
63% of teachers did believe that the bonus amount for which they were eligible was an 
appropriate reward for their work.  
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 There was a fairly even split in whether or not teachers were in agreement with items in 
the Teaching Construct, which included items related to how the CPIP impacted approaches to 
teaching. For most of the items, the percent agreement was near 50%, indicating, for example, 
that approximately half of the Fountain Lake teachers believed the CPIP had resulted in more 
teachers working harder, with the other half believing there had been no impact on how hard 
teachers worked. There was strong agreement among teachers that the CPIP had resulted in a 
greater focus on raising student achievement (73%), though teachers did not agree that the CPIP 
had resulted in more teachers seeking out additional training (27%). 
 Regarding their interactions with other teachers, most teachers (63%) agreed that the 
CPIP did not result in competition with other teachers (37% thought there was more 
competition), and most teachers (83%) thought the CPIP did not result in teachers withholding 
ideas from other teachers (though 17% of teachers did). However, only 38% of teachers thought 
that the CPIP resulted in teachers collaborating more, and only 42% expressed that the CPIP 
encouraged teachers to share pedagogical strategies or practices. In other words, most teachers 
agreed that the CPIP did not result in competition, but most teachers also agreed that it did not 
result in increased collaboration either. 
 When asked whether or not the CPIP had improved student learning across the district, 
less than half of the teachers agreed that the CPIP had been positive for students (46%), and only 
42% believed that students had learned more as a result of the CPIP. Forty-seven percent of 
teachers also reported that the CPIP had led to increased levels of anxiety and/or stress for 
Fountain Lake students. Based on these responses, it seems that the perceptions of how 
beneficial this program was for students were mixed. 
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Table 12  
Summary of Teacher Survey Item Percent Agreement, Spring 2011 
Construct/Questions Overall 
Percent 
Agreement 
(Spring) 
Perc. 
Agree 
Perc. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Supportive Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .735)    
1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be paid more than 
teachers who are less “effective.” 
72% 44% 27% 
9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in improvements in the 
test scores of his/her students 
32% 30% 2% 
12. Teachers with the same level of educational training who have 
worked the same amount of time should be paid the same (R).
 48
 
52% 40% 13% 
13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for improving student 
achievement. 
75% 56% 19% 
Fairness Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .728)    
6. The bonus I receive will be based more on my effectiveness as a 
teacher than on the abilities of my students. 
19% 15% 4% 
14. The current bonus amount for which I am eligible is an 
appropriate reward for my work. 
63% 45% 18% 
36. The CPIP is fair. 37% 33% 4% 
39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-year report card 
will accurately reflect my effectiveness as a teacher. 
15% 15% 0% 
Teaching Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .877)    
18. Because of the CPIP, I have sought out additional training 
(education, professional development, etc.) to improve my teaching. 
27% 22% 4% 
23. Teachers at my school have become more focused on raising 
student achievement as a result of the CPIP. 
73% 58% 15% 
27. Teachers at my school have investigated new teaching practices 
in order to improve their CPIP bonuses. 
47% 44% 2% 
30. I have witnessed other teachers working harder as a result of the 
CPIP. 
52% 44% 8% 
31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson planning at my 
school as a result of the CPIP. 
45% 42% 3% 
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 Indicates that an item has been reverse coded. 
   113 
 
Construct/Questions Overall 
Percent 
Agreement 
(Spring) 
Perc. 
Agree 
Perc. 
Strongly 
Agree 
33. The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my school to adopt new 
teaching strategies. 
51% 49% 2% 
Interactions Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .661)    
21. Teachers now compete with each other instead of working 
together as a result of the CPIP (R). 
37% 32% 5% 
22. I have noticed more teachers at my school working together 
because of the CPIP. 
38% 33% 5% 
29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss various pedagogical 
practices with other teachers at my school. 
42% 38% 3% 
32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to share ideas with 
each other as a result of the CPIP (R) 
17% 13% 3% 
34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP encourages me to help 
other teachers in my school. 
57% 50% 7% 
Student Benefits Construct (Chronbach’s alpha = .657)    
16. I believe the CPIP has improved the educational outcomes for 
students in my school. 
46% 42% 4% 
17. Students at my school had higher levels of anxiety and stress 
because of the CPIP’s focus on testing (R) 
47% 39% 8% 
25. Students at my school have learned more as a result of the CPIP. 42% 40% 2% 
 
 Changes in teacher responses. 
 Teacher responses from the March survey administration appear to indicate that the CPIP 
did not have a positive impact on approach to teaching, interactions with other teachers, or on the 
students of Fountain Lake. The teachers also did not report being supportive of merit pay in 
general, and did not believe the CPIP was fair. However, at the time this March survey was 
administered, teachers did not know what their end-of-year ratings would be, and as a result, did 
not know whether or not they would receive a bonus or how large their bonus might be. Thus, in 
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this section, I explore how teacher attitudes and perceptions changed after they had experienced 
a full year of the CPIP (including receiving their merit pay bonuses). 
 Presented in Table 13 are the mean construct scores from the Spring and Fall surveys for 
those teachers who participated in both rounds of survey administration. Here again, construct 
scores are weighted to account for factors that might have impacted whether or not a teacher 
participated in the second survey administration. I used a paired samples t-test to determine if the 
difference in average responses from Spring to Fall were statistically significant, and have 
included in this Table the difference in construct scores from Spring to Fall, and the p-values that 
correspond to my significance tests.  
 The results of these analyses indicate that even after receiving a bonus, teacher attitudes 
and perceptions remained unchanged, as there were no statistically significant differences in 
mean construct scores from March to October. Teachers did not become more supportive of the 
use of merit pay, and they did not change their opinions of the fairness of the CPIP. There also 
did not appear to be any changes in perceptions of the impact of the CPIP on teaching approach, 
interactions with other teachers, or the benefits for students. The mean construct score for the 
Fairness Construct actually decreased by 0.2 points, and while this difference was non-
significant, it does perhaps indicate that simply receiving a bonus does not necessarily equate 
with the perception of the fairness of a merit pay program. That is, even though all of the 
teachers that participated in both rounds of survey administration received a bonus, the 
perception was still that the program was unfair. This may be a result of teachers receiving 
bonuses that were less than what was expected, or some of the teachers simply received a bonus 
lower than what other teachers received.  
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Table 13 
Summary of Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, Spring 2011to Fall 2011 
Construct N Mean Construct 
Score: Spring (SD) 
Mean Construct 
Score: Fall (SD) 
Diff. p-value 
Supportive Construct 58 2.6 (0.5) 2.7 (0.5) 0.1 .189 
Fairness Construct 58 2.3 (0.6) 2.1 (0.8) -0.2 .667 
Teaching Construct 58 2.4 (0.5) 2.4 (0.5) 0.0 .989 
Interactions Construct 58 2.6 (0.5) 2.5 (0.5) -0.1 .289 
Student Benefits Construct 58 2.4 (0.6) 2.3 (0.6) -0.1 .083 
 
 At the individual item level (see Table 14), the decrease in mean score for the Fairness 
Construct is apparent; in March, 45% of teachers thought the CPIP was fair, and in October that 
percentage decreased to 20%.
49
 There was also a decrease in the percentage of teachers who 
thought the bonus amount for which they were eligible was fair, from 67% agreement in March 
to 59% in October. Oddly, the percent agreement increased for the survey item that addressed 
whether the end-of-year rating that a teacher received would accurately reflect a teacher’s 
effectiveness, with 17% of teachers agreeing in March, and 49% of teachers agreeing in October.  
 There are also interesting response patterns for items in the Supportive Construct. For 
example, the percent of teachers who agreed that more “effective” teachers should be paid more 
than less “effective” teachers increased, from 83% to 93%. However, the percentage of teachers 
who thought that teachers should be financially rewarded for these improvements in student 
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 Because non-core teachers were eligible for a lower maximum bonus ($6,000) than core 
teachers ($10,000), it is possible that the overall perception that the CPIP was unfair was largely 
driven by the responses of non-core teachers. Based on these survey responses, that very likely 
was the case. For example, in March, 50% of core teachers thought the CPIP was fair, compared 
to 23% in October. In contrast, 35% of non-core teachers thought the CPIP was fair in March, 
with that percentage dropping to 15% in October. Thus, it does appear that overall, non-core 
teachers generally viewed this program as being less fair than did core teachers. 
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achievement actually decreased, with 84% of teachers agreeing with this item in the Spring, and 
only 77% agreeing in the Fall. 
 Regarding the impact the CPIP had on teaching approach and interactions with other 
teachers, there was a decrease or no change in the percent agreement for the majority of items 
included in each construct, though in most areas the decrease was not substantial. For example, a 
smaller percentage of teachers reported that they had sought out additional training (24% to 
21%), thought the CPIP had led to an increased focus on student achievement (67% to 62%), and 
thought that teachers worked harder (53% to 48%).  The only areas for which the percent 
agreement increased was more teachers noticed an increased focus on lesson planning (50% to 
51%), and more teachers discussed pedagogical practices with other teachers (44% to 50%). 
Fewer teachers also reported that the CPIP had resulted in teachers competing with each other, 
from 64% in March to 57% in October.
50
 
 Finally, and perhaps somewhat concerning, are the changes in perceptions of teachers 
with regard to the impact of the CPIP on Fountain Lake students. There was a notable decrease 
in the percentage of teachers who thought the CPIP improved educational outcomes for students, 
from 49% agreement in March to 37% agreement in October. This response pattern was 
consistent with responses regarding whether students learned more as a result of the CPIP, with 
the percent agreement decreasing from 40% in March to 35% in October. Additionally, more 
teachers thought the CPIP led to higher levels of anxiety and stress for Fountain Lake students; 
the percent agreement increased to 58% in October (from 54% in March) after teachers had 
experienced a full year of the program. 
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 It should be noted that despite this decrease, over half of the teachers did still say that they had 
observed teachers competing with each other as a direct result of the CPIP. 
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Table 14  
Summary of Teacher Survey Item Percent Agreement, Spring 2011 to Fall 2011 
Construct/Questions Percent 
Agreement 
(Spring) 
Percent 
Agreement 
(Fall) 
Supportive Construct   
1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be paid more than teachers 
who are less “effective.” 
83% 93% 
9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in improvements in the test 
scores of his/her students 
41% 43% 
12. Teachers with the same level of educational training who have worked 
the same amount of time should be paid the same (R). 
48% 52% 
13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for improving student 
achievement. 
84% 77% 
Fairness Construct   
6. The bonus I receive will be based more on my effectiveness as a teacher 
than on the abilities of my students. 
25% 27% 
14. The current bonus amount for which I am eligible is an appropriate 
reward for my work. 
67% 59% 
36. The CPIP is fair. 45% 20% 
39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-year report card will 
accurately reflect my effectiveness as a teacher. 
17% 49% 
Teaching Construct   
18. Because of the CPIP, I have sought out additional training (education, 
professional development, etc.) to improve my teaching. 
24% 21% 
23. Teachers at my school have become more focused on raising student 
achievement as a result of the CPIP. 
67% 62% 
27. Teachers at my school have investigated new teaching practices in order 
to improve their CPIP bonuses. 
48% 48% 
30. I have witnessed other teachers working harder as a result of the CPIP. 53% 48% 
31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson planning at my school as a 
result of the CPIP. 
50% 51% 
33. The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my school to adopt new teaching 
strategies. 
54% 53% 
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Construct/Questions Percent 
Agreement 
(Spring) 
Percent 
Agreement 
(Fall) 
Interactions Construct   
21. Teachers now compete with each other instead of working together as a 
result of the CPIP (R). 
64% 57% 
22. I have noticed more teachers at my school working together because of 
the CPIP. 
39% 37% 
29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss various pedagogical practices 
with other teachers at my school. 
44% 50% 
32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to share ideas with each other 
as a result of the CPIP (R) 
84% 84% 
34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP encourages me to help other 
teachers in my school. 
57% 52% 
Student Benefits Construct   
16. I believe the CPIP has improved the educational outcomes for students 
in my school. 
49% 37% 
17. Students at my school had higher levels of anxiety and stress because of 
the CPIP’s focus on testing (R) 
54% 58% 
25. Students at my school have learned more as a result of the CPIP. 40% 35% 
 
 High performers vs. low performers. 
 For my final set of analyses, I sought to determine if there were differences in teacher 
attitudes and perceptions about the impact of the CPIP based on how well they performed under 
the program. It is likely true that those teachers who received the higher end-of-year ratings or 
the higher bonuses would view the CPIP more favorably than those teachers who performed less 
well, since the higher-performing teachers received greater rewards and perhaps greater 
recognition, and thus received the most benefits from the program. It may also be true that the 
higher performing teachers would be more supportive of merit pay in general, and would be 
more likely to believe that the program had influenced their approach to teaching and their 
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interactions with their fellow teachers. With these analyses, I could determine if that was in fact 
the case. 
 For these purposes, I conducted two separate sets of analyses; one where I compared the 
responses of the teachers who received the higher end-of-year ratings to those teachers who 
received the lower ratings, and one where I compared the responses of the teachers who received 
the larger bonuses to those teachers who received the smaller ones. This consideration is 
important, as the teachers who received the higher ratings are not necessarily the teachers who 
received the larger bonuses. This is because non-core personnel also participated in these 
surveys, and those personnel were only eligible for a maximum bonus of $6,000 (compared to 
core teachers who were eligible for a maximum bonus of $10,000). In other words, even if non-
core teachers received the higher ratings among all teachers, their bonuses could still be less than 
core teachers who received a lower performance rating. 
 In total, there were 58 teachers who responded to the survey at both administration 
periods. For these comparisons, I have simply divided the total sample of teachers into two equal 
groups; those teachers with the higher end-of-year ratings (29 teachers) compared to those 
teachers with the lower ratings (29 teachers), and similarly, those teachers with the higher 
bonuses compared to those teachers with the lower bonuses.  To provide some meaning for how 
these groups differed, the average performance rating for the higher performing teachers was 
89.6 points (out of a total of 100), compared to an average rating of 69.0 for the lower 
performing teachers. The average bonus for the group of high performing teachers was $8,497, 
compared to an average bonus of $4,936 for teachers in the lower-performing group. Of the 29 
teachers who received the largest bonuses, all 29 were core teachers, compared to the lower 
performing group which was comprised of 21 non-core personnel and 8 core teachers (there were 
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no notable differences in the core/non-core distribution for the high and low end-of-year 
performance rating groups). Based on the distribution of personnel in the bonus groups, this 
comparison is largely a comparison of the attitudes and perceptions of non-core personnel to core 
teachers.  
 Presented in Tables 15 and 16, respectively, are the differences in mean construct scores 
for teachers in the high and low performance ratings and bonuses group. Within these tables I 
have included the change in mean construct scores from March to October for each group of 
teachers, and then computed a difference in differences for the two teacher groups. This allows 
me to show if there are notable differences in the survey response patterns for teachers in the low 
versus high groups. For each comparison, I used an independent samples t-test to determine if 
differences between teachers in the low and high performance groups were statistically 
significant; the corresponding p-values for these analyses are also included in the tables.  
 The results of these analyses show that no significant differences exist in the attitudes and 
perceptions of teachers in the low and high performance groups, with the exception of one key 
area. Those teachers who received the higher end-of-year ratings viewed the CPIP as being more 
fair from March to October (an increase of mean Fairness Construct score from 2.3 to 2.4); 
whereas those teachers who received the lower ratings viewed the CPIP as being less fair from 
March to October (a decrease from 2.3 to 2.0); this difference in teacher perceptions was 
statistically significant at the p = .05 level.
51
 Interestingly, this difference in perceptions of the 
fairness of the CPIP was not evident in the comparison of those teachers with the higher bonuses 
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 While those teachers who received the highest ratings viewed the program as being more fair, 
it is still worth noting that their mean construct score of 2.4 in October still indicates general 
disagreement with the overall fairness of the CPIP (since the mean construct score is below the 
midpoint of 2.5). Put differently, these teachers simply disagree less about the CPIP being fair.  
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to those teachers with the lower bonuses; teachers in both groups viewed the CPIP as being less 
fair.
52
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 In a separate analysis, I compared changes in mean Fairness Construct scores for only the core 
teachers who received the higher bonuses to the mean scores for only the core teachers with the 
lower bonuses. Core teachers who received the higher bonuses had a mean construct score of 2.4 
in March and a mean score of 2.5 in October. In contrast, those core teachers with the lower 
bonuses also had a mean score of 2.4 in March, but had a mean construct score of 2.1 in October. 
Thus, there may be a difference in perceptions of fairness of the CPIP if I just isolate this 
comparison to core teachers, and remove non-core teachers from the analysis. There were no 
differences in trends for non-core teachers.  
  
   
 
Table 15 
Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, High Ratings vs. Low Ratings, Spring 2011to Fall 2011 
Construct Mean Construct 
Score-Spring (SD): 
High Ratings 
Mean Construct 
Score-Fall (SD): 
High Ratings 
Diff. 
High 
Ratings 
Mean Construct 
Score-Spring (SD): 
Low Ratings 
Mean Construct 
Score-Fall (SD): 
Low Ratings 
Diff. 
Low 
Ratings 
Diff. 
In 
Diff. 
p-
value 
Supportive Construct 2.8 (0.4) 2.8 (0.5) 0.0 2.7 (0.5) 2.7 (0.6) 0.0 0.0 .611 
Fairness Construct 2.3 (0.6) 2.4 (0.7) 0.1 2.3 (0.6) 2.0 (0.7) -0.3 0.4 .045 
Teaching Construct 2.5 (0.5) 2.5 (0.5) 0.0 2.3 (0.6) 2.3 (0.5) 0.0 0.0 .935 
Interactions Construct 2.6 (0.5) 2.6 (0.5) 0.0 2.6 (0.5) 2.5 (0.5) -0.1 0.1 .287 
Student Benefits 
Construct 
2.5 (0.5) 2.4 (0.6) -0.1 2.4 (0.6)  2.2 (0.6) -0.2 0.1 .462 
Table 16 
Mean Construct Scores, Teacher Survey, High Bonuses vs. Low Bonuses, Spring 2011to Fall 2011 
Construct Mean Construct 
Score-Spring (SD): 
High Bonuses 
Mean Construct 
Score-Fall (SD): 
High Bonuses 
Diff. 
High 
Bonuses 
Mean Construct 
Score-Spring (SD): 
Low Bonuses 
Mean Construct 
Score-Fall (SD): 
Low Bonuses 
Diff. 
Low 
Bonuses 
Diff. 
In 
Diff. 
p-
value 
Supportive Construct 2.7 (0.5) 2.8 (0.6) 0.1 2.8 (0.5) 2.7 (0.6) -0.1 0.2 .338 
Fairness Construct 2.4 (0.6) 2.3 (0.7)  -0.1 2.2 (0.7) 2.0 (0.7) -0.2 0.1 .591 
Teaching Construct 2.4 (0.5) 2.4 (0.5) 0.0 2.4 (0.6) 2.5 (0.5) 0.1 -0.1 .063 
Interactions Construct 2.6 (0.4) 2.5 (0.5) -0.1 2.7 (0.5) 2.6 (0.5) -0.1 0.0 .920 
Student Benefits 
Construct 
2.4 (0.5) 2.3 (0.6) -0.1 2.5 (0.5) 2.3 (0.6) -0.2 0.1 .462 12
2
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 Summary of teacher results. 
 Based on survey responses in March 2011 (prior to receiving an end-of-year rating or a 
merit pay bonus), most teachers appeared to view the CPIP as being unfair, and most teachers 
did not support the use of merit pay in general. There also did not appear to be support for the 
idea that the CPIP would positively impact teaching approach or interactions with other teachers, 
and teachers did not think the CPIP would be beneficial for Fountain Lake students.   
 Further, after receiving their end-of-year ratings and merit pay bonuses, teachers still did 
not think CPIP was fair or support the use of merit pay, with no significant differences in mean 
constructs for any of the five constructs. The percent agreement for individual items indicate that 
teachers actually thought the CPIP was less fair than they did in March, and based on their 
responses, teachers also appeared to think the program was less beneficial for students after 
experiencing a full year of the program. 
 There were also no differences in the survey responses, based on mean construct scores, 
between teachers who received the higher and lower end-of-year performance ratings, and 
between the teachers who received the higher and lower merit pay bonuses, with the exception of 
one key area. Those teachers who received the higher performance ratings viewed the CPIP as 
being more fair than those teachers who received the lower ratings, though teachers in both 
groups still viewed the program, in general, as being unfair.  
 The results of these analyses on teacher views of the CPIP provide little support for the 
use of merit pay, in that the majority of teachers did not like the specific program or the 
compensation approach, did not believe the program had resulted in changes to their teaching 
approach or interactions with their fellow teachers (the motivational effects often associated with 
merit pay), and did not think the program was beneficial for Fountain Lake students. In general 
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then, it does not appear that the use of merit pay at Fountain Lake was successful, at least from 
the perspective of the teachers who were most directly impacted by this compensation strategy. 
This point is perhaps best summarized with the following quote from a teacher, who noted, “I do 
not believe it is fair. I have very little control over what the CPIP reflects,” or from another 
teacher, who simply stated “I liked the bonus, but I don’t feel the CPIP made a positive impact 
overall. The good didn’t outweigh the bad.” 
That is not to say that all teachers were opposed to the CPIP; in fact, there were a number 
of teachers who supported this approach. For example, one teacher noted that the CPIP was “a 
great way to reward teachers for their extra hard work.” Other teachers also voiced their support 
for the CPIP, saying “I love my job and I am good at it, so it’s nice to get rewarded with a bonus 
I would not otherwise be given for my work,” and the CPIP “encourages teachers to go above 
and beyond, and it rewards our hard work.” However, overall, based on the survey responses 
from teachers, it does not appear that the CPIP had a positive impact on the teachers or students 
at Fountain Lake.  
Research Question #3: Student Impacts 
 To determine the extent to which the implementation of the CPIP impacted student 
achievement, I evaluated Fountain Lake student performance in two ways. First, I compared the 
amount of student growth observed on the NWEA math, reading, and language assessments to 
the amount of growth that might be expected based on a student’s grade and RIT score in the Fall 
(at the start of the school year). The difference between the amount of observed growth and the 
expected growth target (referred to as the growth norms) is expressed as the growth norm index. 
This index provides information about how Fountain Lake student performance compared to the 
national growth norms; positive growth norm indices indicate Fountain Lake performance that 
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exceeded that of the growth norms, whereas negative indices are indicative of Fountain Lake 
performance below that of the norms. A growth norm index score of zero represents Fountain 
Lake performance consistent with that of the national growth norms.  
 These comparisons are useful, as they provide a general understanding of how well 
Fountain Lake students performed on a nationally administered standardized assessment. 
Further, because the NWEA assessments were featured prominently in the bonus structure of the 
CPIP, it may be that large gains on these assessments relative to the national norms are a result 
of a greater focus on raising student achievement on these tests (so that teachers were able to 
attain a greater bonus at the end of the year). However, while these comparisons do provide 
information, in general, about the overall performance of Fountain Lake students, they do not 
provide an understanding of whether or not the performance was a direct result of the 
implementation of the CPIP (because of the lack of an appropriate counterfactual standard, such 
as a randomly assigned group of students who serve as a comparison group, from which I could 
estimate the specific impact the CPIP has on student achievement).
53
 
 Thus, in order to quantify what impact, if any, the implementation of this bonus system 
had on student achievement, I also compared the performance of Fountain Lake students on the 
ACTAAP assessments to that of a demographically and academically matched comparison 
group. For these purposes, I identified students in neighboring school districts who were as 
similar as possible to students at Fountain Lake, and then matched one Fountain Lake student to 
a comparison student on such characteristics as grade, prior achievement from the past two years, 
ethnicity, free and reduced lunch status, and gender. The resulting Fountain Lake Comparison 
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 Nonetheless, this comparison does still provide valuable information about the amount of 
growth observed by Fountain Lake students over the course of the 2010-11 school year, and is 
useful in evaluating the overall academic performance of these students.  
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Group, or FLCG, represents a group of students that were nearly identical to the group of 
Fountain Lake students prior to the implementation of the CPIP, with the only significant 
difference being that Fountain Lake students were in a school with a merit pay program in place, 
while the FLCG students were not. Because of this, any differences in student achievement at the 
end of the implementation year between the students in the two groups can likely be attributed to 
the impact of the CPIP.  
 NWEA performance. 
 Presented in Tables 17, 18, and 19 are summaries of Fountain Lake student performance 
on the NWEA assessments, organized by subject (math, reading, and language respectively) and 
disaggregated by grade. In these Tables, I show the average RIT score for each grade in the Fall 
and Spring, as well as the average amount of growth shown for these students from the 
beginning of the school year to the end. I have also included in these Tables the average growth 
norm for each grade, as well as the corresponding growth norm indices. To provide some context 
for the amount of growth these indices represent, I have included the percentile ranks associated 
with each growth norm index score based on guidelines provided by NWEA (2009); in this way, 
I can show how the amount of growth observed relative to the growth norms compared to other 
similar students across the nation.
54
  
 Overall, Fountain Lake students met or exceeded the growth norms in nearly every grade 
and subject area. And, in most grade/subject areas, the raw growth observed for Fountain Lake 
students was extremely large relative to the growth norms (as indicated by large growth norm 
indices) and compared to other students across the nation (as indicated by the high percentile 
rankings associated with the growth norm indices). For example, of the 25 subject and grade 
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 Percentile rankings for growth norm indices were only provided for students in grades 2-10. 
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areas in which percentile rankings were available, Fountain Lake student growth was at the 80
th
 
percentile or higher in 17 areas, including 6 areas where Fountain Lake student growth was at the 
99
th
 percentile (two grades in reading and four grades in language).  
 Aggregated at the school level, students at all three schools had average growth levels 
that exceeded their respective growth norms.
55
 In other words, on average, students at each 
school showed growth from the start of the year to the end that exceeded the level of growth that 
might be expected from these students, based on their grade and starting achievement level. The 
magnitude of growth for all three schools was significant, but perhaps most notably for students 
at the high school. High school students did not test on the NWEA math assessment, so we 
cannot see how their performance compared to the national norms in that specific subject area. 
However, students in the 9
th
 and 10
th
 grade did test in both reading and language, and at both 
grade levels and in both subjects, the amount of growth demonstrated by these students was 
equivalent to growth at the 99
th
 percentile. Or, put differently, the growth shown by the high 
school students was greater than that of 99% of the national population of similar students.  
 The only grade or subject area with a negative growth norm index score, indicating 
growth less than the national growth norms, occurred in math for students in 8
th
 grade. These 
students grew 4.3 RIT points over the course of the school year, which was 0.5 RIT points less 
than what was expected based on the national norms. The amount of growth shown by these 
students equates to performance at approximately the 22
nd
 percentile. This same group of 
students also had a growth norm index score of 0.1 in language, essentially the same level of 
growth as the growth norms, which would equate to growth at the 42
nd
 percentile. Fountain Lake 
8
th
 graders were also among the lowest performing in reading compared to students in other 
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 At Fountain Lake, the elementary school serves grades K-4, the middle school serves 5-8, and 
the high school serves students in grades 9-12.  
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grades, though they still showed high levels of growth in this subject area (at approximately the 
77
th
 percentile).  
Table 17 
NWEA Results, Math, 2010-11 
Grade # of 
Tests 
Avg. 
Fall ’10 
RIT 
Avg. 
Spring ’11 
RIT 
Avg. 
Obs. 
Growth 
Avg. 
Growth 
Norm 
Avg. 
Growth 
Norm 
Index 
Index 
Percentile 
Rank 
K 70 139.6 167.9 28.3 13.4 14.9  
1
st
 74 166.6 188.2 21.7 14.9 6.8  
2
nd
 78 181.8 198.9 17.1 13.1 4.0 84 
3
rd
 85 194.2 210.5 16.3 10.7 5.7 97 
4
th
 87 207.4 221.2 13.8 9.0 4.8 97 
5
th
 82 214.8 223.8 9.1 7.4 1.7 43 
6
th
 78 218.6 227.3 8.7 6.8 1.9 67 
7
th
 79 223.4 232.9 9.4 6.1 3.4 92 
8
th
 93 226.6 230.9 4.3 4.8 -0.5 22 
Elementary 394 179.8 198.8 19.1 12.1 7.0  
Middle 332 221.0 228.8 7.7 6.2 1.5  
Overall 726 198.7 212.5 13.9 9.4 4.5  
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Table 18 
NWEA Results, Reading, 2010-11 
Grade # of 
Tests 
Avg. 
Fall ’10 
RIT 
Avg. 
Spring ’11 
RIT 
Avg. 
Obs. 
Growth 
Avg. 
Growth 
Norm 
Avg. 
Growth 
Norm 
Index 
Index 
Percentile 
Rank 
K 70 142.2 164.9 22.7 11.3 11.4  
1
st
 74 166.0 182.0 16.0 12.3 3.7  
2
nd
 78 176.9 192.5 15.7 13.7 2.0 44 
3
rd
 85 190.9 202.6 11.8 9.2 2.6 77 
4
th
 87 200.8 209.4 8.6 6.6 2.0  75 
5
th
 82 203.8 212.4 8.6 5.6 3.0 90 
6
th
 79 208.0 216.9 8.8 5.1 3.7 98 
7
th
 82 212.9 220.5 7.5 4.6 2.9 97 
8
th
 93 216.5 221.4 4.9 4.0 0.9 77 
9
th
 70 218.7 228.9 10.1 2.8 7.3 99 
10
th
 52 215.6 223.1 7.5 2.9 4.6 99 
Elementary 394 177.0 191.5 14.6 10.5 4.1  
Middle 336 210.5 217.9 7.4 4.8 2.6  
High 122 217.4 226.4 9.0 2.8 6.1  
Overall 852 196.0 206.9 10.9 7.1 3.8  
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Table 19 
NWEA Results, Language, 2010-11 
Grade # of 
Tests 
Avg. 
Fall ’10 
RIT 
Avg. 
Spring ’11 
RIT 
Avg. 
Obs. 
Growth 
Avg. 
Growth 
Norm 
Avg. 
Growth 
Norm 
Index 
Index 
Percentile 
Rank 
2
nd
 77 176.0 195.9 19.9 14.4 5.4 82 
3
rd
 82 191.1 204.8 13.7 9.2 4.5 92 
4
th
 85 199.6 211.7 12.1 6.8 5.3 99 
5
th
 82 204.8 215.9 11.1 5.4 5.7 99 
6
th
 78 209.4 218.1 8.7 4.4 4.3 97 
7
th
 82 215.8 221.9 6.0 3.5 2.6 96 
8
th
 93 217.6 220.7 3.1 3.0 0.1 42 
9
th
 73 216.6 226.1 9.6 3.0 6.5 99 
10
th
 69 218.0 224.4 6.4 2.3 4.1 99 
Elementary 244 189.3 204.4 15.1 10.0 5.1  
Middle 335 212.1 219.2 7.1 4.0 3.1  
High 142 217.3 225.3 8.0 2.7 5.3  
Overall 721 205.4 215.4 10.0 5.8 4.2  
 
Overall, other than a few select grade and subject areas, Fountain Lake students showed 
significantly high levels of growth on the NWEA assessments relative to the growth norms. In 
the next section, I evaluate Fountain Lake performance on the ACTAAP assessments, to see if 
the substantial gains made on the NWEA assessments are evident in Fountain Lake student 
performance on the state assessments as well.  
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 ACTAAP performance. 
 To determine how Fountain Lake students performed on the ACTAAP assessments 
relative to the academically and demographically similar FLCG, I used multiple regression 
analyses to quantify the overall impact that the implementation of the CPIP had on Fountain 
Lake student achievement. The parameters of the model are specified in Chapter 4, but for these 
purposes, the key coefficient of interest was the Fountain Lake (CPIP) variable, a binary variable 
that indicated whether or not a student attended Fountain Lake (1) or was a member of the FLCG 
(0). My regression model estimates 2011 achievement on the ACTAAP assessments while 
controlling for variables such as prior achievement, grade, gender, and FRL and minority status. 
Thus, the Fountain Lake (CPIP) coefficient provides information about the magnitude and 
direction of the difference between students in these two groups, and whether or not the 
difference in performance was statistically significant.  
 My first set of analyses focus on student performance on the norm-referenced Arkansas 
assessment. Recall, the State switched tests for the 2010-11 school year, so our outcome 
measures in these analyses are NCE points on the ITBS, whereas my control variables for prior 
achievement are NCE points on the SAT-10. Summarized in Table 20 are the raw end-of-year 
NCE points for both groups of students, in both math and literacy, over the previous three year 
period (with test scores for the outcome year, 2010-11, shaded in gray). In math, Fountain Lake 
student performance remained nearly identical to the performance of FLCG students, whereas in 
literacy, the performance was similar for the two years of prior achievement, with Fountain Lake 
students showing a 2.1 NCE point decrease from 2009-10 to 2010-11. Over that same time 
period, FLCG students only declined by 0.6 NCE points. While these unadjusted results suggest 
that students did not benefit from the implementation of the CPIP, I conducted regression 
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analyses as a more powerful way of determining if real differences in achievement did exist 
between Fountain Lake and FLCG students.   
Table 20 
Fountain Lake and FLCG Performance on the SAT-10 and ITBS, 2008-09 to 2010-11 
 Math 
NCE, 
2008-09 
Math 
NCE, 
2009-10 
Math 
NCE, 
2010-11 
Literacy 
NCE, 
2008-09 
Literacy 
NCE, 
2009-10 
Literacy 
NCE, 
2010-11 
Fountain Lake 60.7 60.5 56.4 49.8 51.6 49.5 
FLCG 60.8 60.5 56.4 49.6 51.6 51.0 
 
 The estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for all of the variables included 
in my norm-referenced regression analyses are presented in Table 21. The combination of 
predictor variables for the math analysis was significantly related to my outcome variable (NCE 
points on the ITBS), adjusted R
2
 = .602, F(11,927) = 129.77, p < .001. The combination of 
predictor variables for the literacy analysis, also predicting NCE points on the ITBS, was also 
significantly related to the outcome variable, adjusted R
2
 = .630, F(11,927) = 146.08, p < .001. 
 The results of these analyses show that there were no significant differences observed on 
the Math portion of the ITBS in the outcome year (2010-11) between Fountain Lake and FLCG 
students. The coefficient differentiating students in the two groups, Fountain Lake (CPIP), was -
0.22, and was not statistically significant. This small and non-significant coefficient is consistent 
with the minimal differences that were observed in raw average NCE points for students in both 
groups that were presented in Table 20. 
 However, the difference in performance on the Literacy portion of the ITBS in the 
outcome year was statistically significant. In this analysis, the predicted difference between 
students in both groups was -1.56, indicating that Fountain Lake students were likely to score 
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1.56 points below their FLCG counterparts. This difference was statistically significant, and was 
again consistent with the differences in Literacy NCE points presented in Table 20, where the 
difference between Fountain Lake and FLCG students in Spring 2011 was 1.5 NCE points. 
Expressed in terms of an effect size, the predicted difference in performance for students in the 
two groups, based on my regression analysis, was d = -.09, which represents a relatively small 
effect size difference (Cohen, 1988).  
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Table 21 
ITBS Results in Math and Literacy, 2010-11  
 ITBS  
Math 
NCE 
ITBS 
Literacy 
NCE 
Fountain Lake (CPIP) -0.22 
(0.79) 
-1.56* 
(0.73) 
2009-10 NCE 0.44** 
(0.03) 
0.47** 
(0.04) 
2008-09 NCE 0.32** 
(0.03) 
0.30** 
(0.04) 
2010-11 Grade 5 Dummy -4.28** 
(1.39) 
-2.37 
(1.33) 
2010-11 Grade 6 Dummy -7.08** 
(1.39) 
-3.47* 
(1.29) 
2010-11 Grade 7 Dummy -7.48** 
(1.37) 
-5.00** 
(1.27) 
2010-11 Grade 8 Dummy -7.01** 
(1.35) 
-5.26** 
(1.25) 
2010-11 Grade 9 Dummy -4.37** 
(1.37) 
-0.41 
(1.28) 
2010-11 FRL Status -1.27 
(0.83) 
-1.67* 
(0.80) 
Minority -2.02 
(1.22) 
1.37 
(1.12) 
Female -0.46 
(0.79) 
2.20** 
(0.74) 
Constant 16.79 14.01 
Comparison Group Outcome Mean 56.44 51.05 
Comparison Group SD 19.29 18.04 
Adjusted R-squared .602 .630 
Regression N 939 939 
Omitted Variables: FLCG, Non-FRL Eligible, Male, Grade 4 
 *p < .05, ** p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses) 
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 I also conducted similar analyses on the criterion-referenced Arkansas Benchmark 
assessment. While the Benchmark is administered to students in fewer grades (3-8) than the 
ITBS (1-9), this test has been the primary assessment used in measuring Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) in Arkansas, and provides data on a consistent assessment over the previous 
three academic years. Because of this, the results of these analyses may provide a more stable 
assessment of the impact of the CPIP of Fountain Lake students than my analyses of 
performance on the norm-referenced ITBS and SAT-10 assessments.  
 I have provided in Table 22 a summary of the average scale scores for both groups of 
students in math and literacy for each of the previous three years. In both subjects, in the two 
years prior to the implementation of the CPIP (2008-09 and 2009-10) we see similar levels of 
performance between Fountain Lake and FLCG students. This pattern continues in 2010-11, with 
no notable differences between the two groups of students in the outcome year. 
Table 22 
Fountain Lake and FLCG Performance on the SAT-10 and ITBS, 2008-09 to 2010-11 
 Math 
Scale 
Score, 
2008-09 
Math 
Scale 
Score, 
2009-10 
Math 
Scale 
Score,  
2010-11 
Literacy 
Scale 
Score, 
 2008-09 
Literacy 
Scale 
Score, 
2009-10 
Literacy 
Scale 
Score, 
2010-11 
Fountain Lake 677.8 697.4 706.1 680.0 716.7 749.3 
FLCG 676.8 695.6 710.6 673.2 714.7 745.5 
 
 The coefficients and standard errors for the predictor variables included in the Arkansas 
Benchmark regression models are shown in Table 23. The same predictors were used in these 
models as the ITBS/SAT-10 models, with the exception of the Grade 5 and Grade 9 dummy 
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variables (since the Benchmark analyses were restricted to students in grades 5-8 in the outcome 
year, whereas the ITBS/SAT-10 analyses included students in grade 4-9 in the outcome year).   
 The combination of variables used in the prediction of 2010-11 Arkansas Benchmark 
scale scores on the math portion of the assessment was significant, adjusted R
2
 = .742, F(9,623) 
= 202.60, p < .001., as was the combination of variables used in the prediction of literacy scale 
scores, adjusted R
2
 = .703, F(9,621) = 166.49, p < .001. The results of these analyses show 
different subject-specific impacts of the CPIP on student achievement compared to the results of 
the norm-referenced analyses. Here, the difference in student achievement on the math portion of 
the Benchmark was negative and statistically significant, with a Fountain Lake (CPIP) 
coefficient of -10.26 scale score points. Recall, the norm-referenced analyses showed no 
significant differences in math performance. The 10 point difference, expressed in terms of an 
effect size, is d = -.11, which also represents a relatively small effect size difference (Cohen, 
1988). By comparison, while I did find a significant difference on the literacy portion of the 
ITBS between Fountain Lake and FLCG students, there was not a statistically significant 
predicted difference on the Benchmark literacy assessment. Here, the coefficient indicating the 
difference between the two student groups was -1.80.  
For both the math and literacy analyses, the differences follow the pattern in direction 
and magnitude of the differences in average scale scores presented in Table 22. For example, in 
math, Fountain Lake students had a 28.3 point increase from 2008-09 to 2010-11; over that same 
time period, FLCG students had a 33.8 point increase, for a difference of 5.5 points in favor of 
the FLCG. While not as large as the regression-adjusted difference of 10.26 points (likely due to 
students in the two groups not being perfectly matched on all observable characteristics), the raw 
averages and predicted differences are consistent in showing that the FLCG outperformed their 
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Fountain Lake counterparts. In literacy, the difference in performance from 2008-09 to 2010-11 
was 3.0, with FLCG slightly outperforming Fountain Lake students; this difference is consistent 
with the -1.8 regression-adjusted difference.  
Descriptive statistics and correlation tables for all of the variables included in all of the 
regression models can be found in Appendix F.  
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Table 23 
Arkansas Benchmark Results in Math and Literacy, 2010-11  
 Benchmark 
Math 
Scale Score 
Benchmark 
Literacy 
Scale Score 
Fountain Lake (CPIP) -10.26** 
(3.77) 
-1.80 
(6.65) 
2009-10 Scale Score 0.57** 
(0.04) 
0.47** 
(0.04) 
2008-09 Scale Score 0.31** 
(0.03) 
0.33** 
(0.03) 
2010-11 Grade 6 Dummy 1.18 
(5.54) 
-30.29** 
(9.69) 
2010-11 Grade 7 Dummy -22.07** 
(5.56) 
-37.52** 
(9.76) 
2010-11 Grade 8 Dummy -52.98** 
(5.72) 
0.40 
(9.56) 
2010-11 FRL Status -4.11 
(3.99) 
-12.68 
(7.23) 
Minority -11.62* 
(5.68) 
14.13 
(9.90) 
Female 2.81 
(3.80) 
10.86 
(6.77) 
Constant 144.56 218.03 
Comparison Group Outcome Mean 721.25 753.61 
Comparison Group SD 93.65 146.39 
Adjusted R-squared .742 .703 
Overall N 633 631 
Omitted Variables: FLCG, Non-FRL Eligible, Male, Grade 5 
 *p < .05, ** p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Summary of student results. 
In summary, while Fountain Lake performance on the NWEA assessments relative to the 
national growth norms was exceptional in most grade and subject areas (as well as overall), those 
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same findings were not present in my analyses of Fountain Lake performance on the ACTAAP 
assessments. While performance on the NWEA assessments does provide general information 
about the amount of growth observed for Fountain Lake students in comparison to a reasonable 
(though imperfect) counterfactual standard (in this case, a national norming group), these 
positive findings cannot be directly attributed to the impact of the CPIP. However, because I 
utilized a matched comparison group in my ACTAAP analyses, where the only difference 
between the two groups of students was the use of merit pay in the Fountain Lake schools, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the implementation of the CPIP did not have a positive impact on 
student achievement. In fact, it may be that the use of this type of compensation strategy actually 
had a negative impact on student achievement in some areas, as evidenced by negative and 
statistically significant differences in literacy on the ITBS and in math on the Arkansas 
Benchmark. Potential explanations for these findings will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6 – Discussion 
Starting in the 2010-11 school, the Fountain Lake School District implemented the Cobra 
Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), a merit pay program aimed at recognizing and financially 
rewarding highly effective teachers. A teacher’s “merit” was based primarily on the impact he or 
she had on the standardized test scores of his or her students, but also included a measure of 
school-wide achievement and a subjective principal evaluation. Ultimately, the goal of this 
program was fourfold: 1) Incentivize teachers to focus more energy, creativity, and effort raising 
student achievement; 2) Provide rewards to teachers who positively impacted student 
achievement (and performed well in the other measures used in this program); 3) Attract new 
teachers to Fountain Lake who want to earn extra money as a reward for their hard work; and 4) 
Retain those teachers who, based on the merit ratings they received, were deemed the most 
“effective.” While not a primary goal, the structure of this program also allowed Fountain Lake 
administrators to identify those teachers with the lowest performance ratings, which perhaps 
could provide valuable information about which teachers should be retained, and which teachers 
should not be encouraged to return to teach within the district.  
 Under the CPIP, all Fountain Lake employees were eligible for a bonus, not just teachers 
of core subjects. The maximum bonus for which core teachers were eligible was $10,000, with 
non-core teachers and specialists (such as art or music teachers, or school counselors) eligible for 
a maximum bonus of $6,000. Principals and administrators were eligible for a $15,000 bonus, 
and classified staff, such as custodians, bus drivers, or secretaries, could receive a maximum 
bonus of $1,000. The bonus amounts for which employees were eligible were based largely on 
how closely or directly the employee worked with students in an instructional capacity, and the 
employee’s overall level of responsibility and accountability for raising student achievement; the 
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more directly the employee worked with students, or the greater his or her level of responsibility, 
the greater the bonus for which that employee was eligible.  
 The reason for providing incentives to all employees was because all employees, in some 
fashion, contribute to the overall learning experience for students; because everyone contributes, 
everyone should be rewarded. This structure was also intentionally done to promote 
collaboration among all employees and to foster a more positive school environment, with the 
idea being that if everyone was financially rewarded, then everyone would work towards the 
common goal of raising student achievement and be more satisfied and positive in doing so. 
However, while the aim of this approach was sound, it was not without cost; the total cost for 
rewarding all employees was $874,836, which represented a total investment of $721 per 
Fountain Lake student. Because of the substantial financial cost, in addition to all of the time and 
energy spent in the development and implementation of this program, it was extremely important 
to determine to what extent, if any, the CPIP impacted the teachers, school employees, and 
students at Fountain Lake.  
Thus, this dissertation represents an evaluation of how student achievement changed as a 
result of the CPIP, and how teachers and school counselors responded to and were affected by 
the use of this new accountability system. For these purposes, my evaluation of the impact of the 
CPIP focused on three central questions: 
1) How did the roles and responsibilities of school counselors change as a result of the 
CPIP, and was there a shift in the level of support from teachers and administrators 
for school counseling activities because of the increased emphasis on accountability 
(i.e. raising student achievement)? 
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2) How did teachers view, support, and respond to the CPIP, including to what extent 
did the program impact their approach to teaching and their interactions with other 
teachers? 
3) Based on the emphasis on student achievement in the structure of the CPIP, how was 
student achievement impacted by the implementation of this compensation scheme? 
When taken together, the results from these three research questions should provide a strong 
understanding of how the CPIP affected students and school personnel at Fountain Lake, to 
begin to determine if the costs associated with this program resulted in the aforementioned 
benefits or goals of such a program. 
Counselor Summary 
 Based on interview responses from four school counselors, it appears that there were 
some areas that were affected for school counselors, and other areas that remained relatively 
unchanged as a result of the adoption of the CPIP. For example, the focus on raising student 
achievement did not appear to have impacted the roles and responsibilities of school counselors, 
and there were no reports of counselors being asked to take a more central role in the 
standardized testing process since the CPIP was implemented. However, a fairly consistent 
response from school counselors was that they now had less time with students, and that teachers 
had become more protective of classroom time with students (because the teachers do not want 
students to miss out on the lessons being taught).  Further, while the school counselors reported 
no change in the level of support from teacher and administrators for school counseling 
activities, this was because the school counselors were now more cognizant of not removing 
students from core class time (as there were some reports of complaints from teachers when this 
occurred). School counselors were mixed on their views of how the CPIP had affected Fountain 
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Lake students; most thought that the CPIP had a positive impact on student learning, but 
responses were mixed on whether or not the program had resulted in students experiencing 
additional anxiety and stress. 
 The results from my analysis on counselor impacts add to the small but growing body of 
literature on how the work of school counselors is affected in such an accountability system. 
There was no evidence of counselors switching roles to serve as testing coordinators or assisting 
in the administration of standardized tests, which runs counter to what some research suggests 
may occur in schools with a high focus on raising student achievement (Burnham & Jackson, 
2000; Dollarhide & Lemberger, 2006). However, my results do support previous findings 
(Brown, Galassi, & Akos, 2004; Dollarhide & Lemberger, 2006) that teachers are less likely to 
cede class time with students, and as a result, counselors have less time to engage in counseling 
activities with students. Overall, the Fountain Lake school counselors also did not report that the 
implementation of the CPIP had shifted the focus of their roles or responsibilities outside of what 
is recommended in the American School Counselor Association National Model (2005).  
 More research is certainly needed in this area, but these results at least appear to suggest 
that the primary impact of the implementation of a merit pay program is that counselors have to 
be much more flexible in their work with students, as teachers become much more protective of 
their time working with their students. Depending on one’s perspective, this could be viewed as a 
positive or negative finding; positive, since teachers are now much more focused on their work 
with students, but negative, in that this focus comes at the expense of school counseling 
activities. Future research on how counselors respond to the use of a merit pay program should 
certainly assess if these results are unique to the CPIP, or if this is a common occurrence in all 
types of accountability systems.  
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Teacher Summary 
 To assess the impact of the CPIP on teachers, I administered surveys at two different time 
periods; first, in March prior to the teachers receiving their end-of-year ratings or bonuses, and 
again in October after they had received their ratings and bonuses. After the first survey 
administration, there was no real strong indication that the CPIP had a positive effect on 
teachers; that is, teachers did not report that the CPIP had influenced their approach to teaching 
or their interactions with their peers, and the use of merit pay in general was not particularly 
popular among teachers. The teachers also generally viewed the CPIP as being unfair, and 
appeared to think that the program was not beneficial for Fountain Lake students. In fact, other 
than perceptions of the program being unfair, there was no real strong indication that the 
program had a notable positive or negative effect at all for Fountain Lake teachers.  
 After the second round of surveys, and after receiving their end-of-year ratings and 
bonuses, there was almost no change in teacher attitudes and perceptions about the CPIP. The 
level of support for the program did not change, and teachers still did not report that the program 
impacted their work or their interactions with other teachers. And while there were no statistical 
differences in teacher responses, a review of individual item responses showed that teachers 
thought the program was considerably less fair (even after all teachers received a bonus), and 
teachers were slightly less inclined to think that the program was beneficial for students (and 
slightly more inclined to say the program resulted in more anxiety and stress for students).  
 One of the benefits of the format of these surveys was that I could match individual 
teacher responses to measures of teacher performance, specifically their end-of-year merit ratings 
and their bonus amount. This allowed me to assess whether or not the teachers who received the 
higher ratings or bonuses had different perceptions of the CPIP then those teachers who received 
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the lower ratings or bonuses. In nearly every area evaluated, there was no difference in the 
responses of these two groups of teachers. However, the one area where there was a significant 
difference was in the perceptions of the fairness of the CPIP; those teachers who received the 
higher ratings (not the higher bonuses) thought the program was fairer than those teachers with 
the lower ratings. That said, the teachers with the higher ratings were still not overwhelmingly in 
support of the CPIP; the mean score for that particular construct was still slightly below average, 
in the range of “Disagree” for if the CPIP was fair.  
 While there is not a substantial amount of prior research on how teachers respond to the 
use of merit pay, the existing research base suggests that, in general, teachers respond to this type 
of program positively. That is, teachers in schools with merit pay programs tend to report an 
increased focus on student achievement and improved collegiality among teachers (Community 
Training and Assistance Center, 2004). These programs also tend to have a positive impact on 
the climate of the school, though they do not appear to have motivating effects for teachers 
(Springer et al., 2009a; Springer et al., 2009b; Springer et al., 2010b).  
 The findings of this particular evaluation appear to run counter to previous research on 
this topic, as there was no substantial evidence that the CPIP improved teacher collegiality, and 
no reports of the school climate improving as a result of the implementation of this program (in 
fact, these findings could be interpreted as having a negative impact on school climate). In 
general, from the teachers’ perspective, there did not appear to be any positive outcomes as a 
result of the CPIP, even though teachers (and all employees) received substantial end-of-year 
bonuses. Future evaluations of this and other similar merit pay programs should certainly focus 
significant attention on trying to understand why it is that teachers responded in this way, as it 
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would seem that, at the very least, teachers would support a program in which all employees 
were rewarded for their work. 
Student Summary 
 Perhaps the most important piece of this evaluation was determining how student 
achievement was affected as a result of the CPIP. To accomplish this, I analyzed student 
performance in two different ways. First, I compared Fountain Lake growth on the NWEA 
assessments to NWEA’s national growth norms, as a way of understanding how much these 
students improved over the course of the year on a series of assessments that were prominently 
featured in CPIP bonus calculations. While performance on these assessments does provide 
useful information about Fountain Lake student growth, it is difficult to determine how much of 
that growth was a direct result of the implementation of the CPIP. Thus, I also evaluated the 
performance of Fountain Lake students on the ACTAAP assessments, and compared this 
performance to that of a matched comparison group. This comparison group, or FLCG, was 
comprised of students in neighboring school districts who were matched to Fountain Lake 
students based on observable demographic and academic characteristics. By using this matched 
group of students as the counterfactual condition, I could determine the extent to which the CPIP 
impacted student achievement, since the only real observable difference between these two 
groups of students was that Fountain Lake students attended a school with a merit pay program 
in place, whereas FLCG students did not.  
 The results of my analyses of student achievement revealed two different and opposing 
trends. On the NWEA assessments, Fountain Lake students showed remarkable growth over the 
2010-11 school year, exceeding the national growth norms in nearly every grade and subject 
area. In many areas, Fountain Lake growth was well above average, with growth in 17 of the 25 
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grade/subject areas that was at or above the 80
th
 percentile. However, on the ACTAAP 
assessments, Fountain Lake student performance was no different than the FLCG in two 
test/subject areas (ITBS math and Benchmark literacy), and significantly below the FLCG in two 
other areas (ITBS literacy and Benchmark math). Thus, whereas student performance on the 
NWEA assessments was exceptional, performance on the ACTAAP assessments was not.  
Because I could make causal conclusions about the impact of the CPIP based on the ACTAAP 
analyses (and not the NWEA analyses), a reasonable conclusion from these analyses is that the 
CPIP did not have a positive impact on student achievement at Fountain Lake. 
 In general, these finding are consistent with other evaluations of the impact of merit pay 
programs on student achievement. In my literature review, I identified six previous evaluations 
in which there was no impact on student learning after a merit pay program was implemented 
(ex. Bacolod, DiNardo, & Jacobson, 2009; Springer & Winters, 2009), and one evaluation where 
there was actually a negative impact (Fryer, 2011). My analyses of student performance on the 
ACTAAP assessments appears to support these findings, as Fountain Lake students were no 
different than FLCG students in two tested areas, and showed less growth than FLCG students in 
two other areas.  
Limitations 
 When taken together, the results from this evaluation do not suggest that the 
implementation of the CPIP was a particularly effective intervention, at least in its first year of 
implementation. Counselors reported less time with students because of the CPIP, teachers in 
general did not support the program, think it was fair, or alter their approach to teaching, and 
student achievement was not positively impacted (and in some areas, appeared to have been 
negatively impacted). These results are particularly discouraging, especially when paired with 
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the substantial cost of the program, as none of the potential benefits of such a program were 
realized at Fountain Lake during the 2010-11 school year.  
 However, the results from this evaluation should by no means be interpreted as definitive 
evidence that merit pay did not work at Fountain Lake, as there were several factors that may 
have impacted the overall results of this evaluation that should be considered. For example, one 
of the key findings from this evaluation was that teachers, in general, did not seem to be 
particularly receptive to the use of merit pay and did not think the CPIP was fair, and that having 
the opportunity to earn a bonus did not motivate teachers to alter their teaching approach. 
Perhaps most importantly, teacher attitudes and perceptions did not change after receiving a 
bonus. This is interesting, because after teachers saw how they benefitted from the CPIP in terms 
of bonus amount, it might be expected that teachers would at the very least have positive views 
of merit pay and/or the CPIP (since every teacher earned a bonus, and for many teachers, these 
bonuses represented a significant percentage of their base salary). And while these results may 
be representative of the overall views of teachers at Fountain Lake, there are two factors that 
may have had a significant influence on these findings. 
 First, recall that there were a large number of teachers who did not respond to the second 
survey in October. In March, 94 of 100 teachers responded to the first survey, but of those 
original 94 initial responders, only 58 responded to the second survey. In other words, only 62% 
of the original sample of teachers participated in the second round of surveys, which represents a 
fairly substantial attrition rate. I attempted to account for the loss of these teachers by weighting 
survey responses to consider certain factors that might have impacted whether or not a teacher 
participated in the second survey administration (such as bonus amount, end-of-year rating, etc.). 
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that by not having survey responses from 36 of the original 
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teachers, the overall conclusions derived from the teacher surveys could have been significantly 
impacted. Put differently, it may be that the lack of change in teacher attitudes from March to 
October (and the lack of differences in attitudes and perceptions between low and high 
performing teachers) was simply a function of which teachers chose to respond to the second 
survey. It could be that those 36 teachers were very supportive of the CPIP, or it could be that 
those 36 teachers hated the program; without their survey responses, it is difficult to say with 
certainty that the results of these analyses are a true representation of teacher attitudes and 
perceptions.  
 Further, and perhaps more importantly, the survey results may have been impacted by 
when the surveys were administered. Ultimately, the goal of these analyses was to gauge teacher 
attitudes and perceptions prior to and after they received a bonus, so that I could see how 
receiving a bonus (and completing a full year of the program) affected teacher attitudes. In this 
way, I could begin to quantify the impact of the CPIP based on the format and structure of the 
program during the 2010-11. However, when I administered the surveys in October, discussions 
were already underway about how the program would be structured during the 2011-12 school 
year, and much of these discussions were centered on adjusting the program to ensure that only 
exceptional work was being rewarded.
56
 
 Based on the comments of a number of teachers, the perception of why changes were 
being made, as well as how the justification for these changes was being communicated by 
administrators and school board members, may have had a significantly negative impact on 
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 During the first year of the program, there were a number of instances where, based on the 
format of the CPIP, teachers received a substantial bonus for work that likely did not justify a 
bonus at all. Thus, there were a number of discussions at the start of the 2011-12 school year 
about how the program could be restructured to ensure that bonuses were only given to teachers 
whose work merited such a reward.   
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teacher perceptions of the CPIP in October. For example, one teacher, when asked whether the 
CPIP should continue, said “No, I think I would rather have a raise on my base salary. Also, even 
though we have seen some improvement, some of our leaders still don’t acknowledge this and 
still say that they are disappointed in us.” This sentiment was echoed by several other teachers, 
including one teacher who noted the following: “Do you value the education teachers provide 
your children? If so, they should be rewarded, as our salary is barely above poverty level. Just a 
thought, our board basically commented we are failures and they paid us too much, but we 
showed AWESOME GROWTH last year.” Finally, one teacher, in his/her response to the 
question of if the CPIP should be used in the following year, very explicitly stated “No, it has 
demoralized the faculty. There is very little trust in the administration.” Clearly, the way these 
changes were communicated had an effect on teacher perceptions of the CPIP, and likely had a 
significant negative impact on the overall findings from my evaluation of teacher attitudes about 
the program. Combined with the notable attrition rate, it may be that the results on teacher 
impacts I have presented in this dissertation are not a true representation of the teachers’ 
thoughts and perceptions about the CPIP. 
 The inconsistent findings from my evaluation of how student achievement was impacted 
by the CPIP also merits further scrutiny, as student performance on the NWEA assessments was 
exceptional, whereas Fountain Lake student performance on the ACTAAP assessments was 
equal to or worse than the performance of the FLCG. Which set of results is the true 
representation of how student achievement was impacted at Fountain Lake? The research design 
for my ACTAAP analyses allowed me to draw causal conclusions about the impact of the CPIP, 
since the only observable difference between the two student groups (Fountain Lake students and 
FLCG students) was that the Fountain Lake students attended a school with a merit pay program 
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in place. Thus, while the research design was not ideal,
57
 it still does provide evidence that on 
this particular set of assessments, Fountain Lake student achievement was no better than the 
FLCG, and in some areas was actually worse.  
 However, one of the problems with this set of analyses was the actual test instruments 
themselves. The Arkansas Benchmark has been consistently used for a number of years, 
including all three years of this evaluation. This was not the case for the ITBS assessment, which 
was one of my key outcome measures, but in its first year of implementation in 2010-11 (prior to 
that year, the SAT-10 was the norm-referenced assessment used in Arkansas). It is unclear what 
impact this could have had on the interpretation of student achievement results, but it is certainly 
worth mentioning again as one possible explanation for these inconsistent findings.  
 Further, it may be that the psychometric properties of the ITBS and Benchmark 
assessments were not ideal for measuring changes in student achievement. These two 
assessments are grade-level proficiency assessments, which means that students in a particular 
grade respond to a series of test items that are not designed to measure growth, but rather are 
designed to measure whether or not a student meets the proficiency standards for that particular 
grade. The design of assessments such as this necessitates items that are at or around the same 
difficulty level as the proficiency standard; because of this, growth for students well above or 
well below this proficiency standard would not be accurately captured in these analyses.  
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 The best way to evaluate the impact of the CPIP on student achievement would have been to 
use a randomized control trial, in which some students were randomly assigned to a merit pay 
classroom, and other students were randomly assigned to a non-merit pay classroom. It was not 
possible to use this design at Fountain Lake, so I chose to employ a quasi-experimental matched 
group design. While this design does still allow me to make causal conclusions, I would be much 
more confident that my results were a true representation of the impact of the CPIP if I had been 
able to use a random assignment design for this dissertation.  
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 By comparison, the properties of the NWEA assessments are ideal for capturing 
improvements in student achievement, as these tests are designed with the expressed purpose of 
measuring student growth over the course of an academic year. Further, because of the 
computer-adaptive nature of these assessments, growth can be measured for students at all points 
on the achievement distribution, not just those students who are at or near a grade-level 
proficiency standard. The problem, however, with the NWEA analyses was that there was not an 
appropriate counterfactual standard to serve as a comparison for Fountain Lake students. That is, 
with the ACTAAP analyses I was able to use a matched comparison group to make causal 
conclusions about the impact of the CPIP, but with my NWEA analyses, the comparison I used 
(national growth norms) did not allow for causal conclusions to be made. The results from the 
NWEA analyses simply provide descriptive information about the growth observed for Fountain 
Lake students in 2010-11; what they do not provide is information about how much of this 
performance was a direct result of the CPIP.  
 Thus, in my analyses of student achievement, I have a set of analyses with a sound 
research design and a sub-par set of assessments for measuring changes in student performance 
(the ACTAAP analyses). I also have a set of analyses with an unsatisfactory research design (for 
the purpose of generating causal conclusions) in which I used an instrument with strong 
psychometric properties ideal for measuring changes in student performance (the NWEA 
analyses). For these purposes then, it is difficult to discount the findings from my ACTAAP 
analyses, despite the limitations of the tests that were used, which showed that the CPIP had a 
null to negative impact on student achievement at Fountain Lake. Along those lines, despite the 
limitations of the research design, it is also difficult to discount the findings from my NWEA 
analyses, which showed exceptionally high levels of growth in nearly all subject and grade areas. 
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In other words, while it is likely true that there was no positive impact on student achievement as 
a result of the implementation of the CPIP, the results from the NWEA assessments suggest that 
there were considerable achievement gains made by Fountain Lake students that may or may not 
be directly related to the CPIP’s focus on raising student achievement. 
Recommendations & Conclusions 
 The results of this evaluation revealed several areas in which additional research would 
be beneficial to provide further clarity about how students and school personnel are impacted by 
the use of merit pay. For example, one primary finding from my literature review was that there 
was a notable lack of research on how school counselors are affected by the increased 
accountability and focus on assessments inherent in these types of programs. In general, there is 
little research on how anyone other than teachers and students are impacted by such programs. 
This is not particularly surprising, as teachers are the most directly impacted in a merit pay 
scheme (since their work is under the greatest scrutiny for determination of merit pay bonuses). 
Further, the primary goal of most merit pay programs, if not all of them, is to raise student 
achievement, so it makes sense that much of the research on this topic is focused on evaluating 
how students are affected in schools that use merit pay. However, all school personnel, including 
school counselors, principals, teachers of non-core subjects, etc., are likely impacted by these 
programs, be it positively or negatively, and as such, more research could be useful in 
understanding how these other personnel groups respond to and are affected by the use of merit 
pay.   
 During the literature review process, I also identified only a small number of evaluations 
that specifically addressed how student achievement is impacted in schools with merit pay 
programs, and of those evaluations, only a small number were able to evaluate these programs 
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using an ideal research design (i.e. randomized control trials). Additionally, of those evaluations, 
many were focused on merit pay programs in their initial year of implementation (including this 
evaluation), assessing the initial or short-term impacts of these programs on student 
achievement; very few of these evaluations focused on programs that were firmly established in 
a school/district and had been in use for multiple school years.  
 It is certainly reasonable to hypothesize that merit pay programs will not have a 
significant motivational effect in the first year of the program, since teachers are not yet familiar 
with the specific details of these programs (including how their “merit” will be determined), or 
have not yet seen how large or small of a bonus they will receive (since bonuses are generally 
distributed at the conclusion of the school year, after student testing has been completed).
58
 
Combined with research designs that are less well-suited to accurately capture the impact of 
these programs, it is possible that the actual impacts of merit pay programs are being missed in 
some of the current evaluations of merit pay. Thus, more research evaluating the long-term 
impacts of these programs—using an ideal research design—is certainly necessary to gain a 
better understanding of how student achievement is impacted by the use of these programs.  
 Building upon the approach of this evaluation, one additional area of research that 
warrants further attention is determining how certain types of teachers respond to the use of 
merit pay. In this dissertation, I was able to compare the attitudes and perceptions of those 
teachers who received the higher bonuses and performance ratings to those teachers with the 
smaller bonuses/ratings. This research is particularly interesting, as we can see if the attitudes of 
these types of teachers differ, with teachers who benefit the most having the most positive 
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 It is also possible that, because of their significant financial cost, when these programs do not 
have an immediate impact on student achievement they are less likely to be supported and more 
likely to be discontinued, which would further limit the ability to measure the long-term impacts 
of such programs.  
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reactions to the use of these programs (i.e. are more supportive of merit pay, report working 
harder, collaborating more with other teachers, etc.), and those teachers who benefit the least 
having less favorable views or responses to these programs.  
 Despite some of the limitations of this evaluation, there were indications in this research 
that these differences do exist between teachers. And because these programs are meant to 
motivate teachers and impact the composition of the teaching force, it is plausible to expect the 
attitudes and perceptions of teachers to differ, as this may be indicative of the program having 
the desired outcome on the teaching force. If the teachers that perform the best under a merit pay 
program are the most satisfied, report altering their approach to teaching, or are more supportive 
of the use of merit pay, then the program may be providing incentives that are effective at 
rewarding and retaining these high-performing teachers. Conversely, those teachers who do not 
benefit in a merit pay system because they receive the lowest performance ratings may be more 
likely to seek out other vocational opportunities. More research about the differential perceptions 
of teachers would certainly be useful in understanding how teachers of varying levels of 
“effectiveness” respond to the use of merit pay.  
 In the end, this evaluation revealed a great deal of information about how school 
counselors and teachers responded to the adoption of this new compensation system, and as a 
result, how the students of Fountain Lake were affected by the increased focus on testing and 
accountability present in this program. And while it appears that the CPIP did not result in the 
positive outcomes that Fountain Lake administrators were seeking when they first established 
this program, it is worth repeating that this program was in its first year of operation at the time 
of this evaluation. It may be that the true effects of such a program do not come to bear 
immediately, and instead teachers and school personnel need more time in such a system before 
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their teaching approach, collaboration with their peers, and work with students are affected. At 
the very least, this evaluation has added to the growing yet still small body of literature on how 
merit pay impacts a school environment, and as this program continues, a great deal of effort 
should be made to understand the long-term impacts of this particular merit pay program.  
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Appendix A – Literature Review Summary Tables 
Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes (2002) – Eberts, R., Hollenbeck, K., & Stone, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome Measure(s) Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student retention 
rates was the 
primary outcome 
measure; 
however, the 
authors also 
assessed 
differences in 
class attendance, 
grade point 
average, and 
course passage 
rates 
 Students in an alternative 
education high school with a 
merit pay system compared to 
students in a similar high 
school with a traditional 
compensation model 
 Students in the high school 
with merit pay were students 
who had not been successful 
in a traditional school setting, 
and had low attendance and 
graduation rates relative to 
students in the traditional 
school setting 
 The authors assessed the 
impact of this merit pay 
program using data from 
two years prior and two 
years after its 
implementation 
 The authors performed a 
difference-in-difference 
analysis on all outcome 
measures, comparing 
performance for students 
at the school with merit 
pay to student 
performance at the 
traditional high school 
 
 Course completion percentages in the school 
with merit pay increased to 71.7%, compared 
to 54.5% in the traditional high school 
 No effect on attendance rate, which the 
authors note was not surprising due to the fact 
that this was not a focus of the merit pay 
program 
 There was a negative and significant 
difference for GPA and course passing rates; 
the authors noted that this was because the 
incentive program resulted in the retention of 
the lower-achieving students  
 While the merit pay program did not 
positively impact student achievement, it did 
positively impact retention rates, which was 
the primary goal of this program 
1
6
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or Continuous) 
Employees 
Eligible for 
Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or Group 
Bonuses  
Measures Used in the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Teachers could earn a bonus of 
up to 12.5% of their base salary 
 The bonus system was a fixed 
system; teachers either earned 
the full bonus or nothing 
 For a teacher with a bachelor’s 
degree, his or her base salary 
could increase from $22,848 to 
$27,412 after earning a full 
bonus 
 All 
teachers 
 Bonuses were 
distributed to 
individual 
teachers 
 There did not 
appear to be a 
cap on the 
number of 
teachers that 
could earn a 
bonus 
 Bonuses were given for high 
retention rates in a teacher’s 
class, and for high scores on 
student evaluation. 
 The retention bonus was paid if 
80% or more of a teacher’s 
students were still enrolled in the 
teacher’s class at the end of the 
quarter. 
 For student evaluations, teachers 
were rated on a 5-point scale in 
15 areas; teachers that earned an 
average rating of 4.65 or higher 
in each quarter for four 
consecutive quarters were 
eligible for a performance bonus 
 Merit pay 
program 
established in 
1995-96 
 The analysis runs 
through the 1998-
99 school year; 
unclear if this 
program is still in 
operation, or if 
not, when it 
ended 
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Catalyst for Change: Pay for Performance in Denver (2004) – Community Training and Assistance Center 
 
Description of Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or Continuous) 
Employees Eligible 
for Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or 
Group Bonuses  
Measures Used in the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of 
Program 
Operation 
 In the first year, teachers could 
earn a $500 bonus for each 
objective obtained 
 In the second year, that increased 
to $750 for each objective met 
 Teachers either earned the full 
bonus per objective, or did not 
earn anything at all 
 89% to 93% of teachers met one 
or more objective 
 Included all 
teachers and 
specialists 
(nurses, 
language 
specialists, etc.) 
in schools where 
67% of the 
faculty voted to 
participate 
 Bonuses 
distributed to 
teachers based 
on the way the 
objectives 
were 
designed; 
could be either 
individual or 
group bonuses 
 Teacher-designed objectives (could 
be individual or group objectives) 
that were approved and evaluated 
by the principal (and also rated on a 
four-trait rubric to determine the 
quality of the objectives) 
 Involved measuring student growth, 
though the teacher set the growth 
target and the measure(s) used 
 Teachers set two objectives per year 
 This pilot 
merit pay 
program 
operated in 
the Denver 
Public 
Schools 
from 1999-
2003.  
Outcome Measure(s) Sample/Comparison 
Group 
Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student achievement 
gains, expressed in 
NCE scores, 
measured on the 
ITBS (math, reading, 
and language) and 
CSAP (math, reading, 
and writing) from 
spring to spring 
 Teacher attitudes 
about the program 
based on survey and 
interview responses 
 Students in 
schools where 
merit pay was 
piloted (13% of 
all Denver 
schools), 
compared to all 
other Denver 
students   
 Students in pilot schools 
were compared to control 
students, with the primary 
outcome measure being 
changes in mean NCE 
scores 
 Two-stage hierarchical 
linear modeling was used to 
adjust for differences in 
school and student 
characteristics (students 
grouped within schools) 
 The survey responses for 
teachers in pilot schools 
were compared to 
responses from teachers in 
control schools  
 Elementary pilot student test performance was lower 
than that of the control students in 5 of 6 tested areas 
 Middle school pilot students performed significantly 
higher than control students in 3 of 6 tested areas 
 In the high school, pilot students showed 
significantly higher increases in 3 of 6 tested areas 
 For every year that a teacher participated in the 
program, there were statistically significant increases 
in student achievement across all three school levels 
compared to students being taught by teachers with 
only one year of experience in the program 
 Teachers reported better access to data, increased 
focus on student achievement, and improved 
collegiality  among teachers, but did not report 
changes in their instructional practices as a result of 
the program 
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Performance Pay for Teachers: Determinants and Consequences (2007) – Belfield, C., & Heywood, J. 
 
Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or Continuous) 
Employees Eligible for 
Merit Pay Bonuses 
Individual or Group Bonuses Measures Used in the 
Merit Pay Program 
Years of Program Operation 
 The authors noted 
that merit pay 
earnings (in 
addition to other 
forms of 
additional earning) 
ranged from 
$1,612 to $4,822 
 It is not explicitly 
stated whether or 
not bonuses were 
fixed or 
continuous 
 Not explicitly 
stated in this paper 
 Not explicitly stated in 
this paper 
 Not explicitly stated 
in this paper 
 Not explicitly stated in this 
paper 
 
 
Outcome Measure(s) Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Teacher salary 
satisfaction 
 Teacher satisfaction that 
the effort invested in 
teaching (to earn a 
bonus) is being 
rewarded 
 Overall satisfaction with 
being a teacher as a 
result of merit pay 
 The sample for these 
analyses comes from the 
Schools and Staffing 
Survey (2000) 
 Total sample included 
56,354 teachers in the 
public school sector, and 
an additional 10,760 in 
the private school sector 
 The authors used a probit 
estimation model to examine 
the relationship between merit 
pay and teacher satisfaction 
(no additional details provided 
on the methods employed in 
these analyses) 
 Merit pay appeared to have no 
influence on overall career satisfaction, 
and had a negative impact on 
satisfaction with salary 
 The authors suggested that there is no 
support for the notion that merit pay 
raises teacher morale; rather, “merit 
pay may put income at risk, involve 
negative comparisons, and generate 
peer pressure or extra effort” (p.250).  
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Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance (2007) – Figlio, D., & Kenny, L. 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison 
Group 
Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 12th grade 
student test 
scores in 
reading, 
math, 
science, 
and history 
 The sample for this 
study included 
schools in the 
National Education 
Longitudinal 
Survey (NELS) 
dataset 
 Of the schools 
surveyed by the 
authors about their 
compensation 
practices (as well 
as those schools 
surveyed on the 
Schools and 
Staffing Survey 
(SASS)), there 
were 4,523 schools 
that responded, 
compared to a total 
population of 
schools of 12,830 
 The authors conduct a series of 
education production functions, where 
they estimate the impact of merit pay 
programs on student achievement, using 
12
th
 grade test scores as the primary 
outcome measure 
 The authors control for such things as 
8th grade test scores, number of subject-
specific courses taken in high school, 
number of days absent per year, student 
characteristics, and school and teacher 
characteristics (for example, percent of 
teachers with a master’s degree). The 
authors also control for school sector 
(public or private) and teacher 
unionization. 
 They also group schools into three 
categories based on the incentives used 
in the school: High, medium, and low 
salary incentives; these indicate not 
only the size of the bonuses, but also the 
percentage of teachers that received a 
bonus 
 The authors “find evidence that the use of 
teacher salary incentives is associated with 
higher levels of student performance, all else 
equal” (p.910) 
 Having some type of salary incentive is 
associated with a 1.3 to 2.1 point increase in test 
performance. 
 The authors also note that bonus programs with 
low levels of selectivity, where all teachers get a 
bonus, are not associated with improvements in 
student achievement  
 There was an eight year gap between schools 
test scores and response to the authors survey; 
however, the authors note that this is not a 
significant limitation because of the high 
correlation of the presence of merit pay 
programs in schools at both time points 
 The authors also note that because this was not 
an experimental design, that it is difficult to 
attribute achievement gains to merit pay, as 
these gains could just be a result of unobserved 
school quality 
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Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or 
Continuous) 
Employees 
Eligible for Merit 
Pay Bonuses 
Individual or Group Bonuses Measures Used in 
the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Not explicitly 
stated in this 
paper 
 Not explicitly 
stated in this 
paper 
 In this sample, 36% of teachers received a bonus, and 
43% of teachers received merit raises 
 The authors note that in some schools, bonuses were 
distributed to individual teachers, and in others, the 
bonuses were distributed to all teachers 
 Not explicitly 
stated in this 
paper 
 Not explicitly 
stated in this 
paper 
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Impact of the Teacher Advancement Program on Student Test Score Gains: Findings from an Independent Appraisal (2008) – 
Springer, M, Ballou, D., & Peng, A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Fall-to-spring 
mathematics 
test score 
gains on the 
Northwest 
Evaluation 
Association 
assessments 
for students 
in the 2
nd
 
through 10
th
 
grades 
 The authors used a panel 
dataset to estimate the 
impact of the Teacher 
Advancement Program 
(TAP) by comparing test 
score gains in TAP 
schools to gains in non-
TAP schools 
 The total sample 
included 1,200 schools, 
6 of which were TAP 
schools in the initial year 
(2002-03); the number 
of TAP schools 
increased to 28 in 2005-
06 
 The authors conducted 
multiple regression 
analyses controlling for 
school and student 
characteristics 
(including 
race/ethnicity, FRL 
status, average teacher 
salary, student-teacher 
ratio, etc.); the authors 
also included a binary 
variable that indicated 
whether or not a 
student attended a TAP 
school 
 “At all grade levels except 9th grade, there is a positive 
association between TAP and a student’s fall-to-spring 
test score gain. Although the positive coefficients for the 
7
th
 and 10
th
 grade-level models fail to attain conventional 
levels of statistical significance, the dominant impression 
is positive” (p. 11) 
 Using the school fixed-effects model (to control for 
school selection bias), the gains in elementary school 
(grades 2-5) are still positive and significant, though the 
coefficients in grades 6, 7, 9, and 10 switch to negative 
and statistically significant 
 Positive effects for elementary grades but undetectable or 
negative impacts in middle and high school 
 The authors acknowledge several limitations, including 
the small number of TAP schools, sample 
representativeness, and fewer testing data points for 
students in 9
th
 and 10
th
 grade 
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Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed 
or Continuous) 
Employees Eligible 
for Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or Group Bonuses  Measures Used in the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Recommended 
bonuses ranged 
anywhere from $0-
$12,000 per year 
 Bonuses could vary 
based on how well a 
teacher did in each 
of the components 
of the TAP program 
(though school-wide 
achievement was the 
same for all 
teachers) 
 Under the TAP 
system, all 
teachers were 
eligible to 
receive a bonus, 
even those 
teachers without 
direct 
instructional 
responsibilities 
 Bonuses were distributed to 
individual teachers 
 The program was intentionally 
designed to avoid competition; 
teachers earned a bonus by 
reaching a performance 
threshold, that had no impact 
on another teacher earning a 
bonus 
 In other words, all teachers 
were able to earn a bonus 
under the TAP system 
 Classroom observations 
(50%) 
 Value-added measurement of 
gains that the teacher 
produces with his/her 
students (30%) 
o If a teacher taught in 
a non-tested subject 
or grade, this 
component shifted to 
school-wide 
achievement gains 
 School-wide achievement 
gains (20%) 
 For this study, 
the authors 
evaluated the 
impact of TAP 
over the four-
year period 
from 2002-03 
to 2005-06 in 
two unknown 
states 
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An Evaluation of Teacher Performance Pay in Arkansas (2008) – Winters, M., Ritter, G., Barnett, J., & Greene, J.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student math 
performance, 
measured in 
Normal Curve 
Equivalent 
(NCE) points, 
on the 
Stanford 
Achievement 
Test, 9
th
 
Edition (SAT-
9) 
 Schools were not 
randomly assigned to 
participate in this 
program; thus, three 
schools in the Little 
Rock School District, 
similar in demographic 
and achievement 
characteristics, served 
as comparison schools 
for the two schools that 
participated in the 
Achievement 
Challenge Pilot Project 
(ACPP) 
 The authors conduct three separate 
estimations to evaluate the impact 
of merit pay on student math 
performance: 
o A simple differences-in-
differences approach 
(estimation across schools) 
o An expansion of the first 
model, including student 
fixed-effects (estimation 
across students) 
o Same as the second model, 
only including students 
that were treated for two 
years, as opposed to only 
one as was the case in the 
second model 
 First model: Students in the schools that used 
merit pay had gains of 3.64 NCE points 
relative to those students in schools without 
merit pay (these gains were statistically 
significant) 
 Second model:  Students in the schools that 
used merit pay had gains of 4.19 NCE points 
relative to those students in schools without 
merit pay (these gains were also statistically 
significant) 
 Third model:  Students in the schools that 
used merit pay had gains of 4.63 NCE points 
relative to those students in schools without 
merit pay (these gains were also statistically 
significant) 
 Primary limitations were a small N (only 
implemented in very few schools, with a 
small number of students) and a lack of 
random assignment 
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Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or 
Continuous) 
Employees Eligible for 
Merit Pay Bonuses 
Individual or Group 
Bonuses  
Measures Used in the 
Merit Pay Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Teachers received per 
student bonuses dependent 
on average test score gains 
in the class 
 For example, if the 
classroom grew between 
0-4%, teachers received 
$50 per student; if the 
class grew 15% or above, 
the teacher earned $400 
per student 
 Maximum bonus for 
teachers was $11,200 
 All employees were 
eligible for bonuses, 
not just teachers 
(including custodians, 
principals, secretaries, 
etc.) 
 Bonuses were 
distributed individually 
 There was no cap on 
funding; therefore, 
teachers and employees 
were all able to earn the 
maximum  bonus for 
which they were 
eligible 
 Individual 
classroom and 
school-wide 
improvements in 
math performance 
on the SAT-9 
 The ACPP was 
implemented in 
one school in 
Little Rock, 
Arkansas in 2003-
04, and continued 
within five 
schools in the 
district for three 
years 
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Beyond Incentives: Do Schools Use Accountability Rewards Productively (2009) – Bacolod, M., DiNardo, J., & Jacobson, M. 
 
Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or 
Continuous) 
Employees 
Eligible for 
Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or Group 
Bonuses  
Measures Used in the Merit Pay Program Years of Program Operation 
 The average 
amount given to 
qualifying 
schools was 
$287,000, which 
translates to 
approximately 
$1,900 for each 
teacher 
 All employees 
received the 
same bonus 
amount 
 Bonuses 
were given 
to all 
teachers 
and staff 
within a 
qualifying 
school 
 Bonuses were 
allocated to all 
employees, and 
were based on 
group 
performance  
 The state-created Academic Performance 
Index (API), which is “essentially a 
(noisy) weighted average of the 
proportion of students scoring in each 
quintile in a set of nationally norm-
referenced exams and/or content areas” 
(p. 7) 
 For these purposes, the API was based on 
student performance on the Stanford 9 
exam 
 The growth targets for schools under the 
API was 5% growth from the prior year or 
a pre-determined minimum growth score 
 The program was in 
operation during the two-
year period from 2000-01 
to 2001-02 
Outcome Measure(s) Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Academic 
Performance 
Index growth 
scores for 
schools as well 
as for significant 
student 
subgroups 
 
 The sample in this analysis 
included schools that were 
directly above and below a 
performance threshold 
 Those schools directly 
below the performance 
threshold (control schools) 
were not eligible for 
bonuses, whereas those 
schools just above the 
threshold (treatment 
schools) were eligible 
 The authors employed a 
regression discontinuity 
design, where schools 
that just barely met or 
exceeded the 
performance threshold 
(and therefore were 
awarded bonuses) were 
compared to those 
schools just below the 
performance threshold 
that just missed 
receiving a bonus 
 “Little measurable improvement in standard metrics 
of achievement, such as exam performance, for 
those schools that received the award compared to 
those schools that did not” (p. 5) 
 The authors noted that the incentives offered in this 
program were quite weak for a number of reasons; 
the size of the bonuses were generally fairly small, 
and because they were given to groups of employees 
(not to individual teachers based on their unique 
contributions), there was little incentive to alter 
teaching behavior 
 Eligibility requirements were also not clear, and 
changed over the two years this program was in 
operation 
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Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report (2009) – Springer, M., Lewis, J., Podgursky, M., 
Ehlert, M., Gronberg, T., Hamilton, L., Jansen, D., Stecher, B., Taylor, L., Lopez, O., & Peng, A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student 
achievement 
results in 
math and 
reading from 
the Academic 
Excellence 
Indicator 
System 
(AEIS) 
 The survey 
responses of 
61,000 school 
personnel 
 The Texas Educator Excellence Grant 
(TEEG) program was implemented in 
approximately 927  high poverty, 
high performing public schools in 
Texas (a total of 141,423 TEEG 
students) 
 In order to qualify for the TEEG, 
schools had to be in the top half of 
schools in percentage of low-income 
students, and be rated as Exemplary 
or Recognized (or in the top quartile 
of schools rated Academically 
Acceptable) 
 For all analyses (both student 
achievement and teacher attitudes), 
TEEG schools were compared to non-
TEEG schools 
 The authors use 
regression analyses, 
in which they 
controlled for 
various background 
characteristics of 
students and 
schools, to 
determine the extent 
to which TEEG 
plans impacted 
student achievement 
 There did not appear to be any statistically 
significant impacts on student achievement as a 
result of the implementation of the TEEG 
 Teachers did not believe the TEEG resulted in 
less teacher collaboration or decreased 
collegiality; teachers also believed the program 
contributed to a positive school environment 
 There was also a relationship between teacher 
turnover and bonus size – the larger the bonus, 
the lower the probability of teacher turnover 
(though the authors note that most bonuses 
were so small that the program likely did not 
have a significant impact on teacher turnover) 
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Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or Continuous) 
Employees Eligible 
for Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or Group Bonuses Measures Used in the Merit 
Pay Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Most schools 
proposed a 
minimum bonus 
amount of less than 
$3,000; 
additionally, most 
schools also 
proposed a 
maximum bonus of 
less than $3,000 
 The average bonus 
was $1,982 in the 
first year and 
$2,094 in the 
second year 
 The majority of 
funding under 
the TEEG was 
allocated for 
teacher bonuses; 
however, funds 
were also 
available to 
provide bonus 
awards to 
principals, 
teacher aides 
custodians, etc. 
 Teacher eligible for bonuses was 
typically determined by 
individual teacher performance, 
as opposed to the performance of 
teams of teachers or the school 
as a whole 
 There was a limited pool of 
funds available to each school, 
so there was the potential for 
competition among teachers (a 
concern cited by schools as a 
reason for declining to 
participate) 
 TEEG plans relied 
heavily on measures of 
student achievement on 
state standardized 
assessments 
 However, measures 
varied by 
school/district, as 
TEEG funding was 
given to districts to 
implement locally 
designed incentive pay 
plans 
 The TEEG program 
provided annual 
grants to schools to 
design  and 
implement 
performance pay 
programs from 
2006-07 to 2009-10 
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Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report (2009) – Springer, M., Lewis, J., Podgursky, 
M., Ehlert, Taylor, L., Lopez, O., & Peng, A. 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student 
performance 
on the Texas 
Assessment of 
Knowledge 
and Skills 
(TAKS) 
 The survey 
responses 
from the 
spring of 2008 
of over 3,700 
teachers  
 The  Governor’s Educator 
Excellence Grant (GEEG) 
program  was implemented 
in approximately 99 high 
poverty, high performing 
public schools in Texas 
 In order to qualify for the 
GEEG, schools had to be in 
the top third of schools in 
percentage of low-income 
students, and be rated as 
Exemplary or Recognized 
(or in the top quartile of 
schools rated Academically 
Acceptable) 
 For all analyses (both 
student achievement and 
teacher attitudes), GEEG 
schools were compared to 
non-GEEG schools 
 Simple descriptive 
comparisons of  Texas 
Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills 
(TAKS) performance 
in GEEG vs. non-
GEEG schools 
 The authors also use a 
series of modeling 
strategies to estimate 
the impact of the 
GEEG on student 
achievement, 
including a student 
fixed-effects model, a 
time trend analysis, 
and a model that 
included both student 
and school fixed 
effects 
 “The evidence regarding GEEG program impacts on 
student achievement is inconclusive. Depending on 
the specification, the analysis indicates that GEEG 
has a weakly positive, negative, or negligible effect 
on student achievement gains” (p. 107) 
 Teachers and school personnel did not believe the 
program resulted in less collaboration or a decrease 
in workplace collegiality; most personnel said the 
GEEG had a positive impact on the school 
environment 
 However, most teachers also reported that the GEEG 
did not affect their instructional practices, or how 
they approached the teaching process 
 Teacher turnover was also consistently lower in 
GEEG schools 
 The identification of an adequate control group for 
measuring student achievement impacts was difficult, 
due to selection criteria to get into the program (only 
offered to high poverty/high achieving schools) and 
because there was another merit pay program in 
place in over 1,000 schools in Texas 
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or Continuous) 
Employees Eligible for 
Merit Pay Bonuses 
Individual or Group 
Bonuses  
Measures Used in the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Schools applied for grants to 
fund teacher bonus 
programs; these grants 
ranged from $60,000 to 
$220,000 per school (size of 
grants based on number of 
students) 
 The average teacher bonus 
in the three years of the 
GEEG was $2,469, $2,261, 
and $2,249 respectively; 
most teachers who received 
a bonus got between $1,000 
and $3,000 
 The majority of 
funding under the 
TEEG was 
allocated for 
teacher bonuses; 
however, funds 
were also available 
to provide bonus 
awards to 
principals, teacher 
aides custodians, 
etc. 
 Bonuses were 
distributed to 
individual teachers 
 There was a limited 
pool of resources 
for each school, so 
not every 
teacher/employee 
was able to earn a 
bonus 
 Teacher bonuses were 
typically based on the 
impact that individual 
teachers had on student 
achievement (for students in 
their classrooms) 
 School-level performance 
measures were also 
frequently used in the GEEG 
 Measures varied, as 
schools/districts were able to 
create and implement their 
own local merit pay program 
 The Governor’s 
Educator 
Excellence 
Grant (GEEG) 
program was in 
operation in 
Texas schools 
from 2005-06 
to 2007-08 
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New York City’s School-Wide Bonus Pay Program: Early Evidence from a Randomized Trial (2009) – Springer, M, & Winters, M. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student 
achievement 
gains in 
mathematics 
for students 
in grades 3-8 
 The sample for this 
study includes 186 
elementary, K-8, and 
middle schools 
randomly assigned to 
the treatment group (i.e. 
eligible for bonuses), 
and 137 schools 
randomly assigned to 
the control-condition 
(i.e. no bonuses) 
 All of the schools in the 
sample were identified 
as high-need schools 
 The authors estimate the impact of the 
SPBP on student achievement using a 
series of cross-sectional regression models 
 In these models, the authors control for 
treatment status, and in the simplest model 
also only controlled for student grade, 
whereas in the most comprehensive model 
they also included student- and school-
level covariates (such as race indicators) 
 The authors also tested for differential 
SPBP treatment effects by student and 
school characteristics by incorporating 
interaction terms into subsequent 
regression models  
 “The SPBP had no discernible effect on 
overall student achievement in 
mathematics during the first year of the 
program’s implementation. The sign on 
the SPBP coefficient is negative in 
virtually all models, though the average 
treatment effect is always insignificant 
at any conventional level” (p.8) 
 The authors note that this impact 
evaluation was conducted only three 
months after the program was 
implemented 
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Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or 
Continuous) 
Employees 
Eligible for Merit 
Pay Bonuses 
Individual or Group Bonuses  Measures Used in the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Schools eligible for 
bonuses could earn $3,000 
for every staff member 
(who was a union member) 
if the schools met their 
annual performance targets 
 Schools that met 75% of 
their annual performance 
targets could earn $1,500 
per staff member 
 The SPBP set expected 
incentive payments using 
fixed performance 
standards 
 Bonuses could be 
distributed at the discretion 
of four-person 
compensation committees 
at individual schools; all 
staff within a school could 
earn the same amount, or 
the bonuses could be 
differentiated   
 93% of schools received at 
least a $1,500 bonus (65% 
received $3,000), for a total 
payout of $14.25 million 
(an average of 
$160,000/school) 
 All members 
of the United 
Federation of 
Teachers 
union were 
eligible for a 
bonus 
 Schools received a flat 
amount of money for each 
staff member ($3,000 if a 
school met the 
performance target) 
 These funds could then be 
distributed at the 
discretion of the school; so 
in theory, some teachers or 
staff could be excluded 
from the bonus pool 
 All employees were 
eligible for a bonus; the 
SPBP was not designed to 
be a rank-ordered 
tournament, where only 
the top teachers received a 
bonus 
 
 Bonuses were earned by 
meeting school 
performance targets 
established by the Progress 
Report Card (PRC) system, 
the primary accountability 
system in the school district 
 The PRC system evaluates 
schools on three factors: 1) 
student attendance and 
student/parent/teacher 
perceptions of the school 
learning environment 
(15%); 2) student 
performance on high-stakes 
tests (30%); 3) student 
progress on high-stakes 
tests (55%) 
 Performance targets are set 
based on school 
performance from the prior 
year 
 The School-
Wide 
Performance 
Bonus Program 
(SPBP) was 
implemented 
midway into 
the 2007-08 
school year in 
New York City 
schools 
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An Evaluation of the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) in Chicago: Year Two Impact Report (2010) – Glazerman, S., & 
Seifullah, A. 
 
Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or 
Continuous) 
Employees Eligible for 
Merit Pay Bonuses 
Individual or Group 
Bonuses 
Measures Used in the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 In the first year, the 
average teacher bonus 
ranged from $0 to 
$2,045; after that, the 
average bonus was 
$2,653, with a 
maximum of $6,320 
 Principals could earn 
up to $5,000 per year, 
and other school staff 
could earn up to $1,000 
($500 in the first year) 
 The Chicago TAP 
model provides 
financial rewards to 
teachers, as well as 
to principals and 
other school staff 
 Bonuses are 
distributed to 
individual teachers 
 The TAP program is 
intentionally 
structured to avoid 
competition, such that 
everyone is eligible to 
receive a bonus 
instead of having 
teachers compete for a 
finite pool of bonus 
dollars 
 The TAP system provides 
rewards to teachers based 
on performance in three 
areas: 
o Classroom 
observations 
o Teacher value-
added impact on 
students in his/her 
classroom 
o School-wide 
achievement gains 
 This evaluation 
focuses on the 
impact of TAP in 
the Chicago 
Public Schools in 
2007-08 school 
year through its 
second year in 
2008-09 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student test 
scores on state 
assessments in 
math and 
reading for 
students in 
grades 3-8 
 Chicago schools had to apply to become a 
TAP school; initially, 16 elementary schools 
applied that were selected as finalists 
 Of those 16 schools, 8 were randomly 
assigned to begin implementing TAP in 
2007-08 (cohort 1), with the other 8 schools 
serving as the control group (these cohort 2 
schools became TAP schools the following 
year) 
 The authors also used propensity score 
matching to identify other similar Chicago 
schools to serve as comparisons for both the 
cohort 1 and 2 TAP schools  
 The authors 
utilized a series of 
regression models 
in which they 
controlled for a 
range of teacher 
and student 
characteristics 
 There were no statistically significant 
differences in achievement between 
schools in cohort 1 or 2 (the experimental 
analysis); there were also no significant 
cumulative impacts of TAP (being in a 
TAP school for a longer period of time) 
 There were also no statistically significant 
differences between TAP schools (cohort 
1 and 2) and non-TAP schools (the quasi-
experimental analysis) 
 A limitation of the experimental design is 
the reliance on only 16 schools, 8 in each 
treatment condition 
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Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching (2010) – Springer, M., Ballou, D., 
Hamilton, L., Le, V., Lockwood, J., McCaffrey, D., Pepper, M., & Stecher, B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison 
Group 
Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Growth in math 
achievement as 
measured by 
criterion 
referenced test 
scores on the 
state test, the 
Tennessee 
Comprehensive 
Assessment 
Program 
(TCAP) 
 The initial sample 
consisted of 296 
middle school math 
teachers, with 143 
randomly assigned 
to the treatment 
group, and 153 
assigned to the 
control group 
 By the third year of 
the program, only 
148 teachers 
remained in the 
program (84 in the 
treatment group) 
 Schools were stratified into ten 
groups based on TCAP 
performance to ensure balance in 
the performance of schools 
assigned to the treatment and 
control groups 
 Clusters of teachers within each 
school were then assigned to the 
treatment or control group 
 To estimate treatment effects, the 
authors used “lineal mixed models 
designed to account for features of 
the experimental design and 
randomization into treatment and 
control groups” (p. 21), in which 
they controlled for observable 
differences between the treatment 
and control groups 
 The authors found no overall treatments effects 
across all years and grades (effect size of 0.04) 
 However, they did find positive and significant 
effects for students in grade 5 in the second 
two years, equal to effect sizes of 0.18 and 0.20 
(the authors note that most grade 5 classes are 
self-contained) 
 The authors note some threats to validity, 
including an imbalance between treatment and 
control teachers on observable characteristics 
(by grade level), non-random assignment of 
students to teachers (also by grade level), and 
differential and overall attrition by teachers 
from the treatment and control groups; 
however, the authors do not consider these 
factors to have influenced the overall results 
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or Continuous) 
Employees Eligible 
for Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or Group 
Bonuses  
Measures Used in the Merit Pay 
Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 There were three fixed reward 
levels: 
o $5,000 for teachers at 
the 80
th
 percentile of the 
performance threshold 
o $10,000 for teachers at 
the 85
th
 percentile 
o $15,000 for teachers at 
the 95
th
 percentile 
 The average bonus distributed in 
each of the three years, starting 
in the 2006-07 school year, was 
$9,639, $11,370, and $9,623 
respectively 
 Over the three years, $1.27 
million was distributed in 
bonuses, with 33.6% of teachers 
in the initial treatment group 
receiving a year-end bonus at 
least once 
 Middle school 
math teachers 
who taught ten 
or more students 
 Teachers were not 
forced to compete 
against each other 
for a limited bonus 
pool 
 Bonuses were given 
to individual 
teachers, not to 
teams of teachers or 
entire schools 
 In principle, all 
teachers could earn 
the maximum bonus 
if they reached the 
performance 
thresholds  
 The authors used a simple 
value-added measure to 
determine which teachers 
would be eligible for 
bonuses 
 In short, each student’s 
performance in a classroom 
was compared to the 
performance of similar 
students (with the same prior 
year test score) statewide; 
the difference for all 
students between actual 
performance and state 
performance was then 
averaged, resulting in an 
overall value-added score 
that indicated how a 
teacher’s students performed 
compared to other similar 
students 
 The POINT 
experiment 
was open to 
middle 
school 
mathematics 
teachers 
during the 
2006-07 
school year, 
and 
continued 
within the 
Nashville 
School 
System for 
three 
academic 
years 
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District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation Report (2010) – Springer, M., Lewis, J., Ehlert, M., 
Podgursky, M., Crader, G., Taylor, L., Gronberg, T., Jansen, D., Lopez, O., & Stuit, D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Sample/Comparison 
Group 
Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Student 
performance 
on the Texas 
Assessment 
of 
Knowledge 
and Skills 
(TAKS) 
 Teacher 
survey 
responses 
 In Year 1, there 
were 203 districts 
that participated in 
the DATE 
program (191 of 
which continued 
into Year 2), 
compared to 
approximately 
1,000 districts that 
declined the 
opportunity to 
participate  
 Simple descriptive 
comparisons of  
Texas Assessment 
of Knowledge and 
Skills (TAKS) 
performance in 
DATE vs. non-
DATE schools 
 Regression analyses 
in which the authors 
controlled for 
several background 
characteristics of 
students and schools 
 Student passing rates on the TAKS were lower in DATE schools, 
though the difference between DATE and non-DATE schools 
decreased 
 Students in DATE schools had greater TAKS gains than students in 
non-DATE schools 
 Teacher turnover was related to receiving a DATE award; teachers 
that received an award were more likely to stay at their school, and 
teachers that did not were more likely to leave 
 Teachers reported improved school climate and did not perceive 
negative effects; teachers also indicated that the incentive plans did 
not really contribute to school improvements 
 “More often than not, participants in the DATE program had a 
positive experience, student achievement gains and teacher 
turnover moved in a generally desirable direction, and teacher 
attitudes were favorable towards DATE” (p. xiii) 
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Description of 
Bonuses/Rewards (Fixed or 
Continuous) 
Employees Eligible 
for Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or Group Bonuses  Measures Used in the 
Merit Pay Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Teachers in districts with 
district-wide plans 
received an average 
bonus of $1,361 (with 
70% of teachers receiving 
a bonus of at least $1,000) 
 Teachers in districts with 
select school plans 
received an average 
bonus of $3,344 (with 
96% of teachers receiving 
a bonus of at least $1,000) 
 DATE funds 
were primarily 
used to give 
bonuses to 
teachers; 
however, these 
funds were also 
used to give 
bonuses to 
principals and 
other school 
personnel 
 Most districts implemented plans 
in which all teachers were not 
eligible; 21% of districts in Year 
1 and 6% in Year 2 provided 
awards to 90% of teachers 
 During Year 1, the awards were 
a combination of individual and 
group based performance; in 
Year 2, there was a greater 
tendency towards individual 
teacher performance 
 Districts were not required to 
include all teachers 
 There was a limited pool of 
funds for each school 
 Varied by 
school/district, as 
DATE funding 
was given to 
districts to 
implement locally 
designed incentive 
pay plans 
 The program was 
initially 
implemented 
statewide in Texas 
in 2008-09, and 
was still in 
operation during 
2010-11 school 
year (though this 
evaluation only 
focuses on 
outcomes for 
districts 
participating in the 
program for the 
first two years) 
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Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools (2011) – Fryer, R.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome Measure(s) Sample/Comparison Group Analytic Strategy Findings/Limitations 
 Primary outcome 
measure was 
student 
achievement gains 
in math and 
English/language 
arts 
 The author also 
assessed how 
merit pay 
impacted student 
attendance, course 
grades, high 
school graduation 
rates, etc.  
 Total sample was 396 
high-need schools, each 
of which was selected 
based on a school’s 
proficiency ratings, 
poverty rates, 
percentage of English 
Language Learners and 
special education 
students 
 Of the 396 schools in 
the experimental 
sample, 233 schools 
were randomly 
assigned to take part in 
the merit pay initiative, 
with 163 schools 
serving as control 
schools 
 Student-level 
regression analyses 
were used to 
determine the impact 
of the merit pay 
initiative 
 In his regression 
model, the author 
controlled for prior 
achievement levels, 
race, free and reduced 
lunch eligibility, 
special education 
status, English 
language learner 
status, as well as 
controls for teacher 
and school 
characteristics 
 “Providing incentives to teachers based on school’s 
performance on metrics involving student 
achievement, improvement, and the learning 
environment did not increase student achievement in 
any statistically meaningful way. If anything, student 
achievement declined” (p.5) 
 The estimates for the effect of incentives on student 
achievement were all negative, and statistically 
significant in the middle school 
 There were also no statistically significant impacts, 
positive or negative, on any of the other outcome 
measures 
 The author also found no impact on teacher retention 
or on the number of teacher absences 
 The author suggested that the lack of an impact could 
have been the result of small incentives, an incentive 
scheme that was too complex and not easy to 
understand, and focused too heavily on group 
incentives 
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Description of Bonuses/Rewards 
(Fixed or Continuous) 
Employees Eligible 
for Merit Pay 
Bonuses 
Individual or Group 
Bonuses  
Measures Used in the Merit 
Pay Program 
Years of Program 
Operation 
 Schools eligible for bonuses 
could earn $3,000 for every staff 
member (who was a union 
member) if the schools met their 
annual performance targets 
 Schools that met 75% of their 
annual performance targets 
could earn $1,500 per staff 
member 
 Bonuses could be distributed at 
the discretion of compensation 
committees at individual 
schools; all staff within a school 
could earn the same amount, or 
the bonuses could be 
differentiated.  
 The only caveat was that 
bonuses could not be based on 
seniority 
 Total payout for the two years of 
the program was $22 million in 
the first year and $31 million in 
the second year 
 
 All members of 
the United 
Federation of 
Teachers union 
were eligible for 
a bonus 
 Schools received a flat 
amount of money for 
each staff member 
($3,000 if a school met 
the performance target) 
 These funds could then 
be distributed at the 
discretion of the school; 
so in theory, some 
teachers or staff could 
be excluded from the 
bonus pool 
 The majority of schools 
(80%) gave everyone 
the same bonus 
amount, with the only 
differentiation based on 
the position held in the 
school  
 Bonus money was 
distributed to schools if 
annual performance 
targets were met 
 These performance 
targets were based on 
student performance on 
state exams for 
elementary and middle 
school students, Regents 
exam results and 
graduation rates for high 
schools, student 
attendance, and a 
learning environment 
survey administered to 
teachers, parents, and 
schools 
 The New 
York merit 
pay initiative 
was 
established as 
a two-year 
pilot program 
that was 
implemented 
in the 2007-08 
school year 
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Appendix C – School Counselor Interview Questions 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to these questions about how the Cobra Pride Incentive 
Program (CPIP) has impacted your job and your students. Please feel free to respond openly and 
honestly, as I will not share your individual responses with anyone. I may use quotes from your 
responses in my research; however, your name will not be attached to any of the quotes I use. 
Please take as much time as you need to respond to these questions, and if you have additional 
thoughts about the CPIP not covered in these questions, please feel free to include them at the 
end. 
As a thank you for your time, I will provide lunch to all of the school counselors! Thank you for 
your work and your time! 
1. Current vs. Previous Job Responsibilities 
a. Since the CPIP was implemented, have your job responsibilities changed in any way? 
b. Do you now spend more time assisting with testing-related activities than you 
previously did? Examples might include: 
i. Coordinating test administrations  
ii. Helping prepare students for taking test 
iii. Watching classes while teachers focus on test preparation 
iv. Proctoring test administrations 
2. Time with Students 
a. How has your time with students been impacted by the CPIP – do you spend less time 
now with students providing direct counseling services? Or has the amount of time 
spent not changed?  
b. Are teachers less willing now, as a result of the CPIP’s emphasis on testing, to allow 
students to be removed from class time to participate in school counseling activities? 
3. Support from Teachers/Administrators 
a. Because of the CPIP, are teachers now less supportive of school counseling 
activities? 
b. What are your perceptions of the level of support from administrators for school 
counselors now that the CPIP has been implemented? Has the importance of school 
counseling been minimized because of the focus of the CPIP? Or has the level of 
support from administrators remained unchanged? 
4. Impact on students 
a. From your perspective, what impact has the CPIP had on student learning at Fountain 
Lake? 
b. Has the CPIP resulted in extra anxiety or stress for students? 
c. What other changes, if any, have you seen in students (from a counseling perspective) 
that may have been a direct result of the CPIP? 
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Appendix D – Core and Non-Core Teacher Surveys 
The Fountain Lake School District and the Office for Education Policy are interested in 
knowing what teachers think of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP). The attached 
survey is intended to gauge your thoughts on the CPIP performance pay program at your 
school, including what impact you think the program has had on the culture of the school and 
on student achievement (among other things). Please feel free to answer openly and honestly, 
as your individual answers will be kept completely confidential. Thank you for your time! (and 
remember, you are eligible for one of four $25 gift cards if you complete the survey!) 
  For the statements below, please check the 
circle that accurately reflects your 
attitudes. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be 
paid more than teachers who are less 
“effective.” 
 
 
   
2.  The NWEA assessments provide more useful 
information than Arkansas-specific 
assessments (i.e. Arkansas Benchmark) 
 
 
   
3.  I have altered my approach to teaching this 
year based on feedback from other teachers 
on how I could improve my classroom 
practices. 
 
 
   
4. I am an “effective” teacher.  
 
   
5. The NWEA assessments are a valuable use of 
instructional time. 
 
 
   
6. The bonus I receive will be based more on 
my effectiveness as a teacher than on the 
abilities of my students. 
 
 
   
7. I am more likely to have a larger 
performance pay bonus if I work with the 
higher performing students. 
 
 
   
8. If another teacher receives a large bonus, it 
will be harder for me to get a large bonus. 
 
 
   
9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in 
improvements in the test scores of his/her 
students. 
 
 
   
10. The NWEA assessments have been useful in 
improving student achievement across the 
school/district. 
 
 
   
11. The NWEA assessments provide an accurate 
measure of my students’ actual learning. 
 
 
   
12. Teachers with the same level of educational 
training who have worked for the same 
amount of time should be paid the same. 
 
 
   
13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for 
improving student achievement. 
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14. The current CPIP bonus amount for which I 
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my 
hard work. 
 
 
   
15. Standardized assessments used in the CPIP 
are comprehensive measures of what 
students should be learning. 
 
 
   
16. I believe the CPIP has improved the 
educational outcomes for students in my 
school. 
 
 
   
17. Students at my school had higher levels of 
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus 
on testing. 
 
 
   
18.  Because of the CPIP, I have sought out 
additional training (education, professional 
development, etc.) to improve my teaching. 
 
 
   
19. If the CPIP performance pay program 
remains in place at my school, I may seek out 
other teaching opportunities. 
 
 
   
20.  Without the CPIP performance pay program, 
I would not stay at my current school. 
 
 
   
21. Teachers now compete with each other 
instead of working together as a result of the 
CPIP. 
 
 
   
22. I have noticed more teachers at my school 
working together because of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
23. Teachers at my school have become more 
focused on raising student achievement as a 
result of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
24.  The content covered on the standardized 
assessments used in the CPIP is 
representative of what students should be 
learning. 
 
 
   
25.  Students at my school have learned more as a 
result of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
26.  My CPIP bonus will be larger if I work with 
the lowest performing students, since these 
are the students that could show the greatest 
amount of growth. 
 
 
   
27. Teachers at my school have investigated new 
teaching practices in order to improve their 
CPIP bonuses. 
 
 
   
28.  The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at 
my school. 
 
 
   
29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss 
various pedagogical practices with other 
teachers at my school. 
 
 
   
30. I have witnessed other teachers working 
harder as a result of the CPIP. 
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Please provide any additional comments you might have about the Cobra Pride Incentive 
Program: 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for completing our survey! If you have any additional questions, please 
contact Nathan Jensen at (479) 575-3773, or njensen@uark.edu 
 
  
31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson 
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to 
share ideas with each other as a result of the 
CPIP. 
 
 
   
33.  The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my 
school to adopt new teaching strategies. 
 
 
   
34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP 
encourages me to help other teachers in my 
school. 
 
 
   
35. The CPIP has resulted in teachers only 
focusing on content covered on standardized 
tests. 
 
 
   
36.  The CPIP is fair.  
 
   
37. The CPIP encourages teachers to work with 
the highest performing students. 
 
 
   
38. The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress 
for teachers. 
 
 
   
39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-
year report card will accurately reflect my 
effectiveness as a teacher. 
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The Fountain Lake School District and the Office for Education Policy are interested in 
knowing what teachers think of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP). The attached 
survey is intended to gauge your thoughts on the CPIP performance pay program at your 
school, including what impact you think the program has had on the culture of the school and 
on student achievement (among other things). Please feel free to answer openly and honestly, 
as your individual answers will be kept completely confidential. Thank you for your time! (and 
remember, you are eligible for one of four $25 gift cards if you complete the survey!) 
  For the statements below, please check the 
circle that accurately reflects your 
attitudes. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be 
paid more than teachers who are less 
“effective.” 
 
 
   
2.  I have altered my approach to teaching this 
year based on feedback from other teachers 
on how I could improve my classroom 
practices. 
 
 
   
3. I am an “effective” teacher.  
 
   
4. If another teacher receives a large bonus, it 
will be harder for me to get a large bonus. 
 
 
   
5. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in 
improvements in the test scores of his/her 
students. 
 
 
   
6.  Without the CPIP performance pay program, 
I would not stay at my current school. 
 
 
   
7. The NWEA assessments have been useful in 
improving student achievement across the 
school/district. 
 
 
   
8. Teachers with the same level of educational 
training who have worked for the same 
amount of time should be paid the same. 
 
 
   
9. Teachers should be financially rewarded for 
improving student achievement. 
 
 
   
10. The current CPIP bonus amount for which I 
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my 
hard work. 
 
 
   
11. I believe the CPIP has improved the 
educational outcomes for students in my 
school. 
 
 
   
12. Students at my school had higher levels of 
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus 
on testing. 
 
 
   
13.  Because of the CPIP, I have sought out 
additional training (education, professional 
development, etc.) to improve my teaching. 
 
 
   
   204 
 
 
14. If the CPIP performance pay program 
remains in place at my school, I may seek out 
other teaching opportunities. 
 
 
   
15.  Without the CPIP performance pay program, 
I would not stay at my current school. 
 
 
   
16. Teachers now compete with each other 
instead of working together as a result of the 
CPIP. 
 
 
   
17. I have noticed more teachers at my school 
working together because of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
18. Teachers at my school have become more 
focused on raising student achievement as a 
result of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
19.  Students at my school have learned more as a 
result of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
20. Teachers at my school have investigated new 
teaching practices in order to improve their 
CPIP bonuses. 
 
 
   
21.  The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at 
my school. 
 
 
   
22. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss 
various pedagogical practices with other 
teachers at my school. 
 
 
   
23. I have witnessed other teachers working 
harder as a result of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
24. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson 
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP. 
 
 
   
25. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to 
share ideas with each other as a result of the 
CPIP. 
 
 
   
26.  The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my 
school to adopt new teaching strategies. 
 
 
   
27. The school-wide portion of the CPIP 
encourages me to help other teachers in my 
school. 
 
 
   
28. The CPIP has resulted in teachers only 
focusing on content covered on standardized 
tests. 
 
 
   
29.  The CPIP is fair.  
 
   
30. The CPIP encourages teachers to work with 
the highest performing students. 
 
 
   
31. The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress 
for teachers. 
 
 
   
32. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-
year report card will accurately reflect my 
effectiveness as a teacher. 
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Please provide any additional comments you might have about the Cobra Pride Incentive 
Program: 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for completing our survey! If you have any additional questions, please 
contact Nathan Jensen at (479) 575-3773, or njensen@uark.edu 
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Appendix E – Summary of Teacher Survey Responses, Spring & Fall 2011 
Fountain Lake Teacher Survey: Spring 2011 
Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP) 
  For the statements below, please check the 
circle that accurately reflects your 
attitudes. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be 
paid more than teachers who are less 
“effective.” 
8% 
 
20% 44% 27% 
2. * The NWEA assessments provide more useful 
information than Arkansas-specific 
assessments (i.e. Arkansas Benchmark) 
8% 
 
24% 60% 8% 
3.  I have altered my approach to teaching this 
year based on feedback from other teachers 
on how I could improve my classroom 
practices. 
12% 
 
42% 37% 9% 
4. I am an “effective” teacher. 0% 
 
0% 48% 52% 
5.* The NWEA assessments are a valuable use of 
instructional time. 
12% 
 
22% 56% 10% 
6.* The bonus I receive will be based more on 
my effectiveness as a teacher than on the 
abilities of my students. 
25% 
 
56% 15% 4% 
7.* I am more likely to have a larger 
performance pay bonus if I work with the 
higher performing students. 
20% 
 
51% 22% 8% 
8. If another teacher receives a large bonus, it 
will be harder for me to get a large bonus. 
24% 
 
73% 2% 1% 
9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in 
improvements in the test scores of his/her 
students. 
13% 
 
54% 30% 2% 
10. The NWEA assessments have been useful in 
improving student achievement across the 
school/district. 
19% 
 
26% 52% 3% 
11.* The NWEA assessments provide an accurate 
measure of my students’ actual learning. 
17% 
 
48% 33% 2% 
12. Teachers with the same level of educational 
training who have worked for the same 
amount of time should be paid the same. 
9% 
 
39% 40% 13% 
13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for 
improving student achievement. 
8% 
 
17% 56% 19% 
14. The current CPIP bonus amount for which I 
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my 
hard work. 
12% 
 
25% 45% 18% 
15.* Standardized assessments used in the CPIP 
are comprehensive measures of what 
students should be learning. 
6% 
 
23% 67% 4% 
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16. I believe the CPIP has improved the 
educational outcomes for students in my 
school. 
18% 
 
36% 42% 4% 
17. Students at my school had higher levels of 
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus 
on testing. 
10% 
 
43% 39% 8% 
18.  Because of the CPIP, I have sought out 
additional training (education, professional 
development, etc.) to improve my teaching. 
21% 
 
52% 22% 4% 
19. If the CPIP performance pay program 
remains in place at my school, I may seek out 
other teaching opportunities. 
30% 
 
54% 14% 1% 
20.  Without the CPIP performance pay program, 
I would not stay at my current school. 
46% 
 
53% 1% 0% 
21. Teachers now compete with each other 
instead of working together as a result of the 
CPIP. 
14% 
 
49% 32% 5% 
22. I have noticed more teachers at my school 
working together because of the CPIP. 
12% 
 
49% 33% 5% 
23. Teachers at my school have become more 
focused on raising student achievement as a 
result of the CPIP. 
7% 
 
20% 58% 15% 
24. * The content covered on the standardized 
assessments used in the CPIP is 
representative of what students should be 
learning. 
4% 
 
27% 65% 4% 
25.  Students at my school have learned more as a 
result of the CPIP. 
14% 
 
44% 40% 2% 
26. * My CPIP bonus will be larger if I work with 
the lowest performing students, since these 
are the students that could show the greatest 
amount of growth. 
6% 
 
40% 43% 11% 
27. Teachers at my school have investigated new 
teaching practices in order to improve their 
CPIP bonuses. 
9% 
 
44% 44% 2% 
28.  The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at 
my school. 
2% 
 
28% 48% 22% 
29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss 
various pedagogical practices with other 
teachers at my school. 
11% 
 
47% 38% 3% 
30. I have witnessed other teachers working 
harder as a result of the CPIP. 
8% 
 
40% 44% 8% 
31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson 
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP. 
11% 
 
43% 42% 3% 
32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to 
share ideas with each other as a result of the 
CPIP. 
15% 
 
69% 13% 3% 
33.  The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my 
school to adopt new teaching strategies. 
7% 
 
42% 49% 2% 
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*Indicates questions were only answered by core-teachers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP 
encourages me to help other teachers in my 
school. 
6% 
 
38% 50% 7% 
35. The CPIP has resulted in teachers only 
focusing on content covered on standardized 
tests. 
0% 
 
38% 50% 12% 
36.  The CPIP is fair. 23% 
 
40% 33% 4% 
37. The CPIP encourages teachers to work with 
the highest performing students. 
14% 
 
74% 10% 2% 
38. The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress 
for teachers. 
4% 
 
16% 45% 35% 
39. The CPIP merit rating I receive on my end-of-
year report card will accurately reflect my 
effectiveness as a teacher. 
24% 
 
60% 15% 0% 
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Fountain Lake Teacher Survey: Fall 2011 
Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP) 
  For the statements below, please check the 
circle that accurately reflects your 
attitudes. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Teachers who are more “effective” should be 
paid more than teachers who are less 
“effective.” 
2% 8% 66% 24% 
2. * The NWEA assessments provide more useful 
information than Arkansas-specific 
assessments (i.e. Arkansas Benchmark) 
13% 30% 43% 15% 
3.  I have altered my approach to teaching this 
year based on feedback from other teachers 
on how I could improve my classroom 
practices. 
17% 38% 40% 5% 
4. I am an “effective” teacher. 3% 
 
0% 44% 53% 
5.* The NWEA assessments are a valuable use of 
instructional time. 
10% 
 
35% 43% 13% 
6.* The bonus I received in 2010-11 was 
based more on my effectiveness as a 
teacher than on the abilities of my 
students. 
17% 
 
55% 29% 0% 
7.* I am more likely to have a larger 
performance pay bonus if I work with the 
higher performing students. 
8% 
 
41% 23% 28% 
8. If another teacher receives a large bonus, it 
will be harder for me to get a large bonus. 
22% 
 
53% 20% 5% 
9. The effectiveness of a teacher is reflected in 
improvements in the test scores of his/her 
students. 
17% 
 
41% 38% 5% 
10. The NWEA assessments have been useful in 
improving student achievement across the 
school/district. 
10% 
 
30% 56% 5% 
11.* The NWEA assessments provide an accurate 
measure of my students’ actual learning. 
13% 
 
46% 41% 0% 
12. Teachers with the same level of educational 
training who have worked for the same 
amount of time should be paid the same. 
16% 
 
36% 38% 10% 
13. Teachers should be financially rewarded for 
improving student achievement. 
3% 
 
19% 56% 22% 
14. The current CPIP bonus amount for which I 
am eligible is an appropriate reward for my 
hard work. 
13% 
 
25% 48% 13% 
15.* Standardized assessments used in the CPIP 
are comprehensive measures of what 
students should be learning. 
10% 
 
29% 59% 2% 
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16. I believe the CPIP has improved the 
educational outcomes for students in my 
school. 
15% 
 
43% 38% 3% 
17. Students at my school had higher levels of 
anxiety and stress because of the CPIP’s focus 
on testing. 
13% 
 
47% 29% 11% 
18.  Because of the CPIP, I have sought out 
additional training (education, professional 
development, etc.) to improve my teaching. 
13% 
 
63% 24% 0% 
19. If the CPIP performance pay program 
remains in place at my school, I may seek out 
other teaching opportunities. 
34% 
 
49% 11% 5% 
20.  The CPIP performance pay program is one of 
the main reasons why I stay at my current 
school. 
44% 
 
45% 9% 2% 
21. Teachers now compete with each other 
instead of working together as a result of the 
CPIP. 
13% 
 
47% 28% 13% 
22. I have noticed more teachers at my school 
working together because of the CPIP. 
11% 
 
50% 32% 6% 
23. Teachers at my school have become more 
focused on raising student achievement as a 
result of the CPIP. 
7% 
 
28% 59% 7% 
24. * The content covered on the standardized 
assessments used in the CPIP is 
representative of what students should be 
learning. 
5% 
 
28% 67% 0% 
25.  Students at my school have learned more as a 
result of the CPIP. 
13% 
 
49% 37% 2% 
26. * My CPIP bonus will be larger if I work with 
the lowest performing students, since these 
are the students that could show the greatest 
amount of growth. 
25% 
 
58% 18% 0% 
27. Teachers at my school have investigated new 
teaching practices in order to improve their 
CPIP bonuses. 
6% 
 
41% 51% 2% 
28.  The CPIP has led to “teaching to the test” at 
my school. 
2% 
 
25% 49% 25% 
29. The CPIP has encouraged me to discuss 
various pedagogical practices with other 
teachers at my school. 
6% 
 
48% 43% 3% 
30. I have witnessed other teachers working 
harder as a result of the CPIP. 
8% 
 
39% 50% 3% 
31. I have noticed an increased focus on lesson 
planning at my school as a result of the CPIP. 
5% 
 
43% 51% 2% 
32. I’ve noticed that teachers are not as likely to 
share ideas with each other as a result of the 
CPIP. 
11% 
 
73% 14% 2% 
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*Indicates questions were only answered by core-teachers  
33.  The CPIP has encouraged teachers at my 
school to adopt new teaching strategies. 
3% 
 
38% 54% 5% 
34. The school-wide portion of the CPIP 
encourages me to help other teachers in my 
school. 
5% 
 
43% 44% 8% 
35. The CPIP has resulted in teachers only 
focusing on content covered on standardized 
tests. 
2% 
 
27% 56% 15% 
36.  The CPIP is fair. 35% 
 
41% 17% 6% 
37. The CPIP encourages teachers to work with 
the highest performing students. 
7% 
 
62% 28% 3% 
38. The CPIP has resulted in anxiety and stress 
for teachers. 
3% 
 
11% 39% 47% 
39. The CPIP merit rating I received on my 
end-of-year report card (from 2010-11) 
accurately reflected my effectiveness as a 
teacher. 
21% 
 
33% 37% 9% 
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Appendix F – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: ITBS and Benchmark Regressions  
Table 24 
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Math  
Variable Mean Min Max SD N 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 0.50 0 1 0.50 998 
ITBS Math NCE ‘11 56.22 1 99 19.34 998 
SAT-10 Math NCE ‘10 60.53 6.7 99 19.90 998 
SAT-10 Math NCE ’09 60.75 1 99 20.03 965 
Grade 5 0.16 0 1 0.36 998 
Grade 6  0.16 0 1 0.37 998 
Grade 7 0.17 0 1 0.37 998 
Grade 8 0.18 0 1 0.39 998 
Grade 9 0.17 0 1 0.38 998 
FRL 0.56 0 1 0.50 991 
Minority 0.13 0 1 0.33 979 
Female 0.47 0 1 0.50 991 
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Table 25 
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Literacy  
Variable Mean Min Max SD N 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 0.50 0 1 0.50 998 
ITBS Literacy NCE ‘11 50.26 1 99 18.32 998 
SAT-10 Literacy NCE ‘10 51.61 1 99 18.26 998 
SAT-10 Literacy NCE ’09 49.68 1 99 18.91 961 
Grade 5 0.16 0 1 0.36 998 
Grade 6  0.16 0 1 0.37 998 
Grade 7 0.17 0 1 0.37 998 
Grade 8 0.19 0 1 0.39 998 
Grade 9 0.17 0 1 0.38 998 
FRL 0.56 0 1 0.50 996 
Minority 0.13 0 1 0.34 978 
Female 0.48 0 1 0.50 996 
 
    
 
Table 26 
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Math  
Variable Fountain 
Lake 
(Treat) 
ITBS 
‘11 
SAT-10 
‘10 
SAT-10 
‘09 
Grade 
5 
Grade 
6 
Grade 
7 
Grade 
8 
Grade 
9 
FRL Minority Female 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 1.00            
ITBS ‘11 -.011 1.00           
SAT-10 ‘10 .000 .742 1.00          
SAT-10 ‘09 -.004 .694 .756 1.00         
Grade 5 -.003 .024 .040 -.013 1.00        
Grade 6 .003 .012 .050 .109 -.189 1.00       
Grade 7 -.005 -.073 -.043 -.035 -.194 -.197 1.00      
Grade 8 .005 -.140 -.139 -.060 -.204 -.207 -.212 1.00     
Grade 9 .000 .057 .071 .009 -.197 -.200 -.205 -.216 1.00    
FRL -.054 -.243 -.265 -.243 .012 -.014 .047 .010 -.089 1.00   
Minority -.110 -.179 -.163 -.179 .009 .017 .045 -.013 -.050 .202 1.00  
Female .030 -.003 .012 .025 -.039 .086 -.031 -.022 .029 -.060 -.030 1.00 
 
 
 
 
2
1
3
 
    
 
Table 27 
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in ITBS Regression Analysis-Literacy  
Variable Fountain 
Lake 
(Treat) 
ITBS 
‘11 
SAT-10 
‘10 
SAT-10 
‘09 
Grade 
5 
Grade 
6 
Grade 
7 
Grade 
8 
Grade 
9 
FRL Minority Female 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 1.00            
ITBS ‘11 -.043 1.00           
SAT-10 ‘10 .000 .756 1.00          
SAT-10 ‘09 .005 .738 .821 1.00         
Grade 5 .000 .010 .072 -.078 1.00        
Grade 6 .003 .015 .050 .025 -.189 1.00       
Grade 7 .000 -.049 -.011 .004 -.192 -.196 1.00      
Grade 8 -.003 -.124 -.064 -.072 -.205 -.209 -.213 1.00     
Grade 9 .000 .114 .011 .132 -.196 -.200 -.204 -.218 1.00    
FRL -.063 -.325 -.340 -.334 .034 .005 .052 .007 -.096 1.00   
Minority -.129 -.127 -.181 -.172 .024 .016 -.021 .022 -.083 .236 1.00  
Female .006 .219 .181 .192 -.013 -.007 -.017 -.009 .032 -.067 -.006 1.00 
 
2
1
3
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Table 28 
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Math  
Variable Mean Min Max SD N 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 0.50 0 1 0.50 668 
Scale Score ‘11 718.09 437 969 93.59 668 
Scale Score ‘10 698.97 395 959 95.53 667 
Scale Score ‘09 657.96 85 962 105.57 650 
Grade 6  0.24 0 1 0.43 668 
Grade 7 0.25 0 1 0.43 668 
Grade 8 0.27 0 1 0.45 668 
FRL 0.57 0 1 0.50 665 
Minority 0.14 0 1 0.34 654 
Female 0.46 0 1 0.50 665 
 
Table 29 
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Literacy  
Variable Mean Min Max SD N 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 0.50 0 1 0.50 668 
Scale Score ‘11 754.53 222 990 152.56 668 
Scale Score ‘10 715.75 132 972 157.92 666 
Scale Score ’09 661.18 21 967 171.52 649 
Grade 6  0.24 0 1 0.43 668 
Grade 7 0.25 0 1 0.43 668 
Grade 8 0.28 0 1 0.45 668 
FRL 0.59 0 1 0.49 666 
Minority 0.14 0 1 0.35 653 
Female 0.46 0 1 0.50 666 
 
 Table 30 
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Math  
Variable Fountain 
Lake 
(Treat) 
Scale 
Score 
‘11 
Scale 
Score 
‘10 
Scale 
Score 
‘09 
Grade 
6 
Grade 
7 
Grade 
8 
FRL Minority Female 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 1.00          
Scale Score ‘11 -.034 1.00         
Scale Score ‘10 .022 .821 1.00        
Scale Score ‘09 .013 .755 .815 1.00       
Grade 6 .004 .076 -.064 -.030 1.00      
Grade 7 -.007 .057 .103 .018 -.327 1.00     
Grade 8 .007 .003 .196 .306 -.345 -.355 1.00    
FRL -.026 -.243 -.223 -.229 -.035 .043 -.007 1.00   
Minority -.114 -.177 -.148 -.158 .004 .038 -.035 .192 1.00  
Female .029 .058 .018 .051 .112 -.037 -.026 -.097 -.029 1.00 
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 Table 31 
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables Used in Benchmark Regression Analysis-Literacy  
Variable Fountain 
Lake 
(Treat) 
Scale 
Score 
‘11 
Scale 
Score 
‘10 
Scale 
Score 
‘09 
Grade 
6 
Grade 
7 
Grade 
8 
FRL Minority Female 
Fountain Lake (Treat) 1.00          
Scale Score ‘11 .006 1.00         
Scale Score ‘10 -.009 .794 1.00        
Scale Score ‘09 .025 .771 .802 1.00       
Grade 6 .004 -.041 .009 .010 1.00      
Grade 7 .000 -.024 .039 .087 -.324 1.00     
Grade 8 -.003 .109 .010 .085 -.349 -.356 1.00    
FRL -.058 -.305 -.296 -.309 -.024 .036 -.024 1.00   
Minority -.126 -.097 -.132 -.138 .008 -.039 .013 .239 1.00  
Female .027 .218 .213 .185 .005 -.007 .004 -.076 -.006 1.00 
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